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Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia

Volume 25, Issue 2, May 2010

Marta Jorba
Pages 187-196

Is There A Specific Experience of Thinking?

In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.

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