Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy

Volume 42, 2008

Philosophy of Mind

Gang Chen
Pages 13-42

Perception Dualism and Free Will

This paper is to spell out a version of perception dualism, whose ontological description of the mind-body relation is stronger than property dualism but weaker than substance dualism, that is, to define mental events as perceptions from an internal point of view and physical events as perceptions from an external point of view, then, the author set out to tackle some long-persisting ontological issues in philosophy of mind, such as the psycho-physical interaction, the criterion of mind, the clash between free will and natural necessity, Benjamin Libet’s Experiment. It also recovers some of the observations and conclusions achieved by Cartesian internalism and Leibniz’s parallelism. Since perception is the most essential feature of mind, while defining mental and physical events in terms of perception, the author also develops a philosophical theory of perception.