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Philosophical Topics

Volume 45, Issue 2, Fall 2017

Philosophy of Language

Keota Fields
Pages 21-32
DOI: 10.5840/philtopics201745212

Intensional Liar

I propose to downgrade the Liar paradox from what Quine called an antinomy to a much weaker veridical paradox. I then apply Quine’s strategy of rejecting veridical paradoxes by exposing an unacceptable premise to the Liar. I argue that upon analysis the intension of a standard Liar sentence presupposes the existence of a non-empty empty set; and that since such an object is impossible this presupposition may be rejected, downgrading the Liar. I then briefly argue that Dialetheism can be motivated without supposing the existence of a non-empty empty set.

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