In this paper I demonstrate that the analysis supporting Derrida’s identification of the desire for a pure, originary idiom in Heidegger’s reading of Trakl in Geschlecht III provides a framework with which we can understand the call for a new language in Monolingualism of the Other. While acknowledging how his interpretation of Heidegger provides important insights that guide Derrida’s later negotiation with the dual dangers of nationalism and colonialism, I argue that the proximity to Heidegger, manifest in Derrida’s articulation of a desire for language in the singular, threatens to close down possibilities latent in the promising definition of deconstruction as plus d’une langue—both more than a language and no more of a language.

This is a translation of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s recently discovered 1952 Berlin speech. The speech includes several themes that reappear in Truth and Method, as well as in Gadamer’s later writings such as Reason in the Age of Science. For example, Gadamer criticizes positivism, modern philosophy’s orientation toward positivism, and Enlightenment narratives of progress, while presenting his view of philosophy’s tasks in an age of crisis. In addition, he discusses structural power, instrumental reason, the objectification of nature and human beings, the reduction of both to mere means, and the colonization of scientific-technological ways of knowing and being—all of which continue to impact our social and political lives together and threaten the very existence of every living being. This speech is essential reading for Gadamer scholars interested in the social, political, and ethical dimensions of his thought and for those interested in bringing Gadamer into conversation with critical theory.

This article is a review of two recently translated books by Italian philoso­pher Elettra Stimilli: The Debt of the Living: Ascesis and Capitalism (Albany: SUNY Press, 2017; translated by Arianna Bove) and Debt and Guilt: A Political Philosophy (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018; translated by Stefania Porcelli). The essay critically engages with (1) Stimilli’s interpretation of the nexus between ascesis and capitalism; (2) her account of the ascetic dimensions of contemporary economies of debt; (3) her reflections on the subversive potential of ascesis in the context of contemporary regimes of neoliberal governance.

This essay proceeds from the assertion that Derrida’s work has consistently been concerned with translation. This has been clearly evident since “Plato’s Pharmacy” (1968). This concern comes to the fore in Geschlecht III, where countless features of Heidegger’s language are underscored as untranslatable. This does not prevent Derrida from proposing re-translations, of doing what he describes as “harassing” Heidegger’s language “with wave after wave of touches, caresses, and blows.” Untranslatability, as he argues here and elsewhere, is simply a matter of economy, of the one-word-for-one-word principle, according to which standard every text is untranslatable. But translation is also for Derrida a touchstone for the broadest questions posed by or to philosophy. One such important question or problem is hospitality, which, as he asserts in his 1995–1996 seminar on the topic, is “basically the same problem” as translation. This confluence of the questions of hospitality and translation is particularly relevant for his reading of Heidegger’s essay on Trakl, “Die Sprache im Gedicht.”

The article seeks to outline the relationship between Geschlecht III and Jacques Derrida’s published texts devoted to the mark “Geschlecht,” in order to detect the general strategy followed by Derrida in the construction of his archive during his lifetime. Indeed, we suppose that his archive has to be built in accordance with his deconstructive statements about the classical conception of the archive: a totalizing closure of a textual production able to trace it back to the unity of an ideal identity (Archive Fever). In particular, the article aims to focus on a passage at the end of Jacques Derrida’s Geschlecht III, where the question of the animal in Heidegger comes into the foreground and in a way that is slightly different from what we already know through Derrida’s published works and that could require a re-reading of his “entire” work.

This article takes up the specifically poetic dimension of what Jacques Derrida calls Martin Heidegger’s “philosophical nationalism” in the recently published Geschlecht III, arguing that this text doubles as a self-interrogation of Derrida’s own practice of reading poetry. Thus reading Geschlecht III alongside the nearly contemporaneous “Shibboleth: For Paul Celan,” I claim that Derrida’s critical deconstruction of Heidegger’s philosophical-poetic nationalism both allows us to read the traces of a more affirmatively deconstructive thinking of literary community in “Shibboleth” and draws attention to the limits and traps of such a project. Further, I demonstrate that Derrida’s and Heidegger’s respective approaches to the question of literary community cannot be separated from their respective approaches to the question of translation and their respective ways of mobilizing the motif of the “untranslatable.”

Derrida states at the beginning of Geschlecht III that at stake is the question of sexual difference, one that is referred in Heidegger’s 1953 essay on Trakl to a twofoldness that precedes the opposition of sexual duality, a duality which, according to Derrida, neutralizes sexual difference. I follow the development of what Derrida also called the “dream” of “another sexual difference,” one that would not be ruled by the opposition of the two. Derrida’s guiding interpretation in Geschlecht III is that Heidegger privileges “gathering” (Versammlung) and the reference to the “one” in this thinking of difference, and of sexual difference, thereby neutralizing difference. Drawing a contrast between difference as polysemy (gathered) and difference as dissemination (dispersion), I attempt in what follows to discuss Derrida’s interpretation, raising questions concerning some of his readings with respect to the motifs of dispersion, dissemination, polysemy, and gathering.

This paper tracks Derrida’s allusion to the “phoenix motif” in the recently published Life Death seminar, showing how it foreshadows and overlaps with the political problematic of “national humanism” made explicit in Geschlecht III. I argue that, be it in Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche, or Heidegger, biological life is always in the service of a spiritual life that finds its breath in a certain reappropriation of the German idiom. Following Derrida, I argue that this “philosophy-of-life German” (cet allemand philosophe de la vie) introduces a sinister equivocality between these thinkers and National Socialism, and this in spite of all their prudence to shield their discourses from such a co-option.

Derrida’s seminar “The Phantom of the Other” (1984–1985), reads Heidegger’s “Language in the Poem” (1953), which has the poetry of Georg Trakl at its center. Among the principal themes of Derrida’s seminar and/or of Heidegger’s essay are Heidegger’s effort to “place” Trakl’s presumably single, unsung poem; the relation of pain (Schmerz) to poetry; the two “strokes” of Geschlecht, a word that in part means the sexes, the first stroke being neutral, the second being evil; the German language and the Heideggerian idiom; philosophical nationalities and nationalisms; Derridean double-reading.

Spinoza has very little to say concerning the creative arts. A careful consideration of those passages in which he discusses art, however, reveals art to have an importance for him that far outstrips what his relative silence might suggest. In this paper, I argue that Spinoza situates art at the genesis of rational, philosophical knowledge. The importance of abstract reason, Spinoza’s “second kind” of knowledge to which most of philosophy belongs, has been well appreciated by scholars. In the Ethics, Spinoza offers a developmental account of this kind of knowledge: reason develops out of the knowledge of sense experience. By tracing his account of this process, I argue that art has an important role to play in the transition from sense experience to philosophical knowledge.

Building on the theory of humor advanced by Yves Cusset in his recent book Rire: Tractatus philo-comicus, I argue that we can understand the phenomenon in terms of what Jean-Luc Nancy, following Roland Barthes, has called the exemption from sense. I attempt to show how the humorous sensibility, understood in this way, is entirely incompatible with the experience of others as contemptible. I conclude by developing some of the normative implications of this, focusing specifically on the question as to whether it is ever morally permissible to treat others with contempt.

The so-called Menschenpark-debate on genetic engineering—originating in 1999—turned out to be one of the most controversial and contentious debates in German philosophy. It is also regarded as the first manifestation of the struggle between Sloterdijk and Habermas. While Sloterdijk’s ideas had a significant impact on Habermas’s theory, Sloterdijk’s philosophy has been consistently ignored and dismissed until today due to two reasons. First, he was accused of advocating for fascist ideology. Second, philosophers from the same academic circles claimed that his method does not meet academic standards. The debate therefore signifies a larger problem that concerns the methodological difference between analytic-Continental philosophies that work on a formal level and Continental philosophies that work with a tropological account experimenting with different non-formal philosophical expressions. I will carve out this distinction with respect to the Menschenpark-debate to argue that Sloterdijk is an integral part of our philosophical historical moment.

In this essay, I read Freud and Merleau-Ponty as voices for a more perceptive and nuanced discourse on the child. Their works, I suggest, contain two complementary approaches in this direction. The first approach concerns the structural asymmetry of child and adult. In his early writings, Freud assumes a radical break between the child’s and the adult’s sexualities. Taking seriously this assumption of asymmetry cautions us against the hasty application of adult standards to the child. The second approach concerns what I would call a “thick description” of the child’s lived experience. Merleau-Ponty exemplifies this approach in his lectures on child psychology and the notion of institution, where he develops a concrete, phenomenologically informed account of childhood and puberty.

Jan Patočka holds that both the Husserlian and the Heideggerian descriptions of history remain abstract because they lack an authentic reflection on historical sense’s appearing, which presupposes a description of the transition from the nonhistorical and prehistorical states of humanity to its final historical state. Nevertheless, it seems that Patočka would confront an internal aporia here because, even if he sought to think the continuity of these three movements, he tends to affirm the rupture between them. To overcome that aporia, it becomes necessary to formulate the hypothesis according to which the prehistorical is characterized by a repression of sense’s problematic character, whereas the historical as such is characterized by a conversion of consciousness toward this problematic character. Justifying this hypothesis requires exploring Patočka’s anthropology, confronting it with Arendt’s anthropology, and formulating metaphysical perspectives.

This article sets forth a compositional model of ideology by drawing on the tradition of historical materialism and further developing its insights into the aesthetic composition of reality. It demonstrates how ideology is not simply a set of false beliefs but is rather the process by which social agents are composed over time in every dimension of their existence, including their thoughts, practices, perceptions, representations, values, affects, desires, and unconscious drives. By working through a number of diverse debates and authors—ranging from Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to Louis Althusser, Eduardo Galeano, Rosaura Sánchez, and Paulo Freire—it thereby elucidates how ideology is best understood as an aesthetic process that includes aspect of sense and sense-making, and that therefore requires a collective, cultural revolution as its antidote.

This article aims to reread Jonas’s famous lecture on “Heidegger and Theology” linking it with a still unpublished lecture course on Being and Time Jonas held in 1967 at the New School for Social Research. From the reading of Heidegger’s masterwork, Jonas takes the idea of the “burdensome” character of the existence, which he interprets in terms of a “polarity” between man and his “other” (other men, God, world). Such a polarity is for Jonas the very essence of “religion” (as religamen) and of responsibility. From this vantage point, “Heidegger and Theology,” with its sharp criticism of the theological appropriation of Heidegger’s post-turn philosophy, appears to be a strong defense of the burden of “polarity,” as developed in Being and Time, against its removal by the thought of Being: a Being which is nothing but a mirror image of Dasein. Partially reconsidering his views on Heidegger’s Gnosticism, Jonas turns (the earlier) Heidegger against (the later) Heidegger himself.

This essay strives to show the relationship between current efforts to explain the nature of play and the essence of post-postmodernism. The muddied and arduous world of work becomes the site not only for creative play but for post-postmodern solutions to the complex situations we find ourselves in today.

Jacques Lacan comments repeatedly on anamorphic art as it exemplifies for him how the mind from a certain angle perceives through law-like patterns the world that would otherwise be nothing but a chaos of arbitrary multiplicities. The angle, though, has a certain effect on what is perceived; an effect that, as such, cannot be perceived within the realm of experience. The article tries to make the link between diffraction laws of perception more explicit in the subject-object dichotomy and refers for that purpose to the work of both Hegel and Lacan. A reference to Hegel is necessary, as Hegel was not only one of Lacan’s own most important sources of insights, but the author who first focused on justified true belief through a theory of a missed encounter between truth and knowledge.

This essay considers Deleuze and Guattari’s paradoxical claim that Marx’s critique of political economy implies as a universal history derived from the singular features of capitalism. In this critique, capitalism is defined by the commodity form, as a relationship of economic equivalence that replaces the bonds of dependence underlying other social formations. By negating relations of kinship and caste, capitalism reveals, a contrario, the universal foundation of other societies. As the “negative of all social formations,” capitalism conditions a universal history, defined, retrospectively, from the singular standpoint of a society, based upon the negation of kinship and caste. In this universal history, moreover, the negation of capitalism is identified with the possibility of a new and equally singular form of society. In Anti-Oedipus, the latter is defined as a “schizophrenic” condition liberated from the commodity as well as from the bonds of dependence that constituted the universal foundation of earlier societies.

Both Marx and Freud are children of the Enlightenment in certain manners. As such, they each display a qualified but firm optimism about history inevitably making progress in specific desirable directions. Freud predicts that continuing scientific and technological advances eventually will drive religiosity from human societies once and for all. Marx likewise forecasts the withering away of religions. Moreover, he treats this predicted process as symptomatic of even more fundamental socioeconomic developments, namely, his (in)famous anticipations of subsequent transitions to socialism and communism. However, the past century of human history has not been kind to any sort of Enlightenment-style progress narratives. My intervention on this occasion takes inspiration especially from Lacan’s reckoning with a “triumph of religion” defying Freud’s expectations of relentlessly broadening and deepening secularization. I argue that socio-political phenomena of the past several decades bear witness to religious superstructures having infused themselves into economic infrastructures.

In Volume Three of Capital in a striking but somewhat uncharacteristic formula, Marx argues that the labor relation is the “hidden basis” of the entire social edifice including the state and politics. As an attempt to clarify and develop this insight I examine the dual nature of labor as abstract and concrete labor, arguing that the two sides of labor correspond not just to two sides of the commodity, but to different ethics and alienations of labor, and ultimately to different philosophical anthropologies.

Why might alternative taxonomies be needed in contemporary life, and how might the notion of categorisation or anti-categorisation be thought speculatively? This essay considers some of the ways that life and matter have been historically divided and segmented and asks how this might be rendered mobile, offering new divisions and definitions for those who exist outside hegemonic segments or scales.

This essay advances a new materialist philosophy of faith. Mobilizing affect, I show that a change in the capacity to act, such as that created through belief or non-belief, is an experience that unites both secular and religious people. Belief in the superiority of secular culture over religious culture, or vice versa, are affectively similar corporeal orientations.

Plants synthesize with photons, so we commonly say. This article on photosynthesis introduces a notion of concepts that are to be thought of as capital and yet natural. They constitute a metaphysics of meteora alloys and copiousness through “actively lacking” a “proper” notion of conception.

Transversal Posthumanities emerge within the posthuman convergence of posthumanism and postanthropocentrism. Environmental, medical, and digital humanities reposition academic practice towards advanced technologies and climate change issues. A neomaterialist theoretical framework will help distinguish different kinds of Posthumanities: from the profit-oriented knowledge production practices of cognitive capitalism, to community-driven, non-profit experiments with minor knowledges.

This essay shows how Conrad Hal Waddington is at the very center of divergent genealogies of theoretical biology: he is at once remembered for his contribution to epigenetics and complex systems biology (in its current formation) and largely forgotten for the debt that he owes to Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. The essay traces Waddington's debt to Whitehead and demonstrates the way in which this conceptual lineage challenges the transcendental conditions of biological knowledge presupposed by the reigning paradigm of complex systems biology.

This essay re-problematises the Aristotelian concept of techne in terms of the mathematical function to demonstrate the centrality of agency in technics. This schema animates computational theory as an agential operator or computer, to situate agency’s necessity to the technical apparatus and the production of abstract relations.

This essay explores “sculptural plasticity” through neuronal matterings of the brainbody in philosophy, literature, and art. It focuses on Socrates’s cataleptic condition as evidenced in Plato’s Symposium, the plasticities at work in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea, and morphogenetic acts of cell formation in the sculptural installation of Pierre Huyghe’s After ALife Ahead.

Ruinology is defined here as the study of the speculative reconstruction of ruins. Its remit encompasses both the study of the mechanisms of ruination as well as attempts to reverse-engineer ruination and reconstruct architectural remains.

This article explores the ways new materialism centers the problem of morphogenesis—and de-centers language and culture—in philosophical accounts of corporeality. Attention to organic structures gives insight into the entanglement of nature and culture obscured by tendencies to think matter as lacking agential features. I suggest, in conclusion, that new materialism may operate with a notion of “entanglement” or “intra-activity” that is too productive. New materialisms may require a more pliable set of distinctions to capture the relations between morphogenetic forces.

This essay presents, first, a description of Niklas Luhmann’s notion of autopoietic system. Luhmann theorises society as a self-referential, differential, and posthuman communication system that constitutes meaning. Then, second, it defends Luhmann against the new materialist challenge that stresses the role of matter in meaning-making.

This brief examination of treatments of nothingness-oriented dialectics in Kyoto School philosophers Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime engages questions of space from Hegel to quantum mechanics. It begins to situate their work in light of Emmanuel Levinas’s writings on empty space and as overlooked contributions to the philosophy of science.

This article outlines the limits of Marx’s critique of political economy by underscoring the grounding of economics in the nomos of the oikos—law of the household, or oikonomia. It traces the racial-gendered limits on concepts of equality and justice that have shaped neoliberalism, economic nationalism, and their contemporary criticism.

By looking at its history, this article emphasizes the importance of practical judgment for materialism. This sense of practical judgment is traced back to the function of phronesis in one of the ancient schools of materialism, namely, the Epicureans.

The central argument in this essay is that while the concept of entanglement offers materialism the promise of a conceptually rich field of new “entangled” entities, by itself, entanglement is ill-equipped to contend with the thorny questions of how power is organized among those entities. This essay proposes that decoherence provides a welcome complement to entanglement.

Modal logics support philosophy, providing means to organise information, and to think and act in response to abstract concepts and to real conditions. In its organisation, the modal is generative of the ethics of any given system. Feminist new materialist practices require us to consider ethics when generated by technological rather than theological modalities.

As a miniscule philosophical event, this essay proceeds in the liminal space between Deleuze studies and interality studies. Meant as just another “Go” move improvised in relation to previous moves and countermoves in a horizonless game of intellectual nomadism known as interality studies, it sketches out the contours of Deleuzean interology in the process of falsifying Platonist ontology.

This essay argues for a transversal posthumanities-based pedagogy, rooted in an attentive ethico-onto-epistemology, by reading the schizoanalytical praxes of Deleuzoguattarian theory alongside the work of various feminist new materialist scholars.

This essay discusses the problem of materialism and its relation to politics through readings of Deleuze’s ontology. It recounts the “hidden tradition” of materialism in an Althusserian sense and brings about the idea of materialist politics by investigating the relationship between Alexius Meinong and Gilles Deleuze.

This essay proposes the imagination as a new concept for materialism through an interrogation of what therein resists traditional philosophical discourse, and ultimately what Heidegger calls technological positionality or enframing. Drawing from an unpublished 1970–1971 seminar of Derrida’s on materialism, I explore the interplay between the imagination and matter, art and space, in Aristotle, Plato, Heidegger, and Ponge.

There are productive material connections beyond mere internal or external relations. The concept of connection enables a creative reinterpretation of certain historical questions and, accordingly, the essay stresses the importance of the concepts of connection, nexus, and fusion in many philosophies, from Aristotle to Deleuze.

This essay discusses notions of community, commoning, and assemblage, in conjunction with new materialist and posthumanist onto-epistemologies and ethico-politics. The analysis is situated within, and applied to, current debates in ecological and community-oriented art, curating, and activism. The essay concludes with an articulation of what a “community of material-discursive commoning” may be constituted by, through, and with.

While the philosopher Rosi Braidotti sees her own, new materialist work as opposed to the analysis of biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben, the present contribution establishes a dialogue between these two lineages. Starting with Aristo­tle’s distinction between zōē and bíos politikos (natural and political life), it puts the analyses of biopolitics in immunitarian modernity in conversation with NM concep­tualizations of affirmative difference and relationality. Replacing the negative logic of identity/alterity, life/death, dualism or dialectics and desire-as-lack of the Western philosophical and psychoanalytic traditions with human and more-than-human post-individualistic subjectivity as part of a rhizomatic web, NM proposes a groundbreaking shift to post-anthropocentrism. The biopolitical fear of viral contamination cedes to viral contamination as the generative vanishing of borderlines between self and other. In this vital geocentrism marking a new kind of politics, the sym-poetic life force of zōē generates complex allegiances between heterogeneous entities in a shared world.

This essay explicates Édouard Glissant’s aesthetics of opacity in terms of its formation and significance. This theory comes into form in the historical condition of colonial alterity. In The Poetics of Relation (originally published in French in 1990), Glissant extrapolates opacity as the fundamental of aesthetics from such linguistic activities as creole languages and improvised stories found in the Caribbean islands. More than a postcolonial defense of identity alterity, opacity denotes the linguistic expression of material alterity. It means an involuntary flourishing of linguistically enhanced dynamic of exchange, connection, and making in the landscapes of compelling affordances. Such languages cannot be reduced to texts because they are derived from the inevitably alien ground called "the other of Thought,” or a recognition and practice of radical difference. The significance of the aesthetics of opacity lies in that, Glissant asserts, humans can linguistically express the engagement with material ecologies while avoiding the authoritative domination of reason.

This text elaborates an understanding of abstraction as fundamental to how we think from a closer look at relationships between abstraction, movement, materiality and lived experience. Starting from Whitehead-inspired reflections on ab­straction by Alberto Toscano and Brian Massumi, the differences between their respective readings of his work are shown to be indicative for their different conceptions of the relationships between abstraction, the concrete, and lived experience. The text then continues to elaborate how Alva Noë’s enactive approach to perception illumi­nates the central role of movement and sensorimotor skills in the emergence of abstractions from the continuity of process that is reality, and could contribute to further understanding of the relationship between movement and abstraction as what Massumi describes as the incorporeal dimension of the real. Finally, this text reflects on the potential of movement practices (including dance) and technology to become part of how abstraction is achieved.

This essay considers the phenomenon of almanacs, encyclopedias, glossaries, lexicons, word books, vocabularies, companions, and (theoretical) toolboxes, which appears to be an outstanding feature of humanities today. By limiting her discussion to six specific examples of this genre, the author asks the following questions: Why is it that this method became so prolific? What are the objectives of almanacs, glossaries, and vocabularies? What do they do to thinking, writing, researching? What can they say about the moment we are in? And how do they contribute to defining this moment? Those questions orient discussions around humanities today toward the ethico-political practice of thinking otherwise.

In this paper, we propose a Simondonian interpretation of quantum mechanics taking as a standpoint his “preindividual hypothesis” in order to consider the problem of contextuality. We will examine whether the epistemological obstacle produced by the notion of entity can be bypassed by specifying, according to Simondon and the Kochen-Specker Theorem, the mode of existence of quantum potentialities.

Unlike the free interpretations of Simondon’s genetic encyclopaedism, the constraining exegesis of this doctrine resolves the paradoxes that are essential for it to be constructed in its depth and subtlety. Now, at the root of these simple paradoxes lies what is no longer one, but which constitutes a true contradiction, of a methodological type. That is why today we need an encompassing refounding of Simondon’s genetic ontology, which makes it possible to eliminate the contradiction by transforming this ontology into a translation of a new first problematic, called “archi-reflexive semantics.” Such is the program of the global but radically antidogmatic system of the individuation of (making-)sense, or “human ecology”, the ultimate telos of which is political-economic and articulates itself with a decentered humanism refounding the law outside ethics.

We propose to approach Simondon’s writing as a techno-aesthetic object, as a singular prose of thought. To do so requires assuming Simondon’s technological proposal as the creation of a new mode of knowledge about the technicality of objects, abandoning the idea that the word “technology” can serve to designate a given state of things. This proposal, cultural and educational at the same time, requires a new way of approaching the world, starting with the way we approach reading. The techno-aesthetics of Simondon’s writing also requires a techno-aesthetic reading.

This article reevaluates the historical conditions of the concomitant rise of computational systems and DNA-coding in the 1950s (M’Charek, Gilroy) and addresses the implementation of behavioral psychology and cybernetic technologies of control after the Second World War. From this historical perspective, this article interrogates the intersectional relation that automatic systems of control share with models of segregation and structures of knowledge oppression. It engages with the work of French philosopher Gilbert Simondon and poses Simondon’s cybernetic theory as an opportunity to question systems of knowledge imposed on ontological domains. Finally, it reveals how cybernetics reproduces a model of cultural understanding based on exclusion/inclusion and addresses the difficulty of creating new critical paradigms (Said, Spivak) from within the informational technologies of neo-colonial episteme.

This article intends to establish a comparison between technical analog objects—which were the objects of the epoch when the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon elaborated his philosophical reflection—and digital devices that emerged in the last few decades of the 1900s. First, I define the main features of Simondon’s technical objects in order to understand what the necessary conditions are for there to be technical progress, which is based on what he called the process of concretization. Then, I analyze the relationship between digital objects—as understood by Yuk Hui—and digital devices that take over from analog objects, without necessarily presenting continuity in an evolutionary process. Finally, I intend to expose the role that both analog objects and digital devices play as mediators with the world in a digital era, and to address the question of technical culture nowadays.

Within the workerist tradition the concept of general intellect theorised by Marx in the “Fragment on Machines” has framed a socio-political interpretation of Simondon capable of questioning the ongoing process of valorisation and subjectivation of living labour under capitalism. According to Virno (2003), Leonardi (2010) and Pasquinelli (2015), Simondon’s philosophy can provide the theoretical foundation for thinking new forms of political agency and cooperation. Their accounts rely on the concepts of transindividuality, individuation, and mecanology, in order to explore Post-Fordist concepts such as multitude, cognitive capitalism, and algorithmic governmentality. Through my reading of Simondon’s philosophy of technics, I will assess these interpretations and situate the issue of general intellect at the intersection of his notions of “technicity” and “information.” Hence, I aim to integrate workerist and post-workerist interpretations through the concepts of living information incorporated into machinery, and invention-power implied in the concept of technicity. This will eventually lead to the replacement of the Marxist opposition between living and dead labour by a conception of the machine as neither living nor dead.

For the last twenty years, the philosophy of technology has firmly taken an “empirical turn” and has been strongly pervaded with Science and Technology Studies (STS) lessons, focusing on the social consistency of technical beings. In this context, Simondon’s approach to technology may appear a bit dated. A major issue of On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (MEOT) is indeed to theorize technology beyond any reference to social commitments: Simondon distinguishes “pure technicity,” amenable to rational analysis, from “psychosocial overdeterminations” that contaminate technical objects with exogenous concerns. Thus, Simondon may prove behind the times when he claims to analyze technology as a non-social realm. This article intends to demonstrate that Simondon can nevertheless fruitfully feed current debates related to technological developments. More precisely, the difference between several concepts of technological objects in MEOT proves to be of major interest for clarifying current issues related, in particular, to ethics.

This article explores the indissoluble connection between the order of being and knowing in the allagmatic epistemology proposed by Gilbert Simondon based on the following thesis: the knowledge of psychic individuation is the condition for the possibility of knowing different modes of individuation. This statement requires the passage through logic, according to the author’s conception of ontogenesis, for describing the analogy and the subject that knows analogically and individuates itself as he knows. Thus, the psychology of individuation is established as a scientific field of work opened up by Simondon and its epistemological implications in the way of conceiving the subject-object relation.

The article develops the different meanings of the Simondonian idea of the transindividual, reconstructs the different interpretations that have been made about it, and considers its potentiality to think contemporary phenomena. For this, first, it points out the uses of the term transindividual before Simondon’s conceptualization of it. Second, it analyzes the definitions of the concept that appear in his doctoral theses of 1958 and distinguishes his different senses (ontogenetic, metaphysical, ethical, technical, etc.). Third, it reconstructs the contemporary debate about the transindividual and defines three moments (1989-1998, 1999-2005, and 2005-2015). Finally, it concludes by reflecting on the philosophical and epistemological potentiality of the idea of the transindividual to think about complex processes marked by the association of technological, psychosocial, and ethical-political dimensions.

This short piece is a partial translation of the introduction to Gilbert Simondon’s most succinct philosophical reflections on the notions of form, information, and potentials. The material was presented on February 27, 1960, at the Session of the Société française de philosophie. After the abstract and Simondon’s definitions of form, information, and transductive operation, there is a discussion between Simondon and other attendees who were present at his talk, including Paul Ricoeur and Jean Hyppolite, both of whom had been part of Simondon’s viva panel in 1958. The piece represents an interesting moment in the history of philosophy where cybernetics and information theory were problematized by thinkers like Simondon, who thought that the concept of information needed to be expanded and refined to adequately account for processes of individuation, or "ontogenesis."

Simondon’s philosophy of individuation attacks the opposition between liberty and necessity, a key institution of the supposed ontological “difference” between the human being and nature in most of modern political thought. Distinguishing between ontological and epistemological determinism, I will show the political significance of Simondon’s refusal to either reduce human beings to natural determinism or save their alleged metaphysical nature. Simondon inherits part of his critical programme and a good deal of the tools he uses to construct it from Georges Canguilhem. My reading starts from an enigma concerning quantum mechanics that Canguilhem jotted down on paper while involved in the Second World War antifascist struggle. I will suggest that Simondon’s philosophy exposes the two equally anthropomorphic understandings of nature shared by fascism and technocracy. This will allow me to explain the ideological function that voluntarism and human engineering can jointly perform by reinforcing and exploiting the apparent opposition between liberty and necessity, on the basis of their complementary teleological justification for political action.

This article will maintain that the onset of Simondon’s interest in the philosophy of Nature, examined in his thèse principale, “L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information” (“Individuation in the Light of the Notions of Form and Information”) and for philosophy of technics, analysed in his thèse complémentaire, “Du mode d’existence des objets techniques” (“On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects”), lies in his personal acquaintance with Canguilhem and in particular the reading of his The Knowledge of Life, published in 1952. I will demonstrate that the element connecting Simondon’s interest in individuality and his interest in the philosophy of technics can be found in the influence of the following Canguilhemian subjects: 1) the role of vitalist anti-reductionism; 2) the necessity to inaugurate a “biological philosophy of technics”; and 3) the understanding of the concept of milieu in relation to individuality.

In this brief essay Stiegler synthesizes his critical approach to Simondon’s philosophy of individuation. He states his debt toward Simondon’s concept of a systemic indeterminacy in the processes of transindividual individuation, and focusses on his underdeveloped intuition concerning the role played by technics in anthropogenic processes. Situating himself in the phenomenological lineage of Husserl through Derrida, Stiegler explains his own “pharmacological” understanding of “technical individuation” as, at the same time, the intrinsic condition of individuation and the inevitable risk of disindividuation defining the political as such. On this basis he critically extends Simondon’s understanding of religion and psychanalysis. This allows him to move beyond the political optimism implicit in Simondon’s “theoretical indecision” concerning the binding power of technical individuation yet relying on his very study of the question of individuation, which “is political through and through.”

Adorno develops critiques in parallel of the phenomenologies of G. W. F. Hegel and of Edmund Husserl. While respecting their differences, he rehearses conjoined objections to their accounts of philosophy, and of progress, of history, and of nature. Critical of Hegel’s idealist dialectics, and of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, Adorno also in his readings of their texts reveals a textual materiality of their philosophical enquiries, which provides material evidence in support of his critique. This essay seeks to reveal the dynamic of this process, and show certain parallels with results supplied in the phenomenological enquiries of Michel Henry, and in the deconstructions of Jacques Derrida. If an epoch may still be captured in the concept, then the negative dialectical conceptuality developed by Adorno must capture a condition common to that epoch, and, in part, shared by other such thinkers.

Much French philosophy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been marked by the positive valorization of alterity, an ethical position that has recently received a vigorous assault from Alain Badiou’s privilege of sameness. This article argues that Badiou shares a great deal in common with the philosophies of alterity from which he seeks to distance himself, and that Michel Serres’s little-known account of alterity offers a much more radical alternative to the ethics of difference. Drawing on both translated and as yet untranslated works, I argue that the Serresian ontology of inclination, along with his conceptual personae of the hermaphrodite and the parasite, informs ethical and political positions that offer a distinctive ethics and politics that present fresh insights about the relation between the singular and the universal, the contingency of market exchange, and the nature of violence.

This paper attempts to situate Derrida’s newly discovered Geschlecht III in the four-part series Derrida dedicated to the question of sexual difference in Heidegger. Taking its point of departure from an interview conducted two years prior to Geschlecht I, the paper retraces Derrida’s itinerary toward the culminating point of the Geschlecht series, Geschlecht III, the “magnet” that orients and attracts the other three. I argue that Derrida’s initial enthusiasm for a Heideggerian “pre-dual sexuality” in Geschlecht I is significantly tempered by Derrida’s meticulous reading of Heidegger in Geschlecht III, where his reservations vis-à-vis Heidegger’s neutralization of sexual difference become all the more serious and explicit. As I show, Derrida’s “dream” of a “doubly asymmetrical” sexual relation to the other remains incompatible with the sexual gentleness Heidegger imagines between brother and sister, an ultimately Christian incest that will yet again threaten to neutralize and erase the more radical sexual difference Derrida is trying to think.

This essay examines Jacques Rancière’s concept of subjectivation, the coming into being of a political subject as the substance of radical democratic politics. In particular, it provides a detailed reading of disidentification and impossible identification as they relate to figures of the Other. I present some possible points of intersection between subjectivation and hybridity, and explain why these concepts may ultimately be incompatible in their most common formulations. Examining closely a few recurring figures of alterity (“the Algerian” and “the immigrant”), I show that, in each case, the Other is used principally as an abstract figure, a procedure which risks effacing historically situated political voices in the name of universalism. Moreover, I argue that decisions regarding which subjects authentically enact politics and which remain in the realm of the police can themselves turn out to be politically neutralizing.

This essay aims to correct the widely-held view that Arendt is hostile to the body due to its physical needs. By focusing on two modes of corporeality that are distinguished by the production of bodily substances—the digestive body and the crying body—I argue that Arendt (1) deployed various notions of corporeality that thematize, in different ways, the uncontrollability our bodies; and (2) argues for the affirmation of this unmasterablity because it corresponds to the conditioned nature of human existence. Firstly, Arendt criticized the Greek, narcissistic aspiration toward physical beauty, exemplified in the figure of Achilles, for its attempt to subjugate the digestive body to a preconceived end—a criticism that equally applies to Connolly’s plea for strategically altering our affects. Secondly, Arendt’s appreciation of Homer’s description of a crying Odysseus shows that the acknowledgment of events constitutive of one’s life consists in a publicly visible somatic reaction.

The philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Maurice Merleau-Ponty may seem at first glance to be mutually exclusive. On further examination, however, they can be seen to share some fundamental points of view. For instance, they both share a common rejection of a modern mechanistic explanation of nature, and both endorse what we might call a pre-linguistic (pre-ratiocinative) level of meaning. In this paper, we show that these thinkers not only share some fundamental philosophical views, but also had, for many years, contemplated what cognitive scientists today call “embodied cognition.”

Emmanuel Levinas and Theodor Adorno never spoke to one another. Both thinkers were of Jewish ancestry, though their lives would be impacted in distinct ways by the rise of Nazism. With these historical parallels in mind, this paper seeks to place these thinkers in a productive juxtaposition with regard to the status of ethics and politics in either’s work. In particular, I examine the ramifications of philosophical reflection on Auschwitz as a mediating event in post-war European philosophy, reading Levinas’s and Adorno’s theoretical differences as alternate philosophical responses to this momentous event. I argue that Levinas’s thought is ailed by the problem of immediacy, exemplified by his positing ethics as first philosophy and his rejection of the category of totality which, as Adorno highlights, is an important critical tool for an analysis of the form of society which produces Nazism.

In this paper, I compare Gilles Deleuze’s and Søren Kierkegaard’s concepts of “repetition.” Although Deleuze (and interpreters after him) have argued that Kierkegaard’s use of this concept valorizes the role of unity in selfhood, I claim that, in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works, repetition in fact serves as a practical task linked to self-overcoming and rebirth. From this perspective, I argue that Kierkegaard’s conception of repetition as a function of “faith” can helpfully inform an understanding of Deleuze: self-overcoming in Deleuze will have many features in common with a Kierkegaardian conception of acting out of faith.

Kant bequeaths to the present discourse of cosmopolitanism the question of how a constitutionalized global order without a world state is possible. At the core of the matter is what a legitimate public authority as the necessary enactor of the cosmopolitan sovereignty is. Habermas’s answer that this is a three-tiered, networked realm of public authority is a plausible one. The key to Habermas’s answer is the concept of a political constitution for a pluralist world. If such a constitution is possible, I believe that we need a new concept of constitution as a body politic of norms, statute laws, common laws, legal precedents, and international treaties; on this point, we should take the UK constitution as the paradigm and recognize that since the end of World War II, such a body politic of norms, statute laws, common laws, legal precedents, and international treaties of the global human community has been emerging.

This essay explores Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophical return to Cartesian philosophy, specifically to Descartes’s preoccupation with the relation of mind and body, as a fertile ground from which to develop an ontology of the body in (1992). It explores Nancy’s reasons for revisiting the Cartesian thinking framework, which on the face of it, is of little value to an ontology of the body. I argue that Descartes’s impasse in accounting for both mind/body dualism and their union constitutes Nancy’s point of departure in constructing an ontology of the body in , thereby transforming Descartes’s impasse into a productive aporia, in the Derridean sense of the term. To fully understand the significance of the notion of “relation” in Nancy’s’ philosophy, I turn to his reading of Lacan’s famous aphorism “there is no sexual relation” and explore its ontological implications.

Photographs of the body of a drowned three-year-old Kurdish boy from Syria washed up on a Turkish beach encapsulated the plight of refugees fleeing the (so-called) civil war in Syria with particular pathos and power. Through what these photographs index, this essay considers what they open up and open on to: the philosophical problematics embedded in the political issues the refugee crisis raises. These issues and problematics are rendered legible in Jacques Derrida’s recently published seminar on the death penalty and in his reflections on cosmopolitanism. Together, they prompt further reflections on what I call spectatorial responsibility as a potential cosmopolitical site.

Drawing from the works of Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, and Jacques Derrida, this article offers a theory of political theology for the contemporary Western liberal nation-state. Taking as its starting point the death penalty, it presents a triune theory of governance—what I call Trinitarian Governmentality—which exposes the thanatopolitical dimension fundamental to the very articulation of sovereign power and, as such, the theologico-political. It is thus only by conceptualizing sovereignty as Trinitarian Governmentality—composed of biopower/oikonomia, disciplinary power/theologia, and pastoral power/eschatologia—that we can begin to address Derrida’s central question: how might we theorize a properly philosophical abolitionism for the present?

I argue that the key ideas of the movement for Black lives have resonances with Frantz Fanon’s ideas particularly in Black Skin, White Masks. I first demonstrate how the mission to repudiate Black demise and affirm Black humanity captures Fanon’s critique of universal humanism. The fear of the Black body was central to the testimonies of Darren Wilson, Jeronimo Yanez, and George Zimmerman (the individuals that shot and killed Mike Brown, Philando Castile, and Trayvon Martin respectively). Fanon prioritized the role of the body in his account of racism. It is difficult to not see the relevance of Fanon’s analysis when one considers these testimonies. Lastly, I demonstrate how the chants “Black lives matter,” “Hands up, don’t shoot,” and “I can’t breathe” are acknowledgments of the significance of Black lives and serve as contemporary instances of Fanon’s sociodiagnostic approach.

In this wide-ranging interview, Gabriel Rockhill discusses his most recent book, Counter-History of the Present, in the broader context of his research to date on aesthetics, politics and history, as well as its relationship to important interlocutors like Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, Jacques Derrida, Frantz Fanon and Simone de Beauvoir. He explains the similarities and important differences between genealogy and counter-history, and he elucidates how his work performs a materialist deconstruction that contests the idealist logocentrism operative in purely textualist modes of interpretation. The interview also develops an account of “radical geography” that calls into question culturalist spatial imaginaries, which plague certain forms of decolonial theory that diminish or efface social stratification and class conflict. The discussion thereby contributes to the development of a new model for critical social theory with an internationalist perspective, which seeks to weave these conceptual innovations into a rigorous and radical materialism.

In relation to the (neo-)Kantian theory that moral judgments are imaginarily grounded, this contribution explores how moral agents experience and make use of this imaginary groundedness. Drawing from a strand of aesthetics that conceives of imagination as make-believe, the imaginary ground of moral judgment is theorized to stem from the interaction between active participants who pretend that their claims are grounded, and passive participants who are invited to go along. Based on this reconstruction, the experience of the moral imaginary is argued to stem from a divided mind. It allows moral agents to be partly devoted to the mental and communicative attitude fitting the fictional world of groundedness, and partly to generating personal responses to moral claims. Using the experience of artistic fiction as an example, the actual experience of morality’s imaginary ground is finally located in the interplay between those two spheres.

This article explores the hypothesis formulated by Derrida in his early work that structuralism is Aristotelian in foundation. To this end, it traces Derrida’s engagement with Aristotle’s Physics between the seminal essays “Force and Signification” (1963) and “Ousia and Grammē” (1968). On the one hand, it demonstrates that Derrida reads Aristotle’s concept of time as the presupposition of what he designates as structuralism, that is, the teleological understanding of movement from its achieved structure and thus from a theological simultaneity. On the other hand, it shows that Derrida finds in the very text of Physics the index (grammē) for understanding movement otherwise: as the irreducible articulation of space and time, namely, the trace, inscribed in a non-simultaneous volume.

This paper develops an ontology of sound from Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of linguistic expression and political communication framed in terms of the instituted-instituting character of the “flesh.” The analysis explores the role of sound and hearing in experiencing and making sense of a world in order to explain two (arguably related) problems: first, the impact of hearing loss on a person’s relations with others and with their environment and, second, the impact of “trump talk” on the fabric of political community. The argument is that hearing loss and “trump talk” weaken or erase what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the “spirit” of communication and intersubjectivity.

This essay pursues the development of Charles Taylor’s ontological thought by comparing his—insightful yet neglected—early paper “Ontology” (1959) with his little-known essay “Ethics and Ontology” (2003) and his most matured ontological position in Retrieving Realism (2015). It also puts a spotlight on Taylor’s unusual “interwoven” mode of argumentation in between ethics, phenomenology, and ontology. In so doing, I aim, first, to show Taylor’s remarkable consistency; second, to unravel his hybrid position in between ethics, phenomenology, and ontology; third, to argue for a tension between Taylor’s phenomenological approach to ethics and his claims about ontology; and, fourth, to highlight his ongoing hesitation with regard to ontological inquiry in general and issues of moral realism in particular.

The aims of this paper are twofold: (1) to critique Graham Harman’s avowedly nonrelational object-oriented ontology from the shared relational vantage of ethics, social philosophy, and feminist new materialism; and (2) to articulate the metaphysical basis for a materialist ontology that serves at once as a posthumanist metaethic, or, as I call it, proto-ethic. The nascent movements of speculative realism and object-oriented ontology suggest some fruitful strategies for challenging the anthropocentrism of the post-Kantian philosophical landscape. They do so, however, by simultaneously foreclosing the possibility of thinking with these strategies to address moral and political problems, insofar as they characterize the real as fundamentally nonrelational. I argue that Harman’s adopted noumenalism is ultimately self-undermining, and offer as an alternative a materialist account of reality as intrinsically phenomenal, where phenomenality is unpacked as the excessive, ongoing source of proto-ethical norms to which every human ethical system implicitly appeals.

The present study is an attempt to contribute to the debates on the relationship between spiritual traditions and Descartes’s Meditations. Taking its point of departure from Pierre Hadot’s inspiring studies, the article aims to describe the nature of the philosophical practice that Meditations embodies and to discuss the ways in which the work can be located in the history of the relations between theory and practice. To this end, Hadot’s suggestion that Meditations should be read as a set of spiritual exercises will be criticized through an analysis of the nature of the “non-argumentative” or “experiential” level that is at work in Descartes’s text. By showing that the transformation intended by Descartes does not reach beyond the level of cognition, it will be argued that even though Descartes makes use of certain key elements of the spiritualist literature, he belongs to the modern age of “philosophy without spirituality.”

How can a set throw itself into itself and remain a set and an element of itself at the same time? This is obviously impossible, as Bertrand Russell has prominently shown. One simply cannot pick a trash can up and throw it into itself. Now, Hegel and Badiou, but also the anti-Hegelian W. Benjamin, take different positions on the subject when they refer time and again to versions of “concrete universality” as an oxymoronic structure that touches ontologically upon their theoretical as well as their practical philosophies. The article tries to show how the philosophers affirm the mentioned paradox as central for the understanding of Dialectical Materialism in its classical (nineteenth-century) as well as in its modern (twentieth-century) and contemporary (twenty-first-century) understanding.

If philosophy in the wake of Kant’s transcendental revolution tends to orient itself around a subjective principle, namely the human subject, then recently various schools of thought have proposed a counterrevolution in which philosophy is given an objective, nonhuman starting point. In this historical context, “object-oriented ontology” has sought to gain the status of first philosophy by identifying being in general with the object as such—that is, by systematically converting beings to objects. By tracing the provenance of this system to a key moment of late eighteenth-century German philosophy, this paper develops the idea of the difference between being and object in order to demonstrate that object-oriented thinking, contrary to its anti-Kantian claims, adheres to the central axiom of transcendental idealism, that this axiom contains an unsolvable paradox, and that Kant and Novalis give us the resources for a transformative philosophical project that meets the challenge of the cultural and theoretical turn to objects.

The question permeating much of Eugen Fink’s work is whether a nonmetaphysical thinking of the world is possible. Fink views metaphysics as understanding the world merely from the side of beings and as a container of things. A nonmetaphysical thinking would be cosmological; it would think the world as a totality, as the origin of being, of beings, of time, and of space. This thinking requires a radical way of thinking that which cannot be thought: the nothing that allows being and beings to come to appearance at all. My analysis aims to articulate more clearly what Fink means by thinking cosmologically by tracing his understanding of world, earth, and cosmos and the interplay of being and nothing at stake in each. I clarify how Fink both inherits and goes beyond the philosophies of Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger to provide a way of thinking through that which resists articulation.

This lecture from 1946 presents Eugen Fink’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s metaphysics. Fink’s aim here is twofold: to work against the trend of psychologistic interpretations of Nietzsche’s work and to perform the philosophical interpretation of Nietzsche he finds lacking in his predecessors. Fink contends that play is the central intuition of Nietzsche’s philosophy, specifically in his rejection of Western metaphysics’ insistence on being and presence. Drawing instead from Heraclitus, Nietzsche argues for an ontology of becoming characterized by the Dionysian as the temporalization of time and the Apollonian as temporalized in time. The play of becoming is thus the cosmic coming to be and passing away of appearance. Playing, as the creative projection of such a play-world of appearing and concealing, is central to understanding the Nietzschean theme of the will to power as the revaluation of values.

This article deals with Alain Badiou’s practical and theoretical engagements with the SONACOTRA rent strike, which ran from 1975 to 1979 and mobilized tens of thousands of immigrant workers across France. Drawing on the work Histoire politique du mouvement des foyers Sonacotra (1981), a retrospective study written collectively by members of Badiou’s Maoist group L’Union des communistes de France marxistes-léninistes (UCMFL), we demonstrate how the practical stakes of the movement were taken up in philosophical form in the contemporaneous text Theory of the Subject. Finally, we suggest that this interweaving of practice and theory is an exemplary instance of Badiou’s conception of politics as the immanent construction of a universal—a conception that links Badiou’s Maoist engagements with his current philosophical and political commitments, from Being and Event to Logics of Worlds.

Badiou’s contemporary claim that truth processes can no longer be considered as indifferent to sexual difference is set here in the context of the French philosophical moment of the second half of the twentieth century—a sequence in which the deployment of the category of “the feminine” by Badiou’s philosophical peers precisely entailed a formalization of women’s different relation to “the symbolic.” When compared, in particular, with the philosophy of sexual difference elaborated by Luce Irigaray, Badiou’s intertwining of “woman,” love, and the universal—both before and after his inflexion on the sexuation of truths—is confronted with the systematic counterproposition of alternative conceptual constellations. Might it not, then, be possible that the comparison of Badiou and Irigaray ultimately brings into play something of the order of a demonstration of thought’s sexuation?

Thomas Nail’s interview with Alain Badiou focuses on the concept of the migrant, or the sans-papiers. Badiou discusses the importance of this concept in his previous work and for contemporary politics. Nail also inquires into Badiou’s involvement with a migrant-focused political organization, L’Organisation politique, as well as his eventual break with the organization.