Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science

Volume 4, Issue 1, Octubre/Enero 1988/1989

Monismo metodológico y dualismo analítico, teórico y semiótico en la Filosofía del Derecho

In this paper, a series of observations have been made on the pecularities originated by the Theory of Law as an autonomous subject within the wider framework of the Philosophy of Law. The object of these observations is not, however, the Theory of Law in genere but the Theory of Law as understood and defended by some Italian Philosophers of Law of the so-called ‘Bobbio School’. As a result of this examination, it can be seen how a methodological approach to the legal phenomenon does not prevent the existence of a series of dualistic attitudes at three levels: 1) the conception of philosophical analysis (therapy or construction); 2) the status of metajurisprudence (descriptive or prescriptive); 3) the emphasis on meaning (constancy or variability). Subsequently, with reference to certain manifestations which arise from the second of these levels, the dual category (descriptive/prescriptive) is revised and submitted to the instrumentality of the Theory of Law both intentionally and effectively.