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Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy

Volume 39, 2008

Philosophy of Language

Mario Gomez-Torrente
Pages 49-54

The Private Language Argument and the Analogy between Rules and Grounds

I identify one neglected source of support for a Kripkean reading of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: the analogy between rules and epistemic grounds and the existence of a Kripkean anti-privacy argument about epistemic grounds in On Certainty. This latter argument supports Kripke’s claims that the basic anti-privacy argument in the Investigations (a) poses a question about the distinguishability of certain first-person attributions with identical assertability conditions, (b) concludes that distinguishability is provided by third-person evaluability, and (c) is a general argument, not one about a specific kind of alleged rules.