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Studia Phaenomenologica

Volume 10, 2010

Phenomenology and Psychology

Maria Gyemant
Pages 77-90
DOI: 10.7761/SP.10.77

Objet et contenu
L’intentionnalité husserlienne face à son héritage psychologiste

This paper aims to show how Husserl’s concept of intentionality detaches itself from the background of a thorough and recurrent argument that Husserl makes against psychologism. Noting that the concept of intentionality was first recovered by Brentano’s psychology, it seemed to us important to show how Husserl’s intentionality, as it is conceived in the Logical Investigations, distinguishes itself from the “intentional inexistence” that Brentano describes in his Psychology from an Empirical Stand­point. Showing which parts of Brentano’s psychology were rejected and which were maintained in Husserl’s theory is indeed the first concern of those who intend to study the phenomenological concept of intentionality.

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