

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. December, 1912. *La méthode pathologique et le langage actuel* (pp. 545-567): F. LE DANTEC. - Objections to the analytic method on account of its tendency to isolate elements that really have no existence outside of a complex whole. *La signification et la valeur du pragmatisme* (pp. 568-601): H. ROBET. - Pragmatism bridges the gulf between the intelligence and the heart in which A. Comte saw the chief characteristic of the spirit of modern times. *Vers une nouvelle conception du temps?* (pp. 602-616): J. PÉRÈS. - Time is "the condition of that which not only has not its cause in itself, but also imposes on us, in order to be thought, a regression from cause to cause, and also an anticipation of ends, themselves less than more remote ends." *Revue critique*. F. Le Dantec, *Contre la métaphysique*: F. PAULHAN. *Analyses et comptes rendus*. Meyerson, *Identité et réalité*: A. PENJON. Larguier des Bancelles, *Le goût et l'odorat*: J. DAGNAN-BOUVERET. Dr. J. Grasset, *Traité élémentaire de physiopathologie clinique*: PH. CHASLIN. J. de la Vaissière, *Éléments de psychologie expérimentale*: TH. RIBOT. A. Marceron, *La morale par l'État*: M. CONSTANT. *Notices bibliographiques*. *Revue des périodiques étrangers*.

Freud, Sigmund. *The Interpretation of Dreams*. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. xiii + 510.

La Mettrie, Julien Offray. *Man a Machine*. Chicago: The Open Court. 1912. Pp. 216.

Myers, Philip Van Ness. *History as Past Ethics*. New York: Ginn and Company. 1913. Pp. xii + 387. \$1.50.

Rolfes, Eug. Aristoteles Politik. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner. 1912. Pp. xvi + 323. 4.50 M.

Seligman, Edwin R. A. *Essays in Taxation*. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. xi + 707. \$4.00.

Wundt, Wilhelm. *Die Psychologie in Kampf ums Dasein*. Leipzig: Alfred Kröner. 1913. Pp. 38. 1 M.

NOTES AND NEWS

AT the meeting of the Aristotelian Society on April 7, Professor Josiah Royce was elected a corresponding member, and Mr. A. C. Ionides was elected a member. Mr. W. W. Carlile read a paper on "Kant's Transcendental Esthetics, with some of its Ultimate Bearings." Kant's *a-priorism* was based on the view that necessary truth tells us not only what is, but also what must be. It could only do this, Kant held, because it was of *a priori* origin. But in as far as necessary truths rest on the law of contradiction, it must be the case that the denial of them would contradict at the end of the sentence some statement made or implied at its beginning. If this was so, however, their origin could have nothing to do