Studia Neoaristotelica

Volume 2, Issue 1, 2005

A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism

Jan Palkoska
Pages 39-66

„Corpus non est Substantia, sed modus tantum Entis“ leibniz o fenomenalitě látkového světa
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism

The aim of this article is to present and analyze the argumentative structures which are decisive for Leibniz’s position regarding the issue of the ontological status of material things (or bodies) and matter. I reconstruct and thoroughly analyze (i) two different argumentative strategies of Leibniz’s – viz. an “epistemic” and a “realistic” one – for his general thesis that nothing material (and a fortiori no body) has rigore metaphysico the status of a substance, as well as (ii) the corresponding suggestions of his as to how the material world is to be construed out of substances and their modes. Throughout, I lay special emphasis on pinpointing the real key elements of Leibniz’s arguments and on articulating them in such terms that would allow for their direct confrontation with other paradigmatic positions regarding the issue in Leibniz’s times.