Volume 1, Issue 2, 1985
Formalización en teoría de tipos del predicado de existencia de Mario Bunge
Professor Bunge makes the distinction between the logical concept of existence and the ontological one. I agree with him and in this paper I am formalizing his existence predicate into the powerful language of type theory.
I am also proving the logical equivalence of this for mulation with a briefer one, which says that to exist conceptually is the same as to be a conceptual object. Accordingly, from this point on I investigate what conceptual objects are. I reach the conclusion that it is better to study a restricted area each time, where existence could even be assigned in different degrees. For instance, in set theory -like in Animal Farm of Orwell every set exists but so me “exist more” than others. Of course, in relating degrees of existence to degrees of definability I am not following Bunge.