

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

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Abhandlungen

Articles

<p>Richard ROUTLEY: The Theory of Objects as Commonsense . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">Meinong's theory of objects offers an alternative to entrenched logical theory which is nonreductionist, antiverificationist and commonsense. A beginning is made on proving that the theory is a commonsense one. This involves characterising refined commonsense and commonsense philosophy, upon sharpening the theses of the theory of objects, and indicating how these theses can, and do, fit into a commonsense position.</p>	<p>1</p>
<p>Nicholas GRIFFIN: The Independence of <i>Sosein</i> from <i>Sein</i> . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">The paper defends Meinong's theory of objects against criticism by Reinhardt Grossmann. In particular, it is argued that Grossmann fails to show that non-existent objects may not be constituents of states of affairs and fails to provide an adequate alternative analysis of states of affairs which putatively contain non-existent items. Grossmann, in fact, is guilty of a pervasive psychologistic misinterpretation of Meinong according to which Meinong believed that objects have all the properties with which they appear before the mind. Once this error is avoided, Meinong's theory not only escapes Grossmann's criticisms but has a high degree of plausibility.</p>	<p>23</p>
<p>Gary H. MERRILL: Marginal Notes on the Theory of Reference . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;">In 'Notes on the Theory of Reference' Quine offers a brief argument, based on Tarski's Convention T and semantic definition of truth, that the theory of meaning is 'in a worse state' than is the theory of reference and that the concepts of the theory of meaning are inherently more 'foggy and mysterious' than those of the theory of reference. A careful reconstruction of Quine's argument, however, is sufficient to show both that he covertly imposes a double standard of clarity on the two theories in question <i>and</i> that in so far as Tarski's contributions clarify or explicate the notion of truth they do likewise for the notion of analyticity. Consequently, the appeal which Quine makes to Tarski's definition of truth cannot be used in the manner he wishes, to draw a clear boundary between the theories of meaning and reference.</p>	<p>35</p>

- Jack W. MEILAND: Is Protagorean Relativism Self-Refuting? . . . . . 51  
 This paper first explains why the charge of self-refutation against extreme relativism is so important and then defends extreme relativism against two of the most recent and most sophisticated accusations of self-refutation. It is shown that these accusations seem plausible only because they illicitly employ principles appropriate only to absolute truth; hence these accusations are unsound. One central topic of discussion in the paper is the relation between “a believes that p” and “p is true for a”.
- Jules VUILLEMIN: On Duhem’s and Quine’s Theses . . . . . 69  
 The “Duhem-Quine thesis” says that isolated hypotheses are not singularly verifiable by experience, only the whole body of a theory being able to be subjected to the test of experience. I first examine the rather divergent meanings this thesis takes when it is replaced in the different contexts of Duhem’s and Quine’s philosophies. Secondly, questions are asked about the acceptability of the thesis, its logical strength and its historical soundness. Finally, the consequences of some doubts raised by this inquiry are examined especially with respect to Quine’s philosophy.
- Joseph AGASSI: Wissenschaft und Metaphysik . . . . . 97  
 The erroneous hostility to metaphysics is justified by the clashes between science and metaphysics plus the inability to allow clashes within science. The defenders of metaphysics as world-views offering intellectual frameworks for science have overlooked this fact. Einstein and Popper have legitimized the inclusion of clashes well within the domain of science. This resolves the difficulty of the allegiance to both. Science offers testable explanations and metaphysics comprehension; both are insufficient and conflict – yet thereby improve. Popper’s early rejection of metaphysics is rooted in his demand for maximal testability that he better withdraw.
- Gary ROSENKRANTZ: Haecceities and Perceptual Identification . . . 107  
 Russell maintained that a person can have knowledge about a particular only if he is acquainted with some particular. In a similar vein, Chisholm has argued that a person cannot identify a particular unless he identifies some particular *per se*. According to Chisholm, a person identifies a particular *per se* just in case he has knowledge of its *haecceity* or *individual essence*. Chisholm urges us to accept the following controversial claim concerning haecceities: none of us has knowledge of the haecceity of a particular physical object or person, x, when he perceives x by means of his senses, and picks x out as *that thing*. However, Chisholm

does not offer a compelling argument to support this claim. In this paper I aim to show that Chisholm's claim is fundamentally correct.

Neven SESARDIĆ: The Heritage of the Vienna Circle . . . . . 121

This article presents a criticism of the widespread assumption that the programme of the Vienna Circle has been proven to be unrealizable and, therefore, that it is today quite uninteresting and to be entirely abandoned. The basic aim of logical positivists was to raise philosophy to the rigour and high standards of contemporary science. It must be admitted that they were unsuccessful in their attempts to eliminate old-fashioned and conservative philosophy by proving it to be senseless. There is in fact no clear-cut formal procedure to distinguish scientific philosophy from metaphysics. Nevertheless, the Vienna Circle established its aim in a rather unusual, roundabout way. Its method of dealing with various concrete problems gave a picture of what scientific philosophy should be like. Two main features of its method were first, logical precision and clarity in thinking, and second, sticking to facts regardless of our emotional attitude towards them. This was a major turning point in philosophy representing a break with its tradition of irrationalism and sentimentalism.

Hubert SCHLEICHERT: Über Willensfreiheit und strafrechtliche Zurechnung . . . . . 131

Frühere Strafrechte definierten Zurechnungsfähigkeit mit Hilfe der Willensfreiheit; gegenwärtig dient eine "Fähigkeit, gemäß einer Einsicht zu handeln" diesem Zwecke. Aber beide Begriffe ermöglichen keine praktizierbare Unterscheidung zwischen normalen Tätern und solchen, die straffrei bleiben sollen. Eine solche Unterscheidung ist nur unter dem Präventivstandpunkt möglich: Wer durch die üblichen Strafen nicht gebessert wird oder nicht gebessert werden muß (Schocktäter), soll diesen Strafen nicht unterworfen werden. Allenfalls muß er von der Gemeinschaft isoliert werden. Welcher Personenkreis hier in Frage kommt, kann nur empirisch festgestellt werden. Empirisch ist auch die Frage, ob nicht aus Abschreckungsgründen auch unzurechnungsfähige Täter zu bestrafen sind.

T.R. GIRILL: On the Comparison of Inductive Support with Deontic Requirement . . . . . 145

That the concepts of confirmation and requirement are very similar has recently been suggested by the discovery of four analogies between them. This conjecture is tested by comparing examples of each relation. I show that both of these relations can be "defe-

ated” in two similar ways. But I also argue for two important dissimilarities between them: 1) when faced with certain inconsistencies, requirement suffers much more drastically than confirmation, and 2) confirmation is partiresultant in a sense in which requirement is not.

Ansgar BECKERMANN: Zur Natur und Geltung praktischer Schlüsse . 161  
 Unter Berufung auf Aristoteles ist in der neueren Literatur immer wieder die These vertreten worden, die Konklusionen praktische Syllogismen seien keine Sätze, sondern Handlungen. Eine genaue Interpretation der entsprechenden Aristotelesstellen zeigt jedoch, daß nach Aristoteles Handlungen nicht aus bestimmten Prämissen folgen, sondern aus dem *Fürwahrhalten* dieser Prämissen. Deshalb wird hier vorgeschlagen, praktische Syllogismen als epistemisch-praxeologische Schlüsse im Rahmen einer gemischten Wissens – und Handlungslogik aufzufassen. Wenn man von den normalen Begriffen des Wissens und Handelns ausgeht, ergibt sich bei dieser Interpretation jedoch, daß die Gültigkeit praktischer Schlüsse durchaus fraglich ist.

Besprechungen

Review Articles

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