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Studia Neoaristotelica

Volume 12, Issue 3, 2015

A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism

David Peroutka
Pages 26-44
DOI: 10.5840/studneoar201512312

Racionální kompatibilismus

According to compatibilism it is possible that an election or volition of A is truly free even if the elector cannot want – ceteris paribus – the opposite alternative (non-A). The version of compatibilism propounded in the paper is “rational” in so much as the admitted unidirectional determining factors of volition are not physical causes but rather rational reasons. We may posit this compatibilism only in case of volitions that we assess to be morally good (since moral obligation to decide diff erently implies real possibility of such diff erent volition, according to “Kantian” dictum). Particularly interesting – within the ethical sphere – is the case of moral commitment, because it constitutes a kind of necessity (obligation). Such a moral necessity (when appropriately cognized by a moral agent) may imply a certain necessity of a corresponding choice. The theory of rational compatibilism allows us to unite moral necessity and human freedom.

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