Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volume 88, Issue 2, March 2014

Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat

Recent authors have drawn attention to a kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one's doxastic state is the result of a flawed process —for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle. The puzzle is that at least in some situations involving higher-order defeaters the correct epistemic rules issue conflicting recommendations. For instance, a subject ought to believe p, but she ought also to suspend judgment in p. l discuss three responses. The first resists the puzzle by arguing that there is only one correct epistemic rule, an Uber-rule. The second accepts that there are genuine epistemic dilemmas. The third appeals to a hierarchy or ordering of correct epistemic rules. I spell out problems for all of these responses. I conclude that the right lesson to draw firom the puzzle is that a state can be epistemically rational or justified even if one has what looks to be strong evidence to think that it is not. As such, the considerations put forth constitute a non-question-begging argument for a kind of extemalism.