

IV. SEKTION
LOGIK UND ERKENNTNISTHEORIE.

**GENETIC LOGIC AND THEORY OF REALITY
 ('REAL LOGIC').**

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The paper of which this is an abstract¹, after stating the problem and method of Genetic Logic — as developed in the writer's work cited below — shows:

1. That Genetic Logic *lays the basis for Epistemology* (the theory of the objective reference of knowledge), and —
2. That such an Epistemology, in turn, is the foundation of a *positive doctrine of the meaning of Reality*. This latter problem — that of the meaning of Reality, as indicated by Genetic Logic — I call *Real Logic*.

These two positions are taken up in turn and the following conclusions reached:

I. Genetic Logic and Epistemology.

1. Genetic considerations — as worked out in the writer's *Thought and Things or Genetic Logic*², especially vol. ii., Part iv., establish certain "dualisms and limitations of thought." Thought is found to be a function of dualism in the sense that

¹ Abstract of paper prepared for the Inter. Congress of Philosophy, Heidelberg, September 1908.

² London, Sonnenschein; New-York, Macmillans, i., 1906, ii., 1908; German trans. issued by Barth, Leipzig, vol. i., 1908, vol. ii. in preparation; French trans., Paris, Doin, vol. i., 1908, vol. ii. in preparation. Compare also the writer's work *Development and Evolution* (chap. XIX) in which the requirements of the genetic method are stated; Bergson, *Evolution créatrice* advances similar considerations.

This paper presents some of the conclusions of vol. iii., not yet published.

it *mediates facts or truths through ideas*. By this mediation ideas or representations of all kinds are redistributed to the spheres in which their direct experience placed them. They are thus placed under either an external or an internal *control*, under which they are found to be "true." In this respect, then, thought is "mediate": it mediates a more direct experience and refers to a dual control which is in this sense "remote." This dualism thought as such *cannot escape nor overcome: thought issues in an epistemological dualism*.

2. Thought has limitations in respect to its scope. There are certain experiences whose essential meaning for consciousness cannot be rendered through the mediation which is characteristic of thought, since they escape the grasp of generalization and judgment by which thought proceeds. Such experiences are: the "singular" in certain of its forms (*e. g.*, that which is made singular by the operation of a private and exclusive interest); the "subject-self" presupposed in all acts of thought; and the assumptive or imaginative suggestion (or "schema") when it is still personal to the individual's psychic life. Immediate *worth* experiences, also, lose their directness and full meaning when rendered descriptively in judgment. We conclude, therefore, that thought is limited in its rendering of experience, and that there must be a resort to some other function if the types of meaning mentioned above are to be given any epistemological value. Or more positively — the meaning of whatever there is, beyond the psychic life itself, is not exhausted by thought; but the *alogical meanings must have their place also in the theory of what is real*.

3. In general, then, we may say that thought is only one mode in which what is "real" is apprehended. Besides the "real" given as "truth", there are other modes of "realizing" which have their own claim to recognition in the epistemological interpretation of experience as a whole. The further problem, therefore, that of *Real Logic*, is the problem of finding that experience in which the several modes of "finding-real" are all included and intrinsically satisfied.

II. *Real Logic.*

The problem thus raised requires, first, a criticism and interpretation of each of the modes of "realizing" or "finding-real"

similar to that given above to thought. We apprehend reality *perceptually*, we realize it *emotionally*, we postulate it *ethically* and *religiously*, we live it *mystically*, we contemplate it *æsthetically* — all these must have the same thorough criticism and estimation that we accord to the rationalists' and logicians' special mode, — that of the real rendered as "the true." And the problem of Real Logic becomes that of finding the "logic" of the adjustments of these modes of the real, each having its own place and meaning, in the final "real" significance of experience. As epistemology, — that is a theory of the objective reference of knowledge — has *its* logic in the machinery of discursive thinking, so each of the other modes of finding the real has a "logic" of *its* operation in the economy of experience as a whole.

This study has led the writer to certain conclusions in accordance with which he finds the unifying mode of experience to be in its type that of *æsthetic contemplation*. He has presented in a preliminary way certain of the grounds for this conclusion, as well as certain implications of it, in an article entitled "Knowledge and Imagination" in the *Psychological Review*, May, 1908 (especially pp. 189ff.) from which the following quotations are made (somewhat modified): "In the æsthetic construction we find a mode of imaginative cognition which is motived not by the interest of extending knowledge nor by that of seeking satisfactions or working practical effects. It is a way of treating a content which we may properly describe as both *over-logical* and *over-practical*. The interest involved is intrinsic, as opposed both to the theoretical and also to the practical." "The outcome of my investigation is that in the æsthetic mode of experience, so defined, we have the only inkling of the way that the self-reality of inner control, which is the postulate of the voluntary and worthwhile, and the thing-reality of external control, which is the postulate of knowledge and truth, can in the process of experience come together, after having fallen apart in the development of cognition." . . . "The protest of the æsthetic imagination is always against partiality as among the modes of 'real' meaning. Its own ideal, on the contrary, is one of completeness, of reunion; it gives the 'real' which is absolute in the sense that its object is not relative to — and does not fulfill — one type of interest only."

... "If we use the word 'contemplative' to describe the cognitive aspect of the æsthetic consciousness, it should be given this full meaning: the self 'contemplates' a content when it reads it as *ideally truthful and so real for knowledge*, and also as, in its own mode and meaning, *ideally worthful and so real for will*; and in this union of controls, the earlier mediation of 'remote' realities gives place to the *immediateness of the real in feeling*." ... "The object of contemplative interest is thus not only an object, but an object that embodies and completes the self. The self is realized in it, and the experience becomes one that may be called absolute in certain well defined senses" (explained in the article from which this is quoted)... "Allowing each mode of psychic function its chance to make out what 'real' it can in its own way, we find that the æsthetic mode of realizing gets the only meaning that can be called in any intelligible sense absolute. The word 'realize' as popularly used indeed suggests a more adequate experience than that of the 'finding-real' of logical proof or the 'assuming real' of practical life."¹

¹ The article referred to (Psychological Review, May, 1908) summarizes certain of the principal positions of volumes I. and II. of my work, and shows the connection between the earlier stages of imaginative cognition (in which the quasi-æsthetic or 'semblant' type of immediacy appears) and the æsthetic proper.
