Philosophy and Theology

Volume 23, Issue 2, 2011

John Hick’s Pluralism
A Reconsideration of Its Philosophical Framework

Hick’s religious pluralism has been a matter of philosophical de­bate for more than two decades. Until recently, the philosophical framework of Hick’s pluralism has elicited a wide range of philosophical criticism. In this paper, I specify three core claims of Hick’s concept pertaining to the philosophical framework of his pluralism that have been under intensive discussion so far: Firstly, the epistemological claim that all exclusive religious truth claims have to be de-emphasised. Secondly, the methodological claim that Hick’s pluralism must be understood as a meta-theory and not as a first-order theory such as, for example, exclusivism. Thirdly, the metaphysical claim that no substantial properties can be ascribed to the noumenal and therefore transcategorial divine reality. I examine these three claims and reconsider Hick’s responses to philosophical objections to these claims. I argue that Hick is not successful in his defense. A reconsideration of these problems shows that all three pluralist claims remain neither compelling nor consistent.