Volume 10, Issue 1, Enero 1995
Amedeo G. Conte
Deóntica de la negación en Jerzy Sztykgold
This essay deals with the concept of negation in Deontics. In relation with this concept, the polish logician Jerzy Sztykgold seems to put forward (in Negation of the norm, 1936) these two thesis: a) a norm may have a negation; b) a norm may be a negation. Sztykgold studies the concept of Inegation of a norm through the analysis of other two concepts (the concept of “insubsistence” or absence (brak) of a right or of a duty and the concept of opposition of behaviour), and, as early as 1936, he puts hirnself in a clear position in relation to the problem of the possibility of a logic of norms: There is a deontic analogon
of truth, which is the słuszność (‘rightness’; ‘rightfulness’) consequently, for the norms, entities of which the słuszność is predicated, are valid the thesis of the propositional logic that are valid for the apophantic sentences.