Volume 7, Issue 1/2/3, Octubre 1992
Toma A and Toma B
EIs fets negatius en el «Tractatus Logico-Philosphicus»
In this paper I offer an interpretation of those paragraphs of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus in which Wittgenstein talks about negative facts. In my opinion we cannot conclude that Wittgenstein held that negative facts have actual existence, as RusselI, for example, did.
By means of a kind of journey through several possible interpretations, I arrive to the conclusion that negative facts are nothing but non-effective possibilities; they are in the logical space, in the field of possible worlds, but they have no actual existence, they are not inhabitants of the world. Finally, it is suggested that, insofar as pictures are facts, the only negative facts were, for Wittgenstein, the negative pictures and not what those pictures depict.