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Studia Phaenomenologica

Volume 15, 2015

Early Phenomenology

Hynek Janoušek
Pages 105-128

Judgmental Force and Assertion in Brentano and Early Husserl

The goal of the present article is to describe the Brentanian background of several topics concerning judgments and assertions in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Why did Husserl abandon Brentano’s theory of two judgmental forces? Is the “is true/false” to be understood as an expression of judgmental force or as a logical predication? Is a “common expression” of the objective validity of judgment equivalent with our expression of our belief in that validity? Does the linguistic sign of the logical force manifest this force or not? In order to provide a better understanding of Husserl’s approach, the paper also discusses his earlier views on these issues in recently published manuscripts from the early 1890s and in his Logic Lectures from the year 1896.

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