PDC Homepage
Home » Products » Purchase


Volume 16, Issue 2, Fall/Automne 2012

Husserl and the Göttingen Circle

Eric J. Mohr
Pages 218-234

Phenomenological Intuition and the Problem of Philosophy as Method and Science
Scheler and Husserl

Scheler subjects Husserl’s categorial intuition to a critique, which calls into question the very methodological procedure of phenomenology. Scheler’s divergence from Husserl with respect to whether sensory or categorial contents furnish the foundation of the act of intuition leads into a more significant divergence with respect to whether phenomenology should, primarily, be considered a form of science to which a specific methodology applies. Philosophical methods, according to Scheler, must presuppose, and not distract from, important preconditions of knowledge that pertain more to the philosopher than to logical procedure. Accordingly, the phenomenological attitude serves as a foundation for, and is not the result of, the phenomenological method.

Usage and Metrics