

of the major, and in this manner we can develop the ten modes of each figure symmetrically. The third figure with its fourteen modes introduces a slight asymmetry unless we extend the modes of the first two figures by weakened conclusions, which M. Lachelier rightly concludes is too high a price to pay for symmetry.

The paper may be of interest to those still delighting in the artificialities of syllogistic and unwilling to deal with them by the method of Mrs. Ladd-Franklin, which dooms such discussions of modes and figures by laying bare the real nature of the formal reasoning involved.

HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

## JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. February, 1906, Band 12, Heft 1. *Ueber Begriffe, Definitionen und mathematische Phantasie* (pp. 1-32): K. GEISSLER. — All proper definition rests on elements that can not be defined, but which do exist. Mathematicians who disregard this general principle either indulge in mere word-spinning or at least have an erroneous conception of their work. They introduce new elements into the web of demonstration without either defining them or making it clear whether their existence is real or imaginary. Like Kant they suppose the definitions of point, line, etc., to be independent of each other, and yet to permit of synthetic, *a priori* judgments. To be concluded. *De Voluntate* (pp. 33-54): B. LENCKE. — Our knowledge of the will is in part antecedent of all experiences, for the following axioms do not depend on experience; will always refers to some *thing*; in every will there are two kinds, desire and aversion; there is degree; and there is a will-zero, or indifference; will is a continuity of degree, not of parts; no change of degree in will occurs without a cause. Will itself must be known *a priori*. Will is a movement which is known only from one side. The law of desire is, the further an object is removed the greater is the possibility of desire for it. The law of aversion is that the nearer the object the greater the possibility of aversion. *Exakte Darstellung aller Urteile und Schlüsse* (pp. 55-58): HOFFMANN. *Bei welchen Tatsachen findet die wissenschaftliche Begründung der Erscheinung ihre Grenzen?* (pp. 59-65): R. SKALA. — *Hume's Theorie der Leichtgläubigkeit der Menschen und Kritik dieser Theorie* (pp. 66-83): B. WITICO. — The source of credulity is in childhood, preceding reflection. *Ueber Phantasiegefühle II.* (pp. 84-103): E. SCHWARTZ. — The joy of an event imagined springs not from the presence of the idea of that event, but from the judgment present that the event will occur. The intensity of 'fancy-feelings' varies according to four factors: the ideas that excite them, the 'earnest-feelings' to which they are related, the presence of a disposition to related earnest-feelings, and the emotional environment. *Die Metaphysik des XX Jahrhunderts als induktive Wissenschaft* (pp. 104-113): L. POHORILLES. — Transcendental realism clears the way for an inductive

science of metaphysics. *Two Forms of Monism* (pp. 114-120): J. LINDSAY. - An argument for spiritualistic as contrasted with scientific monism. *Jahresbericht über die Literatur zur Metaphysik* (pp. 121-140): D. KOIGEN. - This is chiefly given to Fr. Wyneken's 'Das Ding an sich und das Naturgesetz der Seele.' *Die neueste Erscheinungen. Zeitschriften.*

Guenther, Conrad. *Darwinism and the Problems of Life: A Study of Familiar Animal Life.* Translated by Joseph McCabe. London: A. Owen & Co. 1906. Pp. 436. 12s 6d net.

Jennings, H. S. *Behavior of the Lower Organisms.* A study of the objective processes exhibited in the behavior of the lower organisms, particularly the lower animals. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1906. Pp. viii + 366. \$3.

Klemm, Otto. *G. B. Vico als Geschichtsphilosoph und Völkerpsycholog.* Leipzig: Engelmann. 1906. Pp. xii + 235.

Souriau, Paul. *La rêverie esthétique.* Paris: Alcan. 1906. Pp. 169.

Strowski, Fortunat. *Les grands philosophes-Montaigne.* Paris: Alcan. 1906. Pp. viii + 356.

Wundt, Wilhelm. *Logik: Ein Untersuchung der Prinzipien der Erkenntnis und der Methoden wissenschaftlicher Forschung.* Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke. 1906. Pp. xiv + 650.

## NOTES AND NEWS

THE George Combe lectureship in general and experimental psychology at the University of Edinburgh will be filled by Dr. W. G. Smith, who withdraws from the position of assistant lecturer and senior demonstrator in physiology and lecturer in experimental psychology at Liverpool University.

DR. W. B. SMITH, recently elected to the chair of philosophy at the Tulane University of Louisiana, New Orleans, will spend the coming year in Europe, on leave of absence. His place will be filled, meanwhile, by Dr. Percy Hughes, formerly assistant in philosophy in Columbia University and instructor in philosophy in the University of Minnesota.

DR. WARNER FITE, adjunct professor of philosophy in the University of Texas, has been appointed junior professor of philosophy in the University of Indiana.

MR. D. J. COWLING, formerly assistant in the psychological laboratory of Yale University, has received the appointment of assistant professor of philosophy in Baker University, Kansas.

DR. NORMAN SMITH has been called from the University of Glasgow to fill the Stuart professorship of psychology at Princeton University, recently vacated by Professor Thilly.

PROFESSOR WILHELM OSTWALD will take the place on the International Atomic Weights Subcommittee vacated by Professor K. Seubert.