Volume 8, 2008
Comparative Philosophy
Elias Capriles
Pages 31-37
Heidegger’s Misreception of Buddhist Philosophy
Heidegger attempted a “hermeneutics of human experience” that, by switching from the ontic to the ontological dimension, yet maintaining a phenomenological εποχη would bring to light the true meaning of being and, by the same stroke, ascertain the structures of being in human experience. It is now well known that Heidegger drew from Buddhism. However, in human experience being and its structures appear to be ultimately true, and since Heidegger at no
point went beyond samsara, he failed to realize the phenomenon of being to be one of the two essential aspects of the most basic of delusive phenomena, which is the threefold apparitional structure produced by the threefold thought structure (Tibetan, ’khor-gsum), and therefore, instead of achieving a genuinely ontological understanding of being and its structures, he came to the wrong view of identifying being (the understanding of which was a priori in a somehow non-Kantian sense that will not be discussed here) with truth and taking the ontological structures of samsara to be somehow given. The problem is that he used the term Being (das Sein) roughly as a synonym of Buddha-nature, Tao and so on: whereas the latter is unthinkable and inexpressible, for Heidegger the word “being” is not an empty word, for it has its “appellative force.” In fact, for him it is not a mere sound or written sign that brings nothing to our mind; on the contrary, it causes us to immediately conceive something, and what we thus conceive manifests in our experience as a (non-Kantian) phenomenon.