PDC Homepage

Home » Products » Purchase

Philosophy Research Archives

Volume 11, 1985

Robert D. Heslep
Pages 379-391

Gewirth and the Voluntary Agent’s Esteem of Purpose

This paper discusses Alan Gewirth’s claim that the agent of a voluntary action necessarily values his purpose. It holds that not only is Gewirth wrong in making the claim but that his mistake is of serious importance for his moral theory. The criticism proceeds through an examination of the five arguments advanced by Gewirth, explicitly and implicitly, in support of the proposition that any agent necessarily esteems his goal. A key point in the criticism is that an agent of voluntary action might have his goal capriciously and for that reason might not appreciate the goal. The paper concludes by specifying how Gewirth’s inadequate defense of his claim undercuts certain principles of his moral theory, including the Principle of Generic Consistency.

Usage and Metrics
Dimensions
PDC