

applicable to esthetic enjoyment in general, but is classified as descriptive of the motor-sensory type only. Hence the analyses of Lipps and of Lee and Thompson are valid only for a limited class of observers. The author, however, does not submit any specific introspective reports. His final characterization of art enjoyment describes it as a general enhancement of our psychical life, a heightening of our whole life-feeling, and as a pleasure which carries its worth in itself.

The second book emphasizes the difference between the esthetic attitude and the productive, and indicates the essential community between the artist and the artisan. The creative impulse is an intoxication and ecstasy. Its sudden onset and impersonality are commented on. The technical expression is so intimate a part of the artist's thought that the artist seems to think best when the tools of his craft are actually in his hand.

The third book attempts to show a correspondence between the most fundamental forms of art and various forms of human functioning. Thus rhythm—as many writers have shown—is a favorable and economic form for activity in general to take. Consonance in music and rhyme in poetry afford a maximal impression with a minimal expenditure of energy. The same formula applies to art forms which appeal to the eye.

The fourth book gives, as the most important principle of esthetic evaluation, the principle of extensity. This means that the work of art which occasions the greatest sum of value-feelings has the highest worth, but "greatest extensity of value" is not the same as the judgment of the majority at any one time, for it takes into account the duration of such judgments. The conclusion emphasizes the close connection between art and life, and dwells on the stimulative power of art. The general standpoint of the book has much in common with Guyau, whom, however, the author does not seem consciously to follow.

The work is difficult to judge. It is not a history of esthetics or of art-theory, it does not present any well-elaborated or strikingly original standpoint, nor can it be accepted as an adequate survey of the present status of psychological esthetics. (It is, for example, surprising that in a discussion of rhythm there should be no mention of Hurst and McKay, Awramoff, Wallin, Miner, Stetson or Macdougall, and that in visual esthetics the important experimental work of Witmer, Martin, Puffer, and Rowland should be entirely overlooked.) Yet Freienfels's work is not without interest and value. The author's judgment is at all points moderate and sane. Perhaps the most timely and readable part is the concluding chapter on art in its relation to life as a whole.

KATE GORDON.

LOS ANGELES.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. January, 1913. *Vingtième année* (pp. 1-12): M. DE WULF.—An account of the

work and programme of the *Revue Neo-Scholastique* during the last twenty years. *La démonstration métaphysique du libre arbitre* (pp. 13-38): P. DE MUNYINCK. - In order to prove the existence of free will, we must not resort to the testimony of consciousness, as has been done too often since Descartes, but to the metaphysical argument. *Les caractères de la Philosophie moderne* (pp. 39-51): L. DE LANTSHEERE. - Modern philosophy differs from ancient and medieval thought by its independence from religion, its lack of respect for authority, its mechanical conception of the universe, and the importance it attaches to the problem of knowledge. *Roger Bacon et la composition des trois "Opus"* (pp. 52-68): P. MANDONNET. - Contrary to ordinary belief, the "Opus majus" was not completed before the "Opus minus et tertius," but afterwards, in 1268. The Opus minus and tertius have remained incomplete; but they were interrupted in or before the year 1267. *L'expérience religieuse et la Philosophie de W. James* (pp. 69-87): G. LEGRAND. - Interesting, suggestive, fraught with just and precious reflections, James's religious conception presents multiple inconsistencies due to the pragmatic spirit lying at its foundation. *Le mouvement néo-scholastique*: M. DE WULF. *Comptes rendus*. W. Mackenzie, *Alle fonti della vita*: F. PALHORIÈS. L. Habrich, *Psychologie pédagogique*: F. FRANSEN. M. Losacco, *Razionalismo e misticismo*: B. NARDI. B. Varisco, *Conosci te stesso*: F. PALHORIÈS. E. Troilo, *Il Positivismo e i diritti dello spirito*: F. PALHORIÈS. A. Schmid, *Geheimrat Dr. Alois Ritter v. Schmid*: A. PELZER. E. Dupreel, *Le rapport social*: G. LEGRAND. *Piccola bibliotheca scientifica della Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scholastica*: J. VAN MOLLÉ. J. Gredt, *Elementa philosophiæ aristotelico-thomisticæ*: N. BALTHASAR. P. L. Rodes, *De los cuerpos reales al eter hipotético*: J. LEMAIRE. B. Rawitz, *Der Mensch*: J. VAN MOLLE. *Sommaire idéologique des ouvrages et des revues de philosophie*.

REVUE DE THEOLOGIE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE. January, 1913. *Des fictions dans la science et dans la vie humaine* (pp. 12-33): P. BRIDEL. - A critical analysis of Vaihinger's "Die Philosophie des Als Ob," a work written in 1876, and which presents a striking similarity, on the one hand, to the pragmatic theory of reality, and, on the other hand, to Santayana's conception of religion. *Le cardinal Charles Borromée* (pp. 34-50): E. CHOISY. - Charles Borromeo is a beautiful character, a great reformer of the church, a statesman, a leader. Similar to Calvin in many respects, he lacks his political and theological genius. His religion is the Roman religion; it is not the religion of moral conscience and of the grace of God which is in Jesus Christ. *Charles Secrétan: L'évolution de sa pensée* (pp. 51-62). A. MAURER. - Although generally classified as a disciple of Schelling, Secretan is not the man of a system. He is in many respects a precursor of Bergson and James, and also the creator of a conception of universal life which is perhaps destined to become the leading idea of the future. *Expérience religieuse et psychologie de la religion* (pp. 63-81): E. LOMBARD. There is, properly speaking, no religious experience. There are, however, emotional experi-

ences with regard to which religion plays the part of a super-experience. *Revue générale. Miscellanées.*

- Myers, Garry C. A Study in Incidental Memory. Archives of Psychology, Number 26. New York: The Science Press. 1913. Pp. iii + 108.
- Patrick, M. L. and G. T. W. Külpe's The Philosophy of the Present in Germany. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. vii + 256.
- Town, Clara H. Binet's and Simon's A Method of Measuring the Development of the Intelligence of Young Children. Second edition. Lincoln, Ill.: The Courier Company. 1913. Pp. 82.

NOTES AND NEWS

LETTER FROM PROFESSOR HEIDEL

TO THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS:

In my review of Cornford's "From Religion to Philosophy," published in this JOURNAL (Volume X., page 103), I said (p. 106) that Professor John Burnet had in a private communication virtually retracted the statements regarding φύσις made in his "Early Greek Philosophy" (p. 12 sq.). I find that Professor Burnet did not so intend his remarks, and I therefore cheerfully withdraw my comment. At his suggestion I here set down the text of the communication to which I alluded. It is dated January 30, 1910, and refers to my *Περὶ Φύσεως*:

'I have to thank you for sending me your paper. I think that there is probably less difference between us than you seem to suppose. I was concerned chiefly to call attention to what appeared to me at the time to be a generally neglected view of the meaning of the term. You fully admit that it has this meaning among others. It is thus a matter of degree. For reasons which I can hardly go into now, you seem to me to have inclined the scale too far in one direction, as I very possibly have done in another. You may be sure that what you say will be fully and respectfully dealt with the next time an opportunity offers. One thing is absolutely certain, and that is that you are right in making so much of the Hippokratean uses of the word, and that you have done a most valuable piece of work in bringing so much material together.'

Since the point at issue is whether Professor Burnet intended to retract his statements in question and I now know that he did not, I refrain from further comment at this time. If he ever discusses φύσις again, as I hope he will, there may be occasion to reopen the debate regarding the meaning and implications of the term.

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