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Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia

Volume 12, Issue 1, Enero 1997

Stuart Silvers
Pages 163-184

Nonreductive Naturalism

Nonreductive naturalism holds that we can preserve the (scientifically valued) metaphysical truth of physicalism while averting the methodological mistakes of reductionism. Acceptable scientific explanation need not (in some cases cannot and in many cases, should not) be formulated in the language of physical science. Persuasive arguments about the properties of phenomenal consciousness purport to show that physicalism is false, namely that phenomenal experience is a nonphysical fact. I examine two recent, comprehensive efforts to naturalize phenomenal consciousness and argue that nonreductive naturalism yields a dilemma of reductionism or panpsychism.

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