

when it comes to phenomena so complex as races and nations, some things must be left unexplained. For this reason the book before us suffers in comparison with Professor Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics*. The latter is less literary and less entertaining; but perhaps for that very reason it conveys the impression of being more restrained and judicial. Furthermore, Professor Dewey is more skilful in his selection of a formula, for one can deduce at least twice as much from dualism as from egotism.

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*Religious Values and Intellectual Consistency.* EDWARD HARTMAN REISNER. New York: The Science Press. 1915. Pp. 59.

What do we mean nowadays by the words God and Religion? and can we really mean much of anything and yet be intellectually consistent? These are the questions that Dr. Reisner tries to answer in this book, which was his thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

The author defines religion as an emotional attitude towards the whole of one's experience, and as concerned with judgments of value. Therefore it demands intellectual consistency. The concept of God has always done duty as the guardian of values, and so an historical survey of the God concept may throw light on some of the difficulties of religious philosophy.

The author then gives an account of the growth of Christian dogma and its disintegration, due to the growth of science and to the fact that the critical philosophy of the eighteenth century undermined the intellectual foundations of classical Christianity. The followers of Kant tried to rebuild religion on a basis of absolute idealism. Dr. Reisner gives the usual criticism of Fichte, Hegel, and Royce, and finds that idealism and its absolute have not succeeded in finding a metaphysical basis for the concept of God which is intellectually consistent.

The author then attempts to analyze the concept of God as it exists to-day in the minds of educated people. He believes that any attempt to find a God through philosophy will fail—"God must exist to be discovered and described." He finds that the God concept of the present time is a name representative of certain values, and that "the conception of God as a Being represents an historical phase of religion that modern scientific knowledge finds no place for." Religion is a natural, psychological product and must be founded on an empirical basis. There are religious experiences that are genuine and real, and for the religious man who is also scientific, God might well be the name or symbol for these experiences. "God is the name for the reality of religious experiences; the religious

experiences are the reality of God. God and religion are synonymous, and both stand for the reality of a realized or realizable experience."

The constructive part of this book is so interesting and alive that one regrets that so much space was given to the rather formal and perfunctory refutation of absolute idealism, which nowadays is hardly enough of a bug-a-boo to demand such a thoroughgoing exposure. The kind of discussion that centers around the author's ideas of religious values and religious experiences is the kind of discussion that people of to-day, vitally interested in religion as a fact of life, welcome and find interesting, although many may not agree with the author's conclusions.

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### JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. February, 1917. *Le langage* (pp. 105-131): DR. BARAT. - The author, following P. Marie, insists that aphasias involve a certain intellectual trouble. "That which is specific in aphasic troubles, is the injury, not of intellectual activity as applied to the comprehension of signs, but of the materials and tools of logical thought. These tools and materials are the automatic associations which intervene in the coordination of phonetic movements, in the analysis and interpretation of the sensation, in the evocation and identification of images." *La fonction et l'idéal de la géométrie* (pp. 132-170): PAUL DUPONT. - Chief conclusions: "the order of first propositions of geometry is not necessary and that of the classic treatises does not appear best. . . ." Classical geometry fails in that "it appeals to the three notions of plane, point, and straight line without defining them completely and employs confusedly unconscious postulates"; "it introduces the postulate of Euclid under censurable forms." These errors are to be redressed by taking as primitively given only the notions of the point (element), and the variable coupling of two points (relation); by reforming the theory of parallels, and by "giving to the postulate of Euclid a form relative to the primitive elements of the point and coupling drawn directly from nature." *L'idéalisme positif* (pp. 171-189) (to be continued): DR. GRASSET. - Positive idealism, holding the idea or the human psychic fact as the base of all knowledge, and accepting the positive method, is grounded on human biology. The psychic fact is a cerebral cortical fact, and, therefore, somatic and physiological. "Superior psychic acts" are voluntary and conscious: "inferior psychic acts" are automatic and