Philo

Volume 10, Issue 1, Spring/Summer 2007

Michelle Beer
Pages 59-65

A Defense of the Co-Reporting Theory of Tensed and Tenseless Essences

The co-reporting theory holds that for every A-sentence-token there is a B-sentence that differs in sense but reports the same event or state of affairs. Thus, if it is now t7, what is reported by now tokening “It is t7 now” is identical with what is reported by tokening “It is t7 at t7.” Quentin Smith has argued that the fact that the sentence-tokens differ in sense but are co-reporting is compatible with the A-theory supposition that their difference in sense consists in the fact that the A-sentence-token alone conveys the information that t7 has an irreducible A-property of presentness. I counter argue that every time the indexical “now” is tokened it expresses, not an irreducible A-property, but a unique individual essence of a moment of time which can be apprehended only at that time.