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Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia

Volume 12, Issue 3, Septiembre 1997

Eric Oberheim, Paul Hoyningen-Huene
Pages 447-465

Incommensurability, Realism, and Meta-Incommensurability

The essay begins with a detailed consideration of the introduction of incommensurability by Feyerabend in 1962 which exposes several historically inaccurate claims about incommensurability. Section 2 is a coneise argument against causal theories of reference as used as arguments against incommensurability. We object to this strategy because it begs the question by presupposing realism. Section 3 introduces and discusses a hypothesis that w'e call meta-incommensurability which provides the reason for the wide-spread accusation of question-begging and use of circular argumentation among the proponents of both realist and non-realist interpretations of science.

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