Studia Neoaristotelica

Volume 19, Issue 3, 2022

Series Bohemoslovaca

Tomáš EdlOrcid-ID
Pages 1-31

V čem je kouzlo neurčenosti
Příspěvek ke sporu o (i)racionalitu racionálního kompatibilismu

Leaving aside many of the topics present in the Peroutka vs. Novák (in)compatibilist exchange in this journal, I focus on the core claim of libertarianism: that the availability of alternative possibilities (AP) is a necessary condition of freedom of the will and freedom of action. Therefore freedom and moral responsibility for one’s action requires some indeterminacy in the moment of choice being present. Contrary to what Peroutka defends in his rational compatibilism I argue that compatibilist accounts of authorship and control are not sufficient to fulfil the sourcehood condition, acknowledged by them as necessary. I maintain instead, in light of contemporary incompatibilist literature, that alternative possibilities are also important for giving a convincing account of sourcehood. I further discuss the case of innate intuition of moral laws and actions being necessarily performed upon such intuition suggested by Peroutka. I consider several interpretations of this case and argue that the libertarian one, grounded on Robert Kane’s notion of self-forming actions, seems to be the most plausible.