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Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy

Volume 53, 2008

Theory of Knowledge

Baron Reed
Pages 217-225
DOI: 10.5840/wcp2220085330

Fallibilism and the Lottery paradox

Any theory of knowledge that is fallibilist—i.e., that allows for one to have knowledge that could have been false or accidentally true—faces the lottery paradox. The paradox arises from the combination of two plausible claims: first, no one can know that one’s lottery ticket will lose prior to learning that it in fact has lost, and, second, the justification one has for the belief that one’s ticket will lose is just as good as the justification one has for paradigmatic instances of knowledge. In this paper, I offer a solution to the lottery paradox that is grounded in a thorough-going acceptance of fallibilism.