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Studia Philosophica

Volume 60, Issue 1, 2013

Klaus Vieweg
Pages 3-18

Morální světový názor. K Hegelově kritice praktického rozumu transcendentální filosofie

The transition from morality to the morals involves the dissolution of the antagonism of the moral, the overcoming of the antinomy of constant obligation. In his Wissenschaft der Logik, Hegel focuses on the logical defect of endless progress “mostly in its ap­plication to morality“ (RPh, § 268). Pure will and the moral law on the one hand, and nature and empiricality on the other “presuppose each other as fully independent and mutually indifferent“, and thus the opposition is postulated as an axiom, which excludes its overcoming the antagonism. The antagonism “does not dissolve in infinite progress. It is, on the contrary, depicted as unsolved and unsolvable, and thus confirmed“. The result is “the very same antagonism that stood at the beginning“ (RPh, § 269 an.). The progress ad infinitum exhibits itself as antagonism that unjustly points to itself as a solution of what contradicts itself (WdL 5, p. 166). The real overcoming of this antinomy fails; the idea of the Judgment Day solution owes the answer and is only an expression of excessive gentleness towards the world. Antinomies and collisions in moral action in the end separate, which implies the persistence in insuperable antinomy. Another topic would be a detailed exposition of Hegel’s solution proposal. In any case, Hegel sees the naturalness of speculative thought in the necessity to think the ideality of both of the opposing sides, that is, to understand them beforehand as the moment of the concept of moral action, see them as opposing in their moving unity and think them as the transition from morality to the moral action, the morals, in which the antagonism of the moral is not abstractly lost, but elevated, guarded and overcome.