

mildest, nihilistic when explicitly developed. If the X-ray theorist had contended that his effects were produced not by any physical agency at all, but by dematerialized spirits, and if the appearances of radioactivity were to be interpreted as indicative of some superphysical influence subversive of all existing principles, then the analogy would begin to hold. But the X-ray and the radium phenomena found a place within the pale, and not beyond it; and therein lies the difference between the extreme right and the extreme left. The psychical researcher turns over the ordinary hallucination or dream to the psychologist, but reserves the 'veridical' hallucination for himself as in content significant of the play of agencies unnecessary and unrelated to the principles that shall (and incompletely do) account for the psychology of hallucinations. A physics of this type would be just as unphysical as a psychology is unpsychological. There would be the usual movement of matter by the application of material forces; and by exception chairs and tables would occasionally perform excursions without contact, through hidden 'spiritual' or other agencies. Ordinarily inert bodies would behave without regard to human desires; but in critical situations they would save the day by provident intervention. There is no mean. One can not bring in the Southern verdict of 'almost guilty,' or claim that events are almost providential. Whatever one may be willing to yield to Dr. Hyslop's interest in his investigations and their possible significance, there must be no mincing of issues, and there must be no concession to his contention that he is in any scientific sense investigating the residual phenomena of psychology. That unfortunate term 'psychical research' must not be held responsible for the irrelevancy of its nomenclature; but it is wholly fair to demand of its sponsors that they accept the consequences of their philosophic conceptions. They are not proposing to add or extend the realm of present-day science, but are claiming an adumbration of another world beyond. Dr. Hyslop has enrolled himself unmistakably with the prophets. He must be content to go without honor in the country that he has deserted. And yet it is to be held fortunate that an exponent of a faith that makes slight appeal to those who stand with the reviewer should find a spokesman who in general has so capable a comprehension of the philosophical implications of his enigmas.

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*Association des idées chez les idiots et les imbéciles.* BOULANGER and HERMANT. Ghent: A. Vanderhaegen. 1906. Pp. 137.

The authors begin with a short review of the association theory, and after this presentation of the laws of thought of the normal individual they discuss the associations of ideas in the idiot.

In order that sensations or images arising from them may enter into the associative life of the idiot, these sensations must appear with more marked intensity than is the case in the normal individual. In the latter, sensations and representations may exist in the hazy realm just outside

of the clear field of consciousness, but yet by their associations may play an important part in determining what elements shall arise above the threshold of consciousness. In the idiot the only associations possible are between elements which enter into full consciousness and possess a definite intensity; the subconscious here plays little part, and this want in the mentation of the idiot makes his mental life simple, rude and clear-cut. In the normal individual every sensation may touch by numerous associations an infinite variety of conscious or subconscious elements, and this interdependence of all the mental elements constitutes the unity of a personality; the variety of the reactions of the individual depends upon the complex association of conscious and subconscious elements; such a variety of reaction is not possible to the idiot, where associations are few but rigid; thus an almost fatal automatism replaces the spontaneous choice of the normal man. The dearth and fixity of their associations are shown by the fact that as a rule idiots give the same association when the association series is reversed, that is, when a previous answer is now used as reaction word. On the average the normal individual gives the original test word in only 30 to 50 per cent. of the reactions. As the receptive activities of the idiot are coarse and limited, so his reactions to the environment lack the great variety of choice of the developed individual. As to the detailed mental attainments of the idiot, the notion of an object, of property, of place relation and of causality—all these are within his competence; his logic is that of the normal individual. The mentality of the idiot is poor, but not distorted. In some respects the idiot resembles a child, but he wants the imaginative wealth of the latter. The idiot is stable, with an undeveloped mind, while the imbecile is unstable; the attention of the imbecile may be momentarily good, but is extremely fugitive; while the idiot is too little developed to lie, the imbecile is a born liar.

The authors come to certain practical conclusions with regard to the education of the idiot. In the sphere of the concrete the idiot by frequent association can arrive at a considerable height of development; he may become even an expert artisan, but his education must always be by the concrete, and to attempt to inculcate higher abstract ideas, such as the idea of God, of the soul, etc., is to waste one's time and to run the risk of distorting those faculties which he does possess.

The work as a whole is conscientious and gives a fair analysis of the intellectual aspect of the mental life of the idiot, but such a work is necessarily rather barren. When attention is considered a mere form of association, then, of course, the interests of the individual are merely dissolved into a sequence of associated ideas and the whole mental life is presented as nothing more than a sequence of ideas devoid of feeling tone and stripped of their dynamic equivalent. In such a case we are no longer dealing with concrete facts; the chief psychological value of an investigation of the associations of an individual, or of a group, would be in enabling us to determine the trends and interests and types of reaction of that individual, or group; but to do this the ideas must

always be considered in their relation to the living organism whose ideas they are. The authors, for example, explain the idea of property as depending upon the association between the idea of an object and that of an individual; they make no reference at all to the feelings which accompany personal possession. In the education of the idiot the question of the interests, the likes and dislikes of the individual, play an important rôle, to which the authors do not refer.

While the work is an interesting psychological analysis, it contributes little to our knowledge of the mental life of the idiot. There is no attempt made to discuss the imbecile in any detail.

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*La proposition et le syllogisme.* J. LACHELIER. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, March, 1906. Pp. 135-164.

The author distinguishes relative propositions from propositions of 'inherence,' such as 'Peter is a man' and 'all men are mortal' which 'analyze existence.' Both sorts of propositions give rise to syllogisms, but the laws of the former are said to be more akin to mathematics than to traditional logic. It seems to me, however, that from the standpoint of modern formal logic, if difference is to be made, quite the reverse is true with respect to their kinship to mathematics, for propositions of 'inherence' lend themselves readily to the operations of a calculus, while relative propositions do so only by elaborate particularizations and restrictions.

Propositions of 'inherence,' with which the paper is alone concerned, are of three distinct sorts, singular, general and collective. Our author thinks that general and collective propositions should always be sharply distinguished because the former, unlike the latter, do not depend upon a number of defined individuals. Collective propositions are 'determined' or 'undetermined,' for example, 'all the members of this family are well informed' and 'some of the members of this family are well informed.' General propositions are universal or particular, and they may also be understood in two senses: an abstract sense by which the quality 'man' implies the quality 'mortal,' and a concrete sense by which any being having the one quality has also the other. Formal logic has confused the relations of all but universals and particulars by treating singulars as universals and confusing collectives with generals.

As to the syllogism, there are three figures having the following relations: the first figure alone can prove a proposition of inherence, the second overthrows the minor of the first, and the third overthrows the major of the first. Keeping the five sorts of propositions in mind, the modes of the first two figures are ten each, but the third has fourteen modes. If in the first figure we substitute for the minor the contradiction of the conclusion, we demonstrate in the second figure the contradiction of the minor, and if we substitute for the major the contradiction of the conclusion, we demonstrate in the third figure the contradiction