The author argues that Quijano’s conceptualization of race within the theory of coloniality of power is limited and theoretically insufficient given its lack of elaboration regarding the role of anti-Blackness in Spanish colonization. This article contrasts the idea of coloniality of power with Cedric Robinson’s elaboration of racial capitalism to demonstrates how Robinson has a more complex and historically rich analysis of race that centers the expansion of racial capitalism with the invention of the Negro subject. The article closes with an attempt to bridge the history of anti-Blackness and the idea of coloniality using Sylvia Wynter’s adaptation of the idea of coloniality, which is attentive to the Portuguese expeditions prior to Columbus and how coloniality disproportionally affected people of African descent in the Américas.

In recent years, Rosi Braidotti has proposed to explore the “intersectionality” of natural, social and technological determinations in order to provide a non-dualistic theoretical framework for what she defines as the “critical posthumanities.” In this paper, I polemically engage with Braidotti’s theoretical project by reconstructing the methodological principle through which she endeavors to disentangle the dualisms presupposed by anthropocentrism and humanism. I will argue that the upshot of this methodological procedure is a hypostatization of subjective structures into reality which in turn facilitates an ontological transposition of the political concept of inclusiveness. In highlighting the formal procedure of inclusion by which the posthuman subject conceptualizes difference, this article provides a set of objections to Braidotti’s methodology by evaluating it in terms of the Marxian critique of speculative abstractions.

This paper discusses two thinkers who locate the possibility of revolutionary historical change in political projects oriented toward the formation of subjects and cultivation of sensibility. I begin by considering the relationship between historical violence and education in the works of Walter Benjamin. After introducing the provocative association of education with divine violence found in “Toward the Critique of Violence,” I expand on Benjamin’s conception of pedagogical force. Highlighting the centrality of education in Benjamin’s early work, I argue that his account of learning does not depend on the mastery of students by teachers, nor more generally on the mastery of objective reality by a sovereign subject, but on the mastery of the educational relationship by tradition. Drawing on W. E. B. Du Bois’s discussion of the abolition of slavery, I close by describing the revolutionary cultivation of sensibility as a dynamic and collectively achieved mode of historical learning.

This paper, inspired by Duke University historian Nancy MacLean’s extraordinary book Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America (2017), elaborates the carefully calibrated, multifaceted plan by a billionaire-funded facet of the radical right, deeply disturbed by the fact that so many students have critical views of capitalism, to transform American universities. Its multi-pronged strategy involves the following three steps: (1) Reconfigure the financial superstructure of higher education. Cut public funding for higher education and fill the gap with strategic donor giving. (2) Purge and Recruit: remove left-leaning faculty, develop a counter-intelligentsia of libertarian faculty, and foster the creation of libertarian student organizations on campus. (3) Undermine the general public’s respect for and trust in our colleges and universities by manufacturing controversies that attract widespread attention. This paper examines each of these in detail, with particular attention given to the myriad of privately funded institutional “think tanks” involved in the process.

In Theory of the Partisan, Carl Schmitt outlines a theory of the history of the partisan beginning in 1808, when the Spanish guerilla defeated Napoleon. After that modern nation states began to integrate guerilla war tactics in their strategies. According to Schmitt, this development was intensified during the 20th century, but in a dangerous manner. Arguably, Russia’s actions in Ukraine 2014 and 2022 suggest that Schmitt’s conception is still relevant for understanding extreme political situations. But why do sovereign states need the partisan? The big loser in this development, however, is the partisan himself, who gets exploited and instrumentalized by regular political actors. Even if Schmitt advocates a less extreme way of using the partisan, he arguably helps placing it under the rule of state actors, a tactic Putin’s Russia deploys in action. Therefore, a political rehabilitation of the partisan from its exploitation is very needed.

The narrow-the-scope proposal for defining racism posits that a narrow definition is preferable to a wide definition because the former better facilitates interracial dialogue. Important critiques of the narrow-the-scope proposal have so far focused on the content of narrow definitions. This paper argues that it is important to critique the use of narrow definitions, as well. An examination of white uses of the term “racism” reveals that narrow definitions tend to be interchangeable with individualist definitions, as individualism is an effective framework for white co-optation in the service of white interests. Consequently, philosophers interested in theorizing racism for racial justice purposes ought to reject the narrow-the-scope proposal. Individualist forms of racism should be accommodated within a wide conception of racism that centers the phenomenon of white racism.

Here I both celebrate and critique the legacy of Charles W. Mills. I begin by offering some reflections on the trajectory of Mills’s career and intellectual development, focusing on his move from Marxist philosophy to the philosophy of race. I then attempt to undermine an argument in Mills’s final book, for why those interested in emancipation should choose liberalism over Marxism. By contrasting Mills with the late Italian Marxist philosopher of history Domenico Losurdo, with whom Mills shared a blistering critique of ‘racial’ liberalism but whom I claim Mills misread, I seek to weaken key premises in Mills’s argument.

This paper revisits an aspect of Charles Mills’s work that is usually overlooked, namely, his early engagement with the tradition of analytical Marxism, particularly in From Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism and Black Radicalism (2003). This collection of essays is important not only because it marks Mills’s intellectual trajectory, but also because, as I aim to show in the following, it allows us to trace the source of Mills’s radicalism. I argue that Mills’s radicalism locates the causal source of social change in the material conditions of oppression. I then show how this analysis of Mills’s radicalism can help in clarifying his critique of ideal theory and his insistence on the importance of nonideal theory. I end by considering the relation between class and racial oppression in Mills’s early Marxist work.

Charles Mills’s philosophical work provides a standpoint from which white philosophers can engage philosophical questions about race by demonstrating that the concept of race is relevant to the study of Western political philosophy, by developing the critical concept of white supremacy, and by critiquing the failure of liberal political philosophy to address the history of race-based chattel slavery in the US and the British empire. Nonetheless, the social contractarian methodology of Mills’s philosophical work is flawed because of its individualistic social ontology, its reliance on structured ignorance rather than situated knowledge to attain objective knowledge about society, and its inability to fulfill its promise to generate a generalized account of race-related injustice that applies to all societies at all times.

I examine how James Baldwin explored white ignorance—as conceived by Charles Mills—in his work. I argue that Baldwin helps us understand Mills’s account of white ignorance more deeply, showing that while only mentioned briefly by Mills, Baldwin provides fruitful insights into the phenomenon. I also consider the resources Baldwin provides to find a way out of white ignorance. My aim is to link these thinkers in ways that have been largely ignored.

This is a memorial essay on how the life and work of Charles W. Mills influenced my development as a Black philosopher. Employing Mills’s use of the Jamaican creole term smadditizin’—meaning “becoming recognized as somebody in a world where, primarily because of race, it is denied”—I trace how Mills helped me become a human self myself. Inspired by using his books as texts in courses I taught, and working with him in the Radical Philosophy Association, I learned what it means to be an engaged philosopher. This essay also explores the controversy surrounding radical Black liberalism as a means for attaining personhood. Finally, I defend Mills as a canonical radical philosopher who never wavered from his fierce anti-colonialist, anti-white supremacist, and anti-capitalist stances.

Charles Mills adhered to the highest standards of philosophical scholarship, while seeing his work firmly as a contribution to the cause of social justice. He had a deep appreciation for historical context and a history of ideas approach to racial/philosophical questions. He was one of the foremost Rawls interpreters or our time, though only a few years before his passing was he so recognized. He channeled his analytic training in his habit of demonstrating how a view is strengthened when an author shows how objections can be systematically replied to. I wish he had tried to integrate class and race into a larger theoretical system, of both an explanatory and normative character. Class is sometimes an unnoted presence in his explanation of white supremacy. Charles saw himself contributing to a collective scholarly social justice project and was happy to acknowledge the greater expertise of others in allied areas to his.

In memoriam and ongoing engagement, I begin with my earlier critical interpretation and a reinterpretation that shows how Mills was prescient, given the recrudescence of white supremacy now daily evident in the United States. This leads to an historical analysis of the racial contract as the racist contract and of the racist contract as the racist compact. The racist compact endures in society, outside of government, but protected by democracy. This creates backlash and obstruction to progress that progressives often fail to predict. Influenced by Mills and through a shift in his emphases, I propose humanitarianism. Global ideas of humanitarianism bypass nonwhite racial identities are more general than them, and they bypass the white supremacist racial conceptual scheme of hierarchical races.

As Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have observed, de-moralization—the retreat of normative regulation from specific areas of human life—represents an under-theorized component of the study of moral change. However, Buchanan and Powell, like Philip Kitcher, focus exclusively on instances of de-moralization that they regard as morally progressive. Indeed, the existing literature on moral change is almost silent on the matter of moral regression, and doubly so on the matter of regressive de-moralization. This paper attempts to define and defend a particular, contractualist account of regressive de-moralization as both historically well-documented and a matter of contemporary concern.

In this article, the author argues that anti-colonial Marxism has been obscured and distorted by the contemporary post-Cold War imaginary. The author analyzes the historical-political context in which the narrative of Marxism and decolonization develop during and after the Cold War. Focusing on the writings of Frantz Fanon, Amílcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara, the author reconstructs the “principles” of anti-colonial Marxism, attempting to ameliorate the scholarly deficit of theoretical literature on the anti-colonial Marxist tradition. In conclusion, the author argues that the “revolutionary theory” of these thinkers remains relevant to persistent, present-day conditions of neocolonialism and capitalist imperialism, becoming increasingly relevant with the progression of catastrophic climate change.

In the United States, Protestant Christian identity is the dominant religious identity. Protestant Christian identity confers status privileges, yet also creates objectionable status inequalities. Historical and contemporary evidence includes the unfair treatment of Mormons, Native Americans, Muslims, and other religious minorities. Protestant Christian supremacy also plays a significant role in bolstering anti LGBTQ prejudice, xenophobia, and white supremacy. Ways that Protestant Christian identity correlates with objectionable status inequalities are often neglected in contemporary political philosophy. This paper aims to make a modest contribution towards filling that gap. Some forms of inequality linked to Protestant Christian supremacy can be characterized as domination and oppression. Other instances include barriers to fair equality of opportunity for self-determination. Adapting ideas from egalitarian political philosophy I propose an analysis of objectionable status inequality rooted in Protestant Christian supremacy. Alan Patten’s defense of an egalitarian principle for assessing the effects of law and policy is helpful for this task.

This essay elaborates on Rodolfo Corky Gonzales’s “Yo soy Joaquín” as an inter-American articulation of the critical commitments of Chicanismo, which is here identified as the sociopolitical philosophy and ideological/normative leanings of Mexican Americans who call(ed) themselves Chicanas/os. The purpose of this essay is to show both how syncretism frames Chicanismo as a philosophy of growth and identity beyond borders and that this worldview can be critically explained as seeking alliances to communities and contexts defined by struggle. It engages the historical groundwork, philosophical influences on, and cultural ideals and values voiced through this poem by proponents of Chicanismo among its multiple forms and various representatives.

Leftist political theory remains trapped between two dominant conceptions of sovereignty: the liberal conception of popular sovereignty and the decisionist conception of sovereignty as the power to declare a state of exception. This essay offers a historical critique of the liberal and decisionist conceptions of sovereignty and develops a descriptive theory of aristocratic sovereignty, which is more suited to the history and the needs of radical political theory and praxis. By tracing the genealogy of sovereignty through early modern European political thought to the founding of the United States, this essay reveals the debilitating shortcoming of notions of sovereignty derived from both Carl Schmitt and the liberal tradition and provides a basis for a distinctively radical analysis of the sovereign aristocracy in Amerika.

I argue that while recognition is important for Middle Eastern and North African philosophers in academia and society, recognition alone should not define the anti-colonial movement. BDS provides a better model of engagement because it constructs identities in order to bring about material changes in the academy and beyond. In the first part of the essay, I catalog how MENA thought traditions have been and continue to be suppressed within the academy and philosophy in particular. I then sketch one possible path to better representation in philosophy by reading Fayez Sayegh’s analyses of Zionist colonialism and Palestinian non-being. In the second half of the essay, I argue that BDS is among the premier anti-colonial movements on American campuses today because it is a materialist anti-racist movement. Insofar as that movement is often shunned and prohibited, an anti-colonial society offers a membership in exile.

Humanities advocates focus on demonstrating the humanities’ value to encourage participation. This advocacy is largely done through institutional means, and rarely taken directly to the public. This article argues that by reframing the theory of Direct Action, humanities advocates can effectively engage the public. The article begins by exploring three different understandings of the humanities: that they develop good citizenship, that they develop understanding, and that they develop critical thought. The article then discusses what Direct Action is and how it works. The article concludes by describing how to reframe Direct Action to suit the needs of the humanities, including potential actions that will achieve those ends. Humanities Direct Action must be seen as a debate and will focus on increasing critical thinking.

In this article, I explore the contrast between the recent George Floyd protests and the lockdowns immediately prior by situating these rebellions in the context of Foucault’s disciplinary society and subsequent scholarship on biopolitical management. I assert that the disciplinary mechanisms operative in finance/debt, policing and epidemiological management of the virus share similar epistemological assumptions stemming from liberal individualism. The revolutionary character of these uprisings therefore stems from their epistemological subversions of the predictable individual, and this figure’s spatiotemporal situatedness, a construction that helps power make claims on our collective future. The protests push us to see beyond a strict Foucauldian reading of this moment to uncover the metastatic status of identities in rebellion, which sustain resistance to disciplinary society’s epistemological foundations.

What forms of collective political action conceivably might offer the best prospects for radical, transformative change in the context of a planet currently in crisis, and characterized by intersecting struggles for environmental, economic, social, and racial justice? The concept of radical subjectivity that Herbert Marcuse developed throughout his life and work can provide social movement theorists, organizations and activists with valuable theoretical and practical resources to identify, encourage, and further develop new and emerging forms of political agency and activism, and thereby contribute to the mobilization of contemporary social movements seeking to address these crises and their underlying causes. This concept, when critically reevaluated and appropriated in light of more recent insights about the nature of subjectivity and political agency as well as in the context of these contemporary struggles, can assist in the development of a theory and practice that might be adequate to address the multiple global crises currently confronting humanity and other forms of life on Earth.

How should we conceptualize direct action against climate change? Although direct action is an increasingly significant tactic by the global climate movement, we lack understanding how direct action contributes to the systemic change necessary for addressing the crisis. Drawing upon critical theories of climate change as a crisis in the social reproduction of the metabolic relations between humans and nature in capitalism, I conceptualize direct action as attempts to intervene directly in the organization of the social metabolism, towards reorganizing these relations in a more socially just and ecologically sustainable manner. My framework thus expands and clarifies the scope and potential of direct action as a means of confronting the capitalist climate crisis, as evidenced by Greta Thunberg’s school strike for climate.

I argue that environmental ignorance is a group-based form of substantive ignorance that is analogous to race-based ignorance, showing that they are structurally and functionally similar and sometimes overlap. While race theorists offer promising solutions toward eliminating race-based ignorance, I argue that something far more is needed in the environmental case. I turn to panpsychism as a possible solution. Though I conclude that it is too radical for most Americans to willingly embrace, I incorporate a notion of “encounter” to argue that an expanded conception of home helps with the conceptual overhaul needed to overcome environmental ignorance.

This article addresses the place of situationist ideas in the current drive to make meaningful social and political change to avoid the catastrophic consequences of climate change. After a brief review of some key situationist concepts, the article shows how situationist thinkers post-1968 saw the prospect of environmental degradation as one of the key consequences of the social apathy induced by the spectacle and the grim prospects for the prevailing liberal assemblage of power to address the problem. The article concludes by briefly discussing the place of a situationist-inspired environmentalism in the larger debates about radical solutions to climate change.

What if we fail to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and so face its more severe impacts? I argue that asking this question reveals a new obligation of climate justice: contingency planning for severe climate change. Surprisingly, such plans are already being drafted. But the politics behind them is neoliberal and militarist. I identify the epistemology of futurity motivating contingency planning—possibilism—and argue that we can and should dissociate it from, and redeploy it against, neoliberal militarism.

The alt-right is an online subculture marked by its devotion to the execution of a racist, misogynistic, and xenophobic politics through trolling, pranking, meme-making, and mass murder. It is this devotion to far-right politics through the discordant conjunction of humor and suicidal violence this article seeks to explain by situating the movement for the first time within its constitutive online relationships. This article adds to the existing literature by viewing the online relationships of the alt-right through the genealogy of propaganda. Through situating the alt-right alongside the genealogy of propaganda, the article offers new insights into the social isolation, increasingly extreme social and political positions, nihilism, and violence that have emerged within the alt-right. The article concludes by applying the lessons of the alt-right for online organizing across the political spectrum and argues that a class-based politics of the left is an important part of countering the rise of the alt-right.

In Autopoiesis and Cognition (1980), Humberto R. Maturana and Franscico J. Varela state that “the way an autopoietic system maintains its identity depends on its particular way of being autopoietic, that is, on its particular structure, different classes of autopoietic systems have different classes of ontogenies” (98). With this in mind, in this article I develop how this conception of autopoietic systems is both present in, and operates through, Wynter’s employment of space and place, poetry, and wonder.

Many fear that climate change will lead to the collapse of civilization. I argue both that this is unlikely and that the fear is potentially harmful. Using examples from recent disasters I argue that climate change is more likely to intensify the existing social order—a truly terrifying prospect. The fear of civilizational collapse is part of the climate crisis; it makes us fear change and prevents us from imagining different social relations which is necessary if we are to survive the coming disasters and prevent further escalation. Using affect theory, I claim that our visions of the future affect our ability to act in the present. Rather than imagining a terrifying societal breakdown, we can look at how communities have survived recent disasters to get an image of what we need to expand upon to prepare for the future.

In his essay “Critique of Violence,” Walter Benjamin argued that only certain types of strikes can be considered revolutionary, while others—i.e., most bread and butter, or “political” strikes—tacitly rely on the violent logics of the state. This paper suggests, however, that by reading Benjamin against himself and applying his discussion of “pure means” to those “political” strikes, the extent to which even these basic collective actions represent effective “strategies of resistance” becomes evident. This framework requires an interdisciplinary approach to radical labor studies, combining political theory with history in order to identify and analyze past instances of joyful community-building during strikes. Relying also on a historical case study—the 1926 miners’ lockout in South Wales—and Benjamin’s own writings on the discipline of history, this paper contends that strikes, and the “alternative communities” they encourage workers and their families to build, present enormous revolutionary potential. When theory and history are studied together, and when we pay close attention to the actual tactics of solidarity that make up strike actions, this potential is uncovered.

This article seeks to develop a concept I term surveillant citizenship, referring to a historically-emergent civic national and moral discourse that prescribes citizen participation in surveillance, policing, and law enforcement. Drawing on philosophy of race, surveillance studies, critical prison studies, and cultural theory, I argue that the ideological projects attached to the ‘War on Crime’ and the ‘War on Drugs’ sought to choreograph white social life around surveillant citizenship—manufacturing consent to police militarization, prison expansion, and mass incarceration, with consequences relevant to the future of antiracist strategy.

This essay examines the poem “Angelitos Negros” as a description of social inequity underlain by Latin-American histories of colonialism. Following Nancy Fraser, I analyze the poem as an illustration of the perils of embracing “identity politics” separated from redistributive claims. As Fraser notices, contemporary critique is often content elevating identity struggles to the foreground while simultaneously pushing wealth redistribution to the background. In this light, the paper concludes proposing the Zapatista revolution as an example of a movement whereby claims of identity and redistribution have been successfully combined to produce social change in a manner that responds to the issues that “Angelitos Negros” evinces.

A central challenge common to democratic processes is the inability of citizens to reach agreement on any given matter. Most frequently these disagreements are settled by vote, victory going to the majority. But majority rule is a fairly recent technique. Traditionally decisions were made by some form of non-opposition. This paper describes several versions of that decision-making technique and then shows how mediation methods, also known as “ADR” (Alternative Dispute Resolution), can replicate these traditional ways of overcoming disagreement. The paper argues that these techniques are frequently superior to electoral methods of reaching agreement.

The colonial process constituted a twofold catastrophe. On the one hand, the genocide and enslavement of racialized bodies, along with the large-scale destruction of their lands was a material, or physical, catastrophe. On the other hand, colonialism led to a reconfiguring of intersubjectivities which constituted a “metaphysical catastrophe” according Puerto Rican philosopher Nelson Maldonado-Torres. This metaphysical catastrophe relegates the racialized subject beneath the zones of being and non-being leading to dehumanization and permanent war. This text intends to illuminate ways in which analectical marronage, as an existential state of Being, resists this twofold catastrophe brought about by the imperial enterprise.

As we witness the collapse of the neoliberal consensus and the subsequent rise of authoritarian ‘strong men’ and xenophobic nationalisms across the globe, the capitalist hegemony that was consolidated by the neoliberal project remains very much intact. In pursuit of a sane alternative to this post-neoliberal world order this article proposes love as a key concept for political theory/philosophy and for performing a central role in the revolutionary transformation of contemporary global capitalism. Through a close reading of the works of Emma Goldman and Michael Hardt, and specifically their own pursuit of a political concept of love—I draw on, and make links with contemporary ideas of love as a political concept for radical social transformation in the twenty-first century. I argue that new love-based political subjectivities, practices, and group formations offer exciting opportunities for a reimagining of the frame within which an alter-globalisation can occur, and link theory to praxis by introducing an ongoing Collective Visioning project which illuminates a new post-capitalist, post-patriarchal, post-colonial and post-anthropocentric synergetic politics grounded in revolutionary love.

In Climate Leviathan, Mann and Wainwright address the political implications of climate change by theorizing four possible planetary futures: Climate Leviathan as capitalist planetary sovereignty, Climate Mao as non-capitalist planetary sovereignty, Climate Behemoth as capitalist non-planetary sovereignty, and Climate X as non-capitalist non-planetary sovereignty. The authors of the present article agree that the depth and scale of destabilizations induced by climate change cannot be navigated justly from within the present social-political-economic system. We disagree, however, on which of the non-capitalist orientations is better suited for generating viable alternatives to the worst dystopian futures. The article thus stages a debate to elucidate the theoretical and political divergence between Climate X and Climate Mao (renamed Climate Jacobin).

In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges. Although I concur that same-sex couples should have the right to marry if anyone does, I argue that civil marriage is an unjust institution. By examining the claims employed in the majority opinion, I expose the Court’s romanticized, patriarchal view of marriage. I critique four central claims: (1) that marriage is central to individual autonomy and liberty; (2) that civil marriage is uniquely valuable; (3) that marriage “safeguards” children and families; and (4) that marriage is fundamental to civil society.

We argue that violent political protest is justified in a generally just society when violence is required to send a message about the nature of the injustice at issue, and when it is not ruled out by moral or pragmatic considerations. Focusing on protest as a mode of public address, we argue that its communicative function can sometimes justify or require the use of violence. The injustice at the heart of the Baltimore protests—police brutality against black Americans—is a paradigmatic case of this sort, because of the rela­tionship of the police to the injustice and the protests against it.

In this article I tease out a conception of reason in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s writings that is both decoupled from Enlightenment notions of human nature, progress, and transcendental truth, as well as auto-critically engaged with the anti-authoritarian Enlightenment ethos of anarchist thought. In so doing, I hope to reveal how the Proudhonian deployment of reason retained a healthy skepticism of foundationalism, philosophical systems-building, and the intellectualism bred of its dogmatic excesses as well as reconsider Proudhon’s relation to our most privileged faculty.

This paper critically examines violence, and our shared responsibility for it. Drawing on insights from Jean-Paul Sartre, I develop the correlation between scarcity and violence, emphasizing scarcity as agential lack that results from conditions of oppression and domination. In order to develop this correlation between scarcity and violence, I examine the racial dimension of violence in the U.S. Following this analysis, I claim that we all share responsibility for the social structural processes in which we participate that produce scarcity. On these grounds, I argue for the imperative of democratic equality, i.e., conditions for the self-development and self-determination of all.

In this article, I argue that justice is necessarily inapplicable to the global scale, since there is no such thing as a global society in the proper sense. I examine why this is so, and criticize two types of arguments for global justice—maximalist conceptions (such as those of Charles Beitz and Allen Buchanan) that argue for a robust notion of redistribution on the global scale, and minimalist conceptions (such as those of Thomas Pogge and Iris Young) that argue for a notion of redress or solidarity across borders.

The Correctional Service of Canada is currently re-instituting animal-based agribusiness programs in two federal penitentiaries. To situate the contemporary function of such programs, I provide a historical overview of prison agriculture in relation to Canadian nation-making. I argue that penitentiary farms have functioned as a means of prison expansion and settler territorialisation. While support for agricultural programming is rooted in its perceived facilitation of rehabilitation and vocational training, I show that these justifications are untenable. Rather the prison farm ought to be viewed as an institution made possible by and that reproduces, settler colonial power relations to animals, labour, and territory. Prison agribusiness is then an expression of colonial, agricultural, and carceral powers.

In the United States today, much interpersonal racism is driven by corrupt forms of self-preservation. Drawing from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, I refer to this as self-love racism. The byproduct of socially-induced racial anxieties and perceived threats to one’s physical or social wellbeing, self-love racism is the protective attachment to the racialized dimensions of one’s social status, wealth, privilege, and/or identity. Examples include police officer related shootings of unarmed Black Americans, anti-immigrant sentiment, and the resurgence of unabashed white supremacy. This form of racism is defined less by the introduction of racism into the world and more on the perpetuation of racially unjust socioeconomic and political structures. My theory, therefore, works at the intersection of the interpersonal and structural by offering an account of moral complacency in racist social structures. My goal is to reorient the directionality of philosophical work on racism by questioning the sense of innocence at the core of white ways-of-being.

This article examines Alain Badiou’s and Slavoj Žižek’s advocacy for fidelity to revolutionary truths in light of complex system theory’s understanding of resiliency. It begins with a discussion of how Badiou and Žižek describe truth. Next, it looks at the features that make a complex system resilient. The article argues that if we understand neoliberalism as a resilient system, then the fidelity to revolutionary truths that Badiou and Žižek advocate is not enough, for it doesn’t realize how truths come from the system as a whole. The article concludes by describing how this viewpoint alters discussions of political change.

I begin by briefly reconstructing Honneth’s concept of reification. His paradigm gives the reification of the non-human environment a marginal position in comparison to the reification of human beings, thereby detracting from its explanatory and critical potential. In order to avoid this outcome, I subsequently present a paradigm of subject identity formation in which not only affectively-based intersubjective interactions but also affectively-based interactions with the non-human environment are, in both a “genetic” and a “conceptual” sense, essential to establish an objective and meaningful relationship with external reality. On the basis of this paradigm a closer connection can be identified between the reification of human beings and the reification of the non-human environment—a connection in which the reification of the latter may reinforce human reification (and vice versa).

Marcuse argues that society must be evaluated in terms of its unrealized potentialities. Potentialities are formulated by the imagination, which has an essential cognitive function in revealing what things might be. Utopian thinking, thinking that transcends the given facts toward their potentialities, is thus rational in Marcuse’s view. His explanation for this claim draws on Hegel, Marx, and phenomenology. With Freud, Marcuse elaborates the historical limits and possibilities of the imagination as an expression of Eros. Utopia is the historical realization in a refashioned world of the rational contents of the imagination.

While the decolonial turn calls into question the broad structure of Western knowledge projects, it also suggests an investigation of the central objects and categories of these projects. This study undertakes this latter investigation in relation to Marxist theory. Starting from the work of Frantz Fanon and contemporary theorists of coloniality, I consider three central figures in the Marxian critique of capital: enclosure, valorization, and real subsumption. Interrogating familiar and heterodox accounts of these figures, my analysis exposes an architecture of injury that comprehends the structure of value and that articulates a process of extended violation working beyond the dialectic.

This paper tackles an old, yet persisting philosophical and cultural imaginary that justifies the political subjugation, marginalization and exclusion of distant others through claims that such people are less advanced and cognitively inferior, and therefore remain at the periphery of moral and political considerations of Western political culture. My premise here is that all knowledge is historically conditioned, and as such serves as a discursive formation that mirrors and sustains specific historical forms of social organization and practices. Thus, by considering the interrelated themes of epistemic and social inclusion (and exclusion) of refugees and migrants from a range of critical philosophical perspectives, I argue that successfully managing the dire humanitarian circumstances involved in admitting and receiving displaced and migrant people requires the inclusion of both the bodies of knowledge and discursive interactions (i.e., epistemic inclusion) and also diverse social and cultural perspectives (i.e., social inclusion).

Liberation philosophy was born from radical, socialist roots. Yet recent developments by major figures in the tradition, including Enrique Dussel, would appear to position the movement unhelpfully closer to liberalism. The present article argues that this is a misconception, and that Liberation philosophy rather suggests a new ideal for conceptions of political justice, one that also helpfully avoids a number of common objections that dog traditional socialist proposals. The work of John Rawls is used as a dialogical counter point to suggest the relative merits for the new approach Liberation philosophy suggest for socialism.

In this paper I argue that Nancy Fraser’s theory of social reproduction is misleading and that the process of exploitation is more central to women’s oppression than Fraser’s theory suggests. I argue that Fraser’s theory of women’s oppression is continuous with her theory of capitalism and political agency. I critique Fraser’s theory of capitalism at a structural level to clarify some of the ambiguity in her position about the difference between production and reproduction. I then compare Fraser’s view with a structural view of class to make my critique and extend it to her theoretical distinction between status and class.

The paper reflects on the methods democratic systems use for arriving at decisions. The most popular ones are elections where the majority rules and deliberative democracy. I argue that both of these do not measure up to the demands of democracy. Whether we use voting with majority rule or deliberative methods, only a portion of the citizenry is allowed to rule itself; minorities are always excluded. Instead of voting with majority ruler or deliberative methods, I suggest that we employ mediation (ADR) to reach agreement in democratic publics.

Instead of understanding property and rationality individualistically as in capitalism, the ecological crisis makes it imperative that we change the priority to the social/collective point of view. Public goods/commonstock should be the default, and private property should have to be justified. Rationality should be understood not primarily from an individual perspective, but from a social/collective point of view. This does not entail the sacrifice of individual rights and freedom to the collective, but rather the synthesis of the two. Planning and freedom coincide if the planning is democratic, which can only happen in a more egalitarian society.

Extreme monetary policies successfully prevented the “Great Recession” of 2007–2009 from turning into a global depression. However, they did not address the underlying problems in global capitalism. In recent years prominent “insiders” of global capitalism have proposed reforms designed to remedy these defects. I argue that these proposals are inadequate, due in great part to a failure to acknowledge a profound change in the “deep structure” of capitalism. Technological change, which in the past has contributed so much to the dynamism of capitalism development, no longer does so. The need for extreme monetary policies in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2007–2009, the failure of these policies, and the lack of plausible alternatives to them, are all symptoms of an underlying disease beyond cure. A path towards a democratic form of socialism must be forged for the simple yet compelling reason Rosa Luxemburg articulated: it is a matter of socialism or barbarism.

We are facing a terrifying moment in human history, but also a miraculous moment. At the very time when climate change threatens our species with extinction, we not only know that we face an existential threat, we have the means not only to avert catastrophe, but to provide virtually everybody on our planet with the material means for decent life. This paper asks, and attempts to answer, a series of questions: Why are we not doing what needs to be done? Is there a viable alternative to our current economic order? What then should I do?

In recent decades, the literature of global ethics has promoted greater and more rigorous attention to transnational moral responsibilities. This essay argues, however, that prominent global-ethics anthologies remain burdened by Eurocentric/colonialist elements that contradict efforts to build more ethical transnational communities. Drawing on scholars of coloniality, including Enrique Dussel, Anibal Quijano, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith, the essay traces colonialist elements in deep structures of prominent global ethics texts. It examines how, even when texts argue for aid to the poor, these elements foster tendencies in the affluent world to detach from and dehumanize people on the other side of global hierarchies. They also deprive academic readers of the insights of grassroots global-justice struggles. The essay concludes by sketching some directions that those of us who study and teach global ethics might pursue in order to unsettle colonialist baggage and cultivate skills and relationships more conducive to ethical global communities.

This paper considers the radical democratic theory of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau with reference to the recent rise of Right-wing populism. I argue that even as Mouffe and Laclau develop a critical political ontology that regards democracy as an end in itself, they simultaneously exclude certain elements of the demos. In other words, they appeal to formal categories but decide the political content in advance, disqualifying Right-wing movements and discourses without justification. This ambivalence between form and content reveals the limits of Mouffe and Laclau’s brand of radical democracy for understanding and critiquing the present political conjuncture.

This paper critically examines the ways in which dominant poly discourses position polyamorists among other queer and feminist-friendly practices while setting polygamists outside of those practices as the heteronormative and hyper-patriarchal antithesis to queer kinship. I begin by examining the interlocking liberal discourses of freedom, secularism and egalitarianism that frame the putative distinction between polyamory and polygamy. I then argue that the discursive antinomies of polyamory/polygamy demarcate a distinction that has greater affective resonance than logical validity—an affective resonance, moreover, that is built on neocolonial framings of polygamy as barbaric and idealizations of polyamory that whitewash its practices.

This paper examines the contemporary social context in order to consider why Marcuse’s ideas, specifically those represented in One-Dimensional Man, do not resonate in the United States in the same way that they did when the book was published a half century ago. Although much of Marcuse’s analysis continues to be relevant for contemporary society, a fear of one-dimensional thinking has diminished. This is due, firstly, to scholarly defenses of populism. And secondly, it results from changes in international relations, the social and economic status of youth, and a more uniform reverence for technology.

This article engages a central argument of One-Dimensional Man: that a core register of power rests at the sensible level, within desires, needs and pleasures. Although this line of argument has been targeted by many readers as particularly problematic, this article proposes that it possesses significant resources for contemporary political thought. Where Marcuse has been described as a thinker of a bygone age, his reflections on power and sensibility possess vital resources to cognize power and agency in late modernity.

This essay seeks to read Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man and Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism together in the context of what Marcuse calls the “society without opposition.” It seeks to extract a conception of hope as method from within these two otherwise rather bleak analyses. Their shared conception of hope is understood as the attempt to speak from a conception of capitalism as hell, and to continue to speak anyway. The essay concludes by defending a conception of hope that haunts rather than a hope that promises.

In this essay, I defend the legacy of Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man and the relation it sketches between art, politics, and human instincts against detractors who see the work as defeatist. Through an examination of Marcuse’s use of ideas drawn from biology and aesthetics, I outline a creative politics that illustrates the manner in which new forms of human life might be created from the “bottom up,” through political struggle and artistic practice. I further compare these ideas to those of Jacques Rancière, Autonomist Marxism, and epigenetics in order to better understand the prescience of Marcuse’s thought and its continued relevance.

Today’s Left has inherited and internalized the rift that split the New Left. This split led to Alasdair MacIntyre’s Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and a Polemic, a book that angered many because of MacIntyre’s harsh treatment of Marcuse. I situate MacIntyre’s engagement with Marcuse against the background of the split in the New Left: on the one side, E. P. Thompson, MacIntyre, and those who then saw the revolutionary class in the proletariat, and on the other side, Perry Anderson, Robin Blackburn, and Marcuse who seemed to put their faith in radical student intellectuals, Third World movements, and identity politics. I examine—without polemics— this rift in search of a new basis for Left unity, particularly as regards the question of radical, working class subjectivity. I argue that we must draw from MacIntyre his concept of revolutionary practices and from Marcuse—in One-Dimensional Man and Eros and Civilization—the analysis of technological rationality, aesthetic reason, phantasy, and imagination.

Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man was a critique of late capitalist society in the 1960s, with its “one-dimensional” culture and consumer-based subjectivity shaped by the political economy. Such subjectivity constituted one of the foundations upon which the “administered society” rested. The nature of character structure, as historically instantiated, provided motivation to work, motivation to consume, modes of consciousness, and the disposition toward certain modes of social relatedness. Since the publication of One-Dimensional Man, the contradictions of capitalism have become glaring. At the same time, there are crises of subjectivity, as the traditional forms of selfhood and identity are ever less able to adapt to current circumstances. In Marcuse’s work, we saw major changes as the Freudian Self became obsolescent with the rise of the post-Freudian, Consuming Self. We now again see major transformations, with the rise of a new form of contemporary selfhood—multiple, contradictory, mutable, flexible, liquid, Protean.

The title of Herbert Marcuse’s famous book One-Dimensional Man implies the existence of one or more other dimensions beyond the one-dimensional. This essay theorizes two alternative and opposing dimensions—utopia and barbarism—and perhaps a fourth, the aesthetic dimension. This expanded treatment of the concept of dimensionality may be useful for generating theory and informing praxis in the struggle for liberation.

Taking Herbert Marcuse’s classic One-Dimensional Man as a critical point of departure, this contribution is framed around the insight that complex and contradictory underlying determinants in capitalism are subject to outcomes and appearances that are conceptualized as one-dimensioning. The latter involves reduction to multiple dimensions as opposed to a single dimension, or homogenisation for which presumed conformity to the market and monetisation are the most obvious manifestations. The argument is illustrated through an account of one-dimensioning within the history of economics as a discipline since the marginalist revolution of the 1870s, and through the rise of financialized neoliberalism.

In this essay I pay homage to one of the most important but neglected philosophers of liberation in Latin America, Luis Villoro, by considering what possible lessons we can learn from his philosophy about how to approach injustices in the Americas. Villoro was sympathetic to liberatory-leftist philosophies but he became concerned with the direction they took once they grew into philosophical movements centered on shared beliefs or on totalizing theories that presume global explanatory power. These movements became vulnerable to extremes or vices that undermine their liberatory promise. I examine some of these worrying tendencies among that body of literature roughly described as “decolonial thought” (e.g., Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo). After a concise presentation of Villoro and the decolonial turn, I consider four dangers that this new liberatory-leftist movement faces and why Villoro should be a significant voice as the decoloniality debate moves forward.

This paper argues that certain orientalist writings authorize the genocide of Arab peoples precisely by establishing the conditions for the impossibility of Arab death. Of particular import to this analysis is the nineteenth century philological work of famed orientalist Ernest Renan, who argues that Arabs are psychically inorganic because their language has never demonstrated the organic historical development characteristic of European peoples. The historico-logical impossibility of killing Arab peoples is essential not only if philosophers are going to grasp the rationale of the ongoing and often casual murder of Arabs, but also if scholars of race hope to comprehend the specificities of biopolitical racism, orientalizing racism, historical racism, animalizing racism, and so on.

This article aims to introduce Bell’s work to philosophical audiences while also presenting his work for consideration within our contemporary discussions of race and racism. Bell’s contributions to our understanding of race have gone largely unnoticed, and that those who consider themselves philosophers of race are unfamiliar with the contributions of the intellectual father of Critical Race Theory is not only a failure of intellectual scholarship, but it is also a missed opportunity to take seriously the claims of a legal, political, and philosophical titan. The first section of this paper seeks to present Bell’s paradigm of racial realism and its constituent components. The second section explores what has led to Bell’s near complete exclusion from the discipline of philosophy, and philosophy of race specifically. The third section addresses the contributions that Bell’s theories can make to our contemporary discussions of race within the discipline of philosophy.

Critical theory has recently charted the rise of an unprecedented wave of social acceleration transforming Western capitalism. Within that body of work, a tendency has emerged to frame this new temporality as a stable structure lacking in the possibility for visions of alternatives, let alone for substantive revolt or challenge. This essay argues that recent struggles like Occupy and 15-M experimented with an alternative, utopian temporality that challenged and disrupted acceleration, revealing the latter to be prone to generating and expanding the conditions of temporal struggle. Acceleration is therefore unstable, and cannot be adequately understood apart from its increasing cultivation of visions of and experiments in other temporalities.

Why hasn’t the Marx-inspired Left seized upon catastrophic climate change as the basis for reconceiving historical materialism and the contradictions fueling anticapitalist struggle in the twenty-first century? Defining core participants as energy users and abusers, anchored in the opposition to fossil-fueled profit and growth rather than in traditional class conflicts, the struggle to create a postcapitalist energy commons can become the leading edge of a more broadly conceived global struggle for a sustainable and just postcapitalist society. The new global movement will be enabled by technologies of green energy microproduction, an energy internet for sharing energy on postcapitalist grids, and efforts to create more sustainable community relationships and practices. Catastrophic climate change can become the occasion for reigniting a Marx-inspired sense of transformative agency and solidarity that will enable us to confront transnational capitalism globally and locally in ways that are beyond the imaginative bounds of the current paper.

Taking the work of Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, Hermeneutic Communism, as a point of departure, this essay explores the concept of pensiero debole (weak thought) and its application to progressive contemporary Latin American governments, which the authors describe as “communist in spirit.” The essay embraces pensiero debole as a method to disagree with Vattimo and Zabala’s assessment and to contrast the policies of state capitalism carried out by those governments to the praxis of anti-systemic social movements engaged in a reformulation of territorial autonomy consonant with what John Holloway calls Change the World Without Taking Power.

Current struggles over laws prohibiting and criminalizing the public disclosure of violence in the spaces of animal use in the US have underscored the centrality of exposés to animal activism. This article complicates the activist belief in the power of exposure—“If slaughterhouses had glass walls . . .”—by drawing on the insights of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir concerning the prevalence of bad faith in systems of oppression and exploitation. I describe four forms of bad faith common to these systems, and offer suggestions for exposés of the animal enterprise modeled on Sartre’s and de Beauvoir’s “engaged exposés.”

Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century is not only a work of economic history and theory but also a political and normative argument and a critique of ideology. It is invaluable for its magisterial documentation of increasing inequality in capitalism, and unprecedented US economic inequality in particular. I situate it within philosophical conceptions of justice. I also identify it as a non-determinist critique of the political economy of capitalism and a substantive and methodological challenge to mainstream economics. I discuss not only what Piketty does not do, as some Marxists do, but what Piketty does do and summarize some of his central claims. I then discuss some problems in his work, some of which have not been addressed in the literature. In particular Piketty’s concept of labor income masks forms of capital, and given his arguments, gender and all women’s reproductive practices should have been addressed more fully.

This paper explores the historical conditions under which the object of humanitarian discourse is conceived and organized. What is problematic about this discourse is not only the alarming reality of humanitarianism’s intertwinement with militarism and political power, but also the calculated arbitrariness of redress that brings into question which norms guide public articulations of victims’ suffering. By questioning how a specific understanding of the other is formed, this paper aims to draw attention to the inconsistencies associated with the problematic relation between witnessing atrocities and the moral responses that this should entail.

This paper argues for the legitimacy of daydreaming as an important condition of a liberatory political vision, using a Marcusean framework to supplement and extend the critique of productivism recently made by Kathi Weeks. By differentiating free time from mere pastime, I show that daydreaming not only builds our political imagination, but it also reminds us of the value of unproductive free time. Situating Marcuse within a survey of the role of play and leisure in Aristotle, Schiller, and Marx, I show how Marcuse’s theory integrates neglected historical possibilities for reconceptualizing leisure as a right and not a luxury.

This essay explores the lasting theoretical value of Marcuse’s “repressive desublimation” via the psychoanalytic concepts of Žižek and Lacan. It argues that Marcuse’s theory should be adapted to include Lacanian notions of death drive and enjoyment, but also that it remains particularly suitable to structurally define consumer capitalist ideologies that incorporate both drive and immediate gratification to reinforce institutional patriarchy. Combining the theories then reveals a paradoxical demand to “enjoy responsibly,” which engenders various indirect rationalizations of Marcuse’s “performance principle.” This interpretation also points to various positive ideological beliefs with critical significance that exceeds Marcuse’s focus on their “higher unification.”

Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man is framed as a response to the “end of ideology” thesis of political equilibrium and a criticism of mainstream theoretical construction in advanced industrial countries. Such formulations obscured new forms of self-alienation in totally administered society, and replaced any conceived potential subjectivity with objective laws that govern social relations. One-Dimensional Man is also framed as a response to the “crisis of Marxism” by underscoring the importance of popular ideology in shaping subjective action, which at present, precludes proletarian revolution.

The paper will examine the critical psychoanalytical model of emancipation proposed by Herbert Marcuse. I will show that Marcuse’s critical model has two moments; one that I call negative, formulated around the idea of repressive sublimation—as developed by Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man—and another one that I call normative, which finds its roots in a very peculiar reading of Freudian narcissism and leads to the idea of nonrepressive sublimation. By this reading of Marcuse, I hope to circumscribe the role of psychoanalysis in the redefinition of the actual tasks of Critical Theory.

For Herbert Marcuse, rationality today—amidst advanced capitalism and neoliberalism—is not confronted with an external irrational universal, as it was in the earlier period of liberalism. “General ‘harmony’” is converted into a goal that pacifies because it is technically feasible. Through the critique of everyday experiences, it is possible to distinguish between how individuals immediately appear in actual society and what is essential to society and humanity—by revealing the dependency on capital as a dehumanizing factor. Dependency remains hidden in the relations between universals such as “capitalist society” and technical targets in the everyday lives of individuals. Only social movements that can decipher the rule of capitalism over everyday experiences have any chance of overcoming domination.

This article sets out to revisit Herbert Marcuse’s “transcendent project” of liberation, as well as his notion of “post-technological rationality,” which grounded this project, articulated in outline form in the last section of One-Dimensional Man and in fragments throughout his middle writings between 1955 and 1972. The aim is to assess this project’s continued validity for the struggle for alternatives to the disorganizations and enclosures of neoliberal capitalism and its perpetual moments of crises. This article first reviews Marcuse’s place within substantivist critiques of technology. It then works through how Marcuse’s “post-technological rationality”—the other side of his technology critique—envisions social change happening via a rerationalized, revalued, and reaestheticized technological base spurred by the openings for alternatives made possible by a reconstituted subjectivity, determinate negation, and moments of crisis.

This is the introductory essay for the first of two special issues of Radical Philosophy Review marking the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of one of the twentieth century’s most provocative, subversive, and widely read works of radical theory—Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964), which we now reassess in an effort to contribute to the critical theory of our time. What are the possibilities and limits of our current situation? What are the prospects for moving beyond one-dimensionality? A summary of each of the articles featured in this special issue is also provided.

The Marcusean concept of one-dimensionality is used to explore contradictions of organized labor. Since the original 1964 publication of One-Dimensional Man, the labor movement has suffered significant losses in membership and power. This essay examines the current relevance of Marcuse’s description of the increasing integration and collusion of organized labor with business, the loss of the union’s role as radical/revolutionary subject, and the containment of organized labor as an oppositional force. The specific mechanisms found in the structure, culture, logic, and legal constraints that characterize the deradicalization of organized labor are critically reviewed.

In the mid-twentieth century when One-Dimensional Man was first published, the rapid advance of technology was already beginning to render “labor”—that is, what is known as “work”—superfluous. In 2016, half a century later, the process of “work” is being made largely redundant, if not “unnecessary”: the material truth of capitalist society that can never be uttered since as “work” disappears, so does what was one of its functional cornerstones. This article seeks to contribute to identifying some of the trends in the early twenty-first century first outlined by Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man fifty years ago, in critically defining One-Dimensional Society in 2016.