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Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy

Volume 16, 2008

Modern Philosophy

Hye-Jin Lee
Pages 283-291
DOI: 10.5840/wcp22200816867

Eine andere Art von Gefühl der Lust beim Kantischen Geschmacksurteil

Kant points out the pleasure of the universal communicability of the judgment of taste in the 7th passage of § 9 in the Critique of Judgment. He promises to discuss the subject in a transcendental context further after discussing the Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments. However, he seems to limit his discussion only in an empirical context, neglecting his own commitment. I differentiate the kind of pleasure (which Kant mentioned in the 7th passage) from the intrinsic pleasure of the pure judgment of taste. The latter refers the pleasure in 'the harmonious play of the cognitive powers' stimulated by 'the merely formal purposiveness of a representation of an object'. It seems to have been overlooked that the pleasure of the universal communicability is independent from the intrinsic pleasure of the pure judgment of taste. My goal is to define the another feeling of pleasure by focusing on the analysis of the § 42 where Kant discusses the possibility of one's interest combined with a pure judgment of taste. I come to the conclusion that another feeling of pleasure is a sort of practical pleasure. It is an interested pleasure in fulfilling the notion of generalizability of one’s state of mind, which is relevant to a moral judgment. Therefore, such pleasure is not actually common to everyone, as Kant insists in § 42, but restricted to those who have already developed the moral interest.

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