

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

TRUTH AND PRACTICE. .

THE question whether there is a determinate and direct connection between the truth of a proposition and its practical utility is one which, besides being interesting in itself, has of late been very prominently brought before the notice of students of philosophy by the sharply controversial articles of Mr. F. H. Bradley¹ and Professor James and Mr. Schiller.² Hence, some general reflections on the precise nature of the logical problem involved can hardly fail to be opportune at the present moment. More particularly will they be opportune, if, as I almost venture to hope, the suggestions I am about to offer are adapted to serve to some extent as an *eirenicon* between the contending parties. That either side will accept my suggestions in their entirety is, indeed, much more than I dare to expect; *haud equidem tali me dignor honore*; but at least I believe they may be found serviceable as a basis for future discussion. May I add, that I shall at any rate try to pitch my remarks in the key appropriate to equable philosophic argumentation, and to avoid making any addition to the stock of subacid pleasantries and personalities in which the discussion of this particular problem is already so rich? My main object, then, in the present paper is less to offer a positive solution of the problem than to urge the necessity, as a preliminary to any solution, of a careful delimitation of the logical issue at stake from irrelevant extra-logical associations of a psychological kind by which it is in danger of being confused.³

¹ *Mind*, N. S., No. 51.

² *Ibid.*, No. 52.

³ I observe that Professor James, in the article above alluded to, makes a reference to a recent paper of my own in the *McGill University Magazine*, a periodical of which