Philosophy of Management

Volume 11, Issue 2, 2012

Representations and Representing

David Ardagh
Pages 5-28

Presuppositions of Collective Moral Agency
Analogy, Architectonics, Justice, and Casuistry

This is the second of three papers with the overall title: “A Quasi-Personal Alternative to Some Anglo-American Pluralist Models of Organisations: Towards an Analysis of Corporate Self-Governance for Virtuous Organisations”.1 In the first paper, entitled: “Organisations as quasi-personal entities: from ‘governing’ of the self to organisational ‘self ’-governance: a Neo-Aristotelian quasi-personal model of organisations”, the artificial corporate analogue of a natural person sketched there, was said to have quasi-directive, quasi-operational and quasi-enabling/resource-provision capacities. Its use of these capacities following joint deliberation in ethically permissible and just joint acts, their effect on end-users and other parties, and conformity with or challenge to State law, arguably settles its moral status as an ethical or unethical organisational agent. This paper identifies and defends the presuppositions of this conception, and applies the results to business.