The Review of Metaphysics

Volume 65, Issue 3, March 2012

The Principles of the First Critique

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant claims that he is offering a science of reason grounded on principles.  Given Kant’s frequent but diverse use of the term “principle” throughout the work, it is unclear what exactly this term is supposed to signify, whether there are more or less fundamental principles and on what basis, and whether there is supposed to be some way in which the diverse instances of them are related to form a unified science of theoretical reason.  The aim of this paper is to offer a theory of Kant’s principles that will provide answers to these questions.  First, the article clarifies what Kant understands by the term “principle” by briefly looking to his metaphysics lectures and then to the use of the term by two thinkers contemporary and influential to Kant—namely, Hume and Newton.  The resulting hypothesis is that Kant conceives of principles in an Aristotelian fashion.  While it is common to think of Kant’s theory of theoretical reason as uncovering the formal principles of cognition, the article next argues that such principles should be understood in the broader context of Kant’s teleological conception of theoretical reason, which contains also efficient transcendental principles, and whose unifying transcendental principle is a final cognitive aim.  Finally, the article suggests that this teleological conception of reason has implications for a proper understanding of the highly disputed metaphysical results of the Critique.