Volume 27, 2018
María Jimena Clavel Vázquez
La destrucción de la metafísica como ausencia en M. Heidegger
During the project of the fundamental ontology, Heidegger refers to destruction as a moment of phenomenology –among other two that are equally constitutive– which has a mainly historical character. Now, this paper aims to show that the notion of philosophy as destruction is intensified as Heidegger’s thought moved forward. Destruction, in Heidegger’s first lectures, demands an analysis on both the limits and possibilities of the philosophical tradition. It is in this analysis when we come to realize that the question of being has been forgotten; that, instead of that, we have privileged the question of beings. In this way, destruction allows us to discover the absence of Being and, therefore, the horizon from which it must be answered: time. On the lectures that came after Being and Time, Heidegger shows that the absence unveiled by the destructive analysis is based on the character of Dasein itself. This being is constituted by the absence of beings, by nothing. Philosophy is, therefore, destruction in the most radical way, because its task is to show the metaphysical character of Dasein. It is only because of this task that philosophy in this destructive manner is historical.