Phenomenology 2005

Volume 1, Issue Part 1, 2007

Selected Essays from Asia Part 1

Inagaki Satoshi
Pages 175-210

Ich, Leben und Trieb
Das Problem des Ich und des Bewusstseinsstroms bei Husserl

In the Phenomenology of Husserl it is certain that the concept of “I” frames an important sphere of problems. But it is still difficult to say that his concept of “I” is clearly defined. Therefore, in my paper I will illuminate the definition of Husserls concept of “I”. According to Husserl the following thesis is fundamental: The transcendental “I” is always presence (dabei) in all experiences of consciousness. Nevertheless this does not mean that “I” constitutes all experiences of consciousness. Consciousness is nothing else than the consciousness of “I”, but even “I” generates in some kind from consciousness. In the analysis of the stream of consciousness the “generation” of “I” is implicated. During the progress of the genetic analysis it becomes clear, that the stream of consciousness can not be analysed detailed by the egological approach. In the stream of consciousness a phenomenon occurs, alongside the passive synthesis of consciousness, which Husserl described as “Life of drive”.