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Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia

Volume 15, Issue 2, Mayo 2000

Max Kölbel
Pages 209-228

A Criterion for Objectivity

There are many reasons to assume that the contents expressible by declarative sentences are generally truth-evaluable (reasons stemming from semantics, logic and considerations about truth). This assumption of global truth-evaluability, however, appears to conflict with the view that the contents of some sentences do not admit of truth or falsehood for lack of objectivity of their subject matter. Could there be a notion of truth on which the truth-evaluability of a content does not rule out the non-objectivity of its subject matter? In this paper, I discuss Crispin Wright's criterion of Cognitive Command as a criterion for objectivity. This criterion faces the Problem of A Priori Error. I reject Wright's response to that problem and propose to solve the problem by relativising truth. This move allows for the possibility of contents that are truth-evaluable yet non-objective.

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