Volume 45, 2008
Philosophy of Religion
Plantinga and Leibniz’s the best world
An atheist argument usually goes like this. If God exists and is omnipotent as believed, He could have created any possible world as he pleased. The existence of moral evil, though, makes problematic the existence of God, or His omnipotence at least. Plantinga's answer to an atheist is: it is not that God, as omnipotent, could have created any possible world as he pleased, but rather it is that God, even though omnipotent, could not have created the world as he pleased. In chapter 2, I formulate an atheist's view of moral evil which resulted from the free will of human beings, and examine Plantinga's view that distinguishes between an act of creation, and an act of actualization of state of affairs. He asserts that creation of earth, heaven, or Socrates can be attributed to God, but the actualization of necessary states of affairs, and among contingent states of affairs, false possible states of affairs cannot be attributed to God. In chapter 3, I explain Plantinga's view that God cannot be held responsible for actualizing state of affairs implemented by free choice, and that human action with free will can only be attributed to human being, not to God. In chaper 4, I will criticize Plantinga's view not to be a genuine compatibilism between the existence of God and moral evil, and sketch the compatibilism between providential determinism and moral evil.