

did not write extensively on the corporation, Singer examines whether Rawls' framework can be applied to make moral arguments about corporate ownership, control, and objectives. After careful consideration, he concludes that it cannot apply.

Singer (2015: 65) begins with an instructive overview of the main questions in corporate governance and business ethics. This overview is essential to Singer's argument, because he needs to show that Rawls' theory of justice cannot apply to any of these topics. The first question is the purpose of corporate governance. Should the rules or institutions that govern corporations resolve conflicts of interest between owners and managers? Or should it solve conflicts with a broader set of parties, including employees? Second, who is entitled to participate in corporate governance? Should workers have greater democratic control over corporations? Or should shareholders ultimately control corporations without the participation of workers in decision-making? Third, who should own corporations? Should the state redistribute the ownership of shares widely among citizens, or should the owners be the investors who pay for it in the market? Fourth, what are the powers of corporations? Does the firm exercise an authority over its employees that should be regulated? Or is regulation unnecessary as long as employees can exit the firm? Fifth, what are the proper corporate objectives? Are the aims of the firm limited to maximizing profits, or do corporations have larger ethical responsibilities?

Singer (2015: 66) rightly regards these issues of corporate governance as being highly consequential for the justice of societies. But he argues that Rawls' theory cannot apply to corporate governance, because of the "deep-seated distinction between the business firm and state, or between the political and associational, upon which Rawls' theory rests" (Singer 2015: 68). This distinction between the political and associational concerns the subject of principles of justice. In Singer's (2015: 71) view, Rawlsian justice "applies only to the 'basic structure' of society" or the main political and economic institutions. It does not apply to voluntary associations or to individual transactions. Rawls limits the subject of justice in this way because of two reasons. One is respect for freedom of individual choice and association. Citizens should be free to make meaningful decisions in their