

It is a little startling, *e. g.*, to have to think of the absolute as morbidly dissociated, or even as downright mad. But a really resolute monist would not allow himself to be staggered by such inferences. For (1) the objection to a mad absolute is only an ethical prejudice. And he would have read Mr. Bradley to little purpose,¹ if he had not learnt that ethical prejudices go for very little in the realm of high metaphysics, that the moral point of view must not be made absolute, and that to make it so would be the death of the metaphysic of the absolute. The fact, therefore, that to our human thinking a dissociated absolute would be mad, would only prove the limitations of our finite intelligence and should not derogate from its infinite perfection. Moreover, (2) if the absolute is to include the whole of a world which contains madness, it is clear that, anyhow, it must, in a sense, be mad. The appearance, that is, which is judged by us to be madness must be essential to the absolute's perfection. All that the analogy suggested does is to ascribe a somewhat higher degree of reality to the madness in the absolute.

Less stalwart monists no doubt may be a little dismayed by these implications of their creed, and even disposed to develop scruples as to whether, when pursued into details, its superiority over pluralism is quite so pronounced as they had imagined; but in metaphysics at least we must never scruple to be consistent, nor timorously hesitate to follow an argument whithersoever it leads. It must, therefore, be insisted on that idealistic monism is a perfectly thinkable, if not exactly an alluring, theory. Hence even a disbeliever in it may display a certain intellectual sympathy with it by helping to work out its real meaning more clearly than its advocates have hitherto succeeded in doing, or the public in understanding.

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THE GENESIS OF IDEALS

I

THE ideal too frequently in discussion is an *ignis fatuus*.¹ The reason for this is that, being a complex idea which, through repetition, has become familiar to ear and tongue, we mistake this familiarity for intelligent understanding, and presuppose a common

¹ See 'Appearance and Reality,' Ch. 25.

¹ If in this paper we speak more frequently with reference to moral ideals, it is because these are most frequently called in question, not because the position for which we argue would fail of illustration in other departments where ideals are functional.

meaning where, in fact, we have little more than incompatible sense experiences, fused with vague emotional reactions which color the discourse as long as it continues. So little, as a rule, do we demand of ourselves in the way of clear and distinct ideas when we are concerned with the problem of life! It is only a particular application of the same presumption that we know without inquiring, that we find illustrated, in regard to this same class of problems, by two characteristic attitudes that, for convenience, we may call, respectively, the naturalistic and the theological.² With both it is a question of *where* the ideal is to be affirmed; neither raises the previous question of *what* an ideal is. With the one, the ideal has an objective character, an existence outside the individual consciousness, to which the individual consciousness may progressively approach, but which it may not comprehend. To know it, to bring it within terms of a scientific definition, according to this view, would endanger its ideal character and destroy its value as a moral force. With the other, the ideal must find its place within the experience of those in whom it is operative, but then it is no longer an ideal, but just a bit of the common experience of common men. On this view, the only improvement is self-improvement. Between these two accounts we are left to face a dilemma somewhat significant of the moral situation of the day. For if the ideal is objective, in the sense acknowledged by both, it is incapable of affecting the life of men; if it is subjective, it is no longer an ideal. The naturalistic and the theological interpretations cancel each other, for, according to the former, the organizing factor of life may be moral, but it is not ideal; according to the latter, it is ideal, but can not be moral.

The method that underlies each of these views, however different their standpoints, is the same. Each undertakes to construe life from an abstract point of departure; the one taking it as a series of facts to be described, the other regarding it as a plastic continuum to be moulded and shaped. Neither of these attitudes is adequate. Life is not a series of facts any more than a series of impressions. It is, in some sense, both. Hence when we come to consider the subject of ideals, we find that, to do justice to each of the views referred to, we are driven to the concrete facts of experience, to life as it manifests itself in the complex relationships defined by our intercourse with one another in the various interests of the family, the business, the society, etc.³ But the recognition of this

² With the distinction suggested in this paragraph may be compared Baldwin's 'Autonomy' and 'Heteronomy' ('Social and Ethical Interpretations,' pp. 251, 252).

³ This statement is intended to apply to both the theoretical and the practical interests, in each of which advancement is marked by the ability to give

implies more than a compromise between the naturalistic and the theological attitudes of mind; it requires the substitution of a scientific⁴ temper and method, and a reconstruction of the problem itself. Only a careful and exact study of the facts of life can solve the questions that life itself suggests. We are led, consequently, to a consideration of the relationships in and through which the ideal both is and undergoes development. These relationships are, of course, those that are designated, broadly, as social. An accurate social psychology must underlie any adequate philosophy of the social relations.

II

We have pointed out in another connection that imitation is the instrument, *par excellence*, of social organization.⁵ This, we maintained, is true whether we have regard to the conformities or to the variations that are characteristic of every normal social group. Through it *both* conservation *and* development are brought about. We revert to the position here because it is opposed, in some of its features, to the view of Baldwin, and because it is fundamental to the exposition of the concept of the ideal. To refer briefly to Baldwin's statement, he holds that 'the reign of imitative feeling and impulse, whether it be by instinct or by suggestion, would make possible only the form of organization in which fixed habit is all, and in which no accommodation, movement, progress, would take place.'⁶ That imitation works, by instinct and by suggestion, toward the fixation of habit, there is no reason to dispute, but that it does *only* this, especially when the statement is taken to exclude 'accommodation,' may be regarded an open question. Unless there were adaptation to another or others within the social organization, that is, without 'accommodation,' there would be nothing corresponding to what, in the place referred to, we have called 'conformity,' and what Baldwin means by 'fixed habit.' By habit as a social phenomenon must be understood the common modes of behavior which have or have acquired the standing of conventions. Every society is directly interested in maintaining a conventional morality—if, indeed, this not a pleonasm—and, therefore, in putting a premium on certain habits. Accommodation, consequently, must be looked upon as tending to the the data under consideration an ideal reconstruction. In the broadest sense, the entire history of human progress lies at the foundation of the science of the ideal.

⁴ The term 'scientific,' as used here, is intentionally broader than the term 'naturalistic.' It is an interesting *petitio principii* that makes them synonymous.

⁵ This JOURNAL, Vol. III., p. 405 ff.

⁶ 'Social and Ethical Interpretations,' p. 489.

permanency of the social group through the emphasis it gives to a selected set of motor reactions.

But this should not be taken to mean that accommodation leaves no room within the group for variety and change. It may be, as Baldwin holds, that the term covers a broader range of fact in which difference is a characteristic feature. Social situations are never—or rarely—simple, and require, for their practical solution, modifications of the conventional forms of behavior. We have to learn, as we say, to accommodate ourselves to new conditions. And they are, of course, the novel situations that emphasize the limitations of imitation. But the fact to be noted is that there are no novel situations, any more than there are conventional ones, which are only and wholly resolvable on the basis of imitation.⁷ The repetition of old relations without points of novelty, and the presentation of new ones without points of similarity, are equally incapable of arousing psychological attitudes of any *social* significance. In the former case, we should have such a complete mechanization of the required reactions that their social value for the subject himself would be reduced to zero; in the other, a complete arrest of mental movement. But of the two conditions, the latter is the more vitally important. For here we have theoretically the situation of any given subject at the beginning of his psychophysiological existence. He is, in view of the undiscovered social world around him, merely a potentiality; but a potentiality in this sense is more dynamically momentous than an actualized mind which has exhausted the possibilities, either in whole or in part, of life. The first reaction of such a subject can not be called imitative, however near to or far from those actions it may be which, for sufficient reason, deserve that name. It can not be on Baldwin's theory, because 'thoughts' are the proper material of social organization;⁸ it can not be on our own, because imitation is always a reproductive affair.⁹ But if imitation is to work in the interests of social organization by its incorporation of thought material, it may be well to ask how, if not through the development of the imitative process, the subject comes to think at all. Either, it would seem, imitation is the instrument of both difference and likeness, or the subject from the start must be capable of thought. In the one case, you have an explanation; in the other, you have none.

The discussion up to this point has served to emphasize the importance of difference in social life, and to raise the question whether we need a new principle, other than imitation, to account for this feature of organized society. The problem is, must we assume

⁷ Compare what was said on the limitation of imitation in our former paper.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 487.

⁹ This JOURNAL, Vol. III., p. 404.

'thought,' because we need it in explanation of the facts, or is not 'thought' itself a product of the essentially social character of mental evolution? In support of the latter view, we shall indicate how, as it seems to us, the process of social differentiation, conceivably, may take place, and, at the same time, maintain that it is, genetically, through the conflict of feeling-impulses that thought gets its specific determination.

The primary problem for every subject, from the social point of view, may be said to consist in the acquisition of ability to live in harmony with every other subject within the limits set by the group which is alike the source of the life of each. This tendency to conformity may be looked at in two ways. Either, it is the impulse to do what others do; or, it is the impulse to do what others do in like circumstances. In the former case, we have an example of unimpeded suggestibility; in the latter, suggestibility is working under limitations. Mob action, according to Baldwin, is a typical instance of the first.¹⁰ The illustration, we think, is unfortunate. We are not concerned in this place with the author's theory of mob action. What, rather, we wish to indicate is that, granting the inflammable suggestibility of the crowd, the important consideration for social psychology is a statement of the conditions under which the entire set of organized social sanctions which determine the normal life of societies become, suddenly or the reverse, inoperative, and give rise to a situation in which there is abnormal homogeneity of function. We can understand why Baldwin, with this illustration in mind, should find it impossible, on the basis of unimpeded suggestibility, to account for that differentiation which characterizes social life, and should have recourse to 'thought' as the principle he requires. But *collective* irrationality is not a normal condition, although individual irrationality, as perhaps mob action sufficiently testifies, is. It does not follow, therefore, that because you can not find in imitation, as this principle is illustrated in the mob, a principle of differentiation, that it is not to be found in the same principle as it operates under the usual conditions that surround the human infant. In the case of children suggestibility of the type under consideration is a normal condition. For who has not seen the child leave off doing one thing after another because his associates, or those who occupied with him the same social situation, were doing these several different things? The importance of this will be illustrated below. For the present it is sufficient to state that, from the genetic standpoint, unimpeded suggestibility or instinctive imitation is an elementary condition of social organization, and it does not differ except in regard to the

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 235 ff.

number and complexity of the factors and relations involved from all other forms of suggestion or imitation whatsoever. How imitation is brought under limitations, and thus a higher, more rational form of activity is made possible, we shall endeavor to show, in part, in the next section.

III

Turning now to a consideration of social growth which, as we hold, requires the presence of ideal factors tending to modify the social structure through individual action, we may mention two typical stages of the way ideals are evolved in and through the increasing complexity of the relations involved in the social experience of the race. In the first, we are concerned wholly with the single group; in the second, with contrasts between groups. In regard to the former, the most characteristic thing is the points of varying emphasis which the social environment comes to have for the single subject. We may make this statement more explicit by referring to the fact that while the group as a whole maintains itself with relative consistency, the relationships between one member and another, as these are determined by the group as a whole, are seldom identical and constantly changing. It is a thing to be remarked concerning the human family that we are born into a society which because of its complexity not only permits, but favors an indefinite variety of behavior. There are forms of social organization, for example, the state, which are comparatively simple, and where the relations sustained are not of the problematical nature of those which are defined by the home. From the standpoint of genetic psychology, it is significant that the home presents the freest opportunity for the exercise of the motive tendencies of the child. It is not merely that the child needs a field for the expression of his congenital tendencies through which he comes to be aware of his likeness to others, but also that through his own self-activity others come to be defined in terms of his subjective satisfactions. The environment receives emphatic significance at those points which are connected with the painful and pleasurable flow of the subject's conscious life. The variety of the experience which the complexity of the home makes possible is important, not mainly because of its variety, but because variety is a condition which most surely mediates those conflicts out of which the distinctively ideal qualities are developed. It is the most efficient moral force because, through the number and character of the relations it involves, it is the direct means of generating within the consciousness of each of its members a number of conflicting impulses through the resolution of which each one gains for himself a 'soul.'

The bearing of these statements upon the problem of the ideal may be made clear by an illustration. The child, we will say, has learned to behave in definite ways under the recurrent conditions of his life: he is bathed, eats, plays, sleeps, etc. These are his mechanized habits; they are, as such, the results of unhindered imitation. There is here no question of ideal factors. The imitation that is the foundation of this relatively simple existence must be brought under some sort of limitation before any higher development can take place. This may, conceivably, be brought about when some other person than the one who customarily performs that service for the child undertakes, let us say, to put him to bed. Then he is 'naughty': he cries, kicks, fights, etc. The whole experience is important for the child, however disagreeable it may be for the innocent (*sic*) cause of it all. Translated into terms of social psychology, the child is the subject of two conflicting courses of feeling leading out to incompatible lines of action which inhibit each other. The inhibition operates to heighten the feeling-impulses which, after awhile, break bounds and overflow in any available motor channels. To specify more definitely, there is, as we conceive it, a contrast between a presented content *B*—the person who is doing the unusual thing—and a represented content *a*—the person who usually does what is now being done—mediated through the act of undressing, etc.—*xyz*. What is getting done—*xyz*—calls up the image of *A*—*a*—which fails to get verified in the child's experience through the presence of *B*. Or, to put it another way, and at the same time to emphasize another aspect of the case, *B* arouses the expectation *pqr* which fails to get realized through the substitution of *xyz*. But *xyz* calls up *a*, and thereby throws into conflict, by the meaning each has come to have in experience, two previously emphasized points of the environment *A* and *B*. These, as we understand, are the conditions under which on the basis of imitation both intellectual and moral development normally takes place. Intellectually, the problem means that the judgments of value, *B* is *pqr* and *A* is *xyz*, must give place to a higher synthesis through which *pqr* and *xyz* may both serve as predicates qualifying the same subject *B*. Morally, the same situation may be interpreted as one of allowing, through growth in mental faculty, an ideal element—*a*—to serve as a reconstructive factor in behavior in the given relation *B*—*pqr*.

We have the same general situation when, instead of the relatively changing attributes which may serve as qualifications of a given object, we consider the relations which, in the nature of the case, are not interchangeable. The characteristic feature of the home more narrowly conceived is that it is the center of a system of

relations that in their nature involve the principle of identity-difference which, as we have remarked, is the principle of intellectual and moral growth. To the same extent, this is not true of any other social group. The fundamental relationships that are defined by the home are always *correlatives*. Hence, parent-child, brother (sister)-brother (sister), uncle (aunt)-nephew (niece), etc. Each of these pairs of terms may, of course, be read the other way; each term of the relation implies the other. But the parent-child relation is determinative throughout. An identity of blood relationship underlies all the differences mediated by the home. Now these obvious facts condition not only what each member of the family—whether we take a narrower or broader view of the term—may do, but also, as we saw in the other case, what it is possible for each one to think. Thinking, that is to say, is determined for all members of the family by the particular relationship which for the time being is operative. But, as we saw above, every other term is potentially functional at the same time, and at any moment may become operative—ideally—in modifying the customary behavior in any given relation. This is seen even in so fundamental a relation as that between parent and child. This relation is interpreted aright only when it stands for authority on the one side and obedience on the other. The brother (sister)-brother (sister) relation, and every other relation based on more remote kinship, place their subjects more nearly on a footing of equality. The give-and-take in these cases is not nearly so well prescribed as in the parent-child relation. In the latter, restrictions as to behavior are obvious, whatever their sanctions or methods of enforcement. We thus have two general groups within the one family life which play back and forth on one another in the consciousness of the child, and which, through the process of adjustment, secure the intellectual and moral development of their subject. The relative freedom of the one tends to limit the necessity of the other until, through the discipline of experience and the growth in intellectual discernment, the parent-child relation, as we started with it, is changed into the best type of human companionship. But all this comes about through actual relationships operating in an ideal way to modify the permanent relationship on which the home is founded.¹¹

After what has been said, few words will suffice to show that education through ideals, already begun within the home, is continued, on similar lines, when the home is no longer the only sphere

¹¹ It is hardly necessary to say that the influence works in the other direction as well. Thus, the parent-child relation in respect to the other relations prevents equality degenerating into contempt by securing mutual respect.

for the exercise of one's activity. Instead now of the different values that come to be attached to the several parts of the same environment, we have different groups, qua groups, arousing conscious conflicts which, as we have seen, is the general condition of the growth of their subject in intellectual and moral ability. The point of importance, therefore, is to see how there come to be differentiated groups which may act in an ideal way in the interests of a freer life. Genetically considered, the home is the parent of every other group of a definitely social character. This is due to the fact that, essentially, the home can be adequately defined only through relations that are correlatives. The limitation involved in this makes it impossible, within the same group, for the child to occupy any other place than that which is determined by the coexistent parenthood of other members of the home. The child can not change place with its parents. The child relation, however, is not, in itself, incompatible with the parent relation, but to become consistent with it, it requires a new sphere for its legitimate exercise.¹² The principle involved in this particular case is capable of indefinite expansion. The farther we get from the original center in this multiplication of group on group, the more specialized do the relations which their members sustain to one another become. The interests of one group over against another become more and more exclusive. The fact, therefore, is as we now know it, that the same person is at once child, parent, brother, neighbor, etc. The importance of the fact in its bearing on ideals is that these existent conditions, which because they are so familiar seldom arouse inquiry, implicitly state the problems the solution of which determines the character and extent of one's human development. From the intellectual standpoint, the problem is, how these various predicates can be made consistent within the unity of the same consciousness; from the moral point of view, it is how conduct in these several relations can be brought into the form of a reconstructive ideal, and thus serve as an implicit principle of social and ethical development.

IV

In so far as the previous discussion enables us to do so, we shall state, in this section, the question of ideals in some of its positive aspects. Only a word or two, however, can be offered on the points of greater importance. The ideal, in the first place, implies some form of transcendence. We began our consideration of this subject

¹² It has always seemed unnatural to the writer for a young man to hang up his hat in the home of his newly wedded wife, or *vice versa*, a custom which because it is quite common is not for that reason justified.

by referring to the fact that it was this characteristic of ideals that determined the naturalistic and theological estimate of ideals. We may now point out that it is a too rigid interpretation of what transcendence may mean that prevents a recognition of the degree of truth in each of these views. In this connection, it is pertinent to call to mind the distinction drawn by Kant between the transcendent and the transcendental, and to remark that transcendence, which may be held in the meaning of either or both of the senses indicated by Kant, is now commonly used to signify what, in the usage of that thinker, only the first one stood for. It is in this way, for example, that the theological writer speaks of God—the Ideal—as a Being who is metaphysically transcendent. He has Being in and for himself. The naturalistic reaction against this mode of conceiving the problems of life and mind insensibly leads the positivist to approximate, if not to adopt, the transcendental view of ideals and in doing so to banish them from the sphere of determinate knowledge. No doubt objections might be urged against the former view, but it has the merit of being clearly conceived and stated. Objections also might be urged against the other view if only it would take the pains to think itself into consistency and express itself unambiguously. The transcendental view is acceptable to naturalism because it gives ideals a subjective interpretation, but what stern denial should we hear of their instrumental function when this is affirmed to extend not only to ethics and religion but to science as well! But it is to a transcendental view of ideals that the course of our discussion directly leads. In making this statement we have in mind the importance of affirming of ideals, what the study of their genesis serves to emphasize, that they are elements of experience which lie beyond the limits of any present experience. The difficulty, at this point, is to see how that which is no part of the present system of facts can have any relation to the way in which the present system undergoes development. Yet, with an equal show of reason, it might be asked how any given group of facts could become something which, at the present moment, it is not *unless* part of what it really is somehow lay beyond what it now shows itself to be. The problem of ideals, consequently, presents itself as an antinomy which, as we have endeavored to show, gets its solution in the concrete experience of the race. In experience, the contrast is not so sharp as our logical modes of thinking would seem to indicate. For there, the fact which the term transcendence is intended to denote is this: the ideal is a term which gets applied at different times to different experiences to indicate the way in which they are related to the complex of facts that constitutes a given situation. This is what we mean by the

phrase, 'experience is a guide to future action.' When we are called upon to act, the organized habits of a lifetime, in the form of an ideal of conduct, provide the key to what we ought to do in the given instance. So it is in the world of thought. The body of organized knowledge determines the solution we find for every new problem. Hence it is that thought and conduct are ideal constructions. But this they could not be unless the ideal transcended the limitations by which the theoretical and practical problems are alike made determinate.¹³

A second characteristic of ideals may now be indicated. It follows from the nature of the ideal as a relation within the total complex of facts by which our problems are determined and solved that it is some part of a conscious experience. And yet we said just now that it falls outside of, that is to say, transcends, the actual experience. The two positions are not contradictory. For it may be pointed out that there is more in experience than is allowed when we have an exclusive regard for the data which define the problem as such. (The span of consciousness is wider than that part of it which at any time is focal.) From the standpoint of naturalism, the idea could have no functional value, it could be only a content of consciousness, and hence Hume, for example, does not hesitate to speak of '*impressions* of memory.'¹⁴ Now it is the analytic method that leads one to emphasize the importance of a doctrine of elements. There is no need to undervalue the truth of this standpoint. But is there not danger of overestimating it? This seems to be the case when the argument in regard to ideals is made to run as follows: All contents of consciousness, directly or indirectly, are impressions. Ideals, you say, are contents which appear in the form of ideas. But ideas are, indirectly, sensations. Therefore ideals are not essentially different from sensations. Show me, then, the impression from which your ideal is derived, and we can talk understandingly about it. But, we reply, we can not talk, understandingly or otherwise, about an ideal on any such terms; for the moment it is transmuted into impressions, it is no longer ideal, and as long as it remains ideal, it is, *ex hypothesi*, incomprehensible. We may, however, without adding to the doctrine of experience another set of factors, in the Kantian fashion, in the form of ready-made principles of understanding and reason, maintain the ideal as a content of experience

¹³In this paper we are confined to the epistemological aspect of ideals. If it is of any interest, the writer is willing to confess his belief in their metaphysical validity.

¹⁴Treatise, Bk. I., Pt. III., sec. 5. It should be remarked, however, that Hume's epistemology depends upon ideas of both memory and imagination, as the organizing principles of knowledge.

and still hold to the transcendental view of the nature of ideals. For the problem is to see how that which is within experience can at the same time transcend experience in such a way as to provide the ground of possibility for a positive metaphysic of experience. But leaving the transcendent character of ideals aside, it is in order to point out that, as contents, ideals are always present along with the perceptual data which are the terms in which our problems are defined. In order to illustrate how this can be, let us suggest that every logical definition and all scientific classification are possible only on the supposition that the position we are stating is true. Underlying both these methods of knowledge there is a mental process which validates the judgments to which each conducts, and which may be expressed in the general form, 'This is that.' Now, the only question we are concerned with, from the present point of view, is, what is the 'that'? What, in consciousness, is it that this term denotes? In the logical definition, it is the 'genus' through which the 'this,' whatever it may be, becomes specified. Definition is a process of specification, as the text-books say, *per genus et differentiam*. The 'that,' in the other case, is the class, the group of things which has the same general characteristics. However, this only affirms that we know the particular through the general. It does not tell us whence we get the general, or what the general is. As our study has led us to see, the general, whether it be simple or complex, is always an idea. The perceptual, as such, is never more than particular, and in this feature it is related to the general as the impression is to the idea.¹⁵

The third characteristic of ideals is found in their function. The transcendency of ideals is due to the fact that they are contents which are qualitatively distinct from the presented material of consciousness. This difference is indicated by the term—idea—which is used to describe this class of contents. But while all ideas possess the two characteristics named, not all ideas are ideals. It is for this reason that they may be neglected in favor of a rigidly naturalistic explanation of experience in those cases where they are, as we say, *mere* ideas. It is only when ideas function in the organization of experience that we have the right to speak of them as ideals. Ideals are ideas which, arising in the course of experience, are modified by the experience to which they give coherence. They are not technically causes and, in the nature of the case, can never become causes. They are factors of consciousness which are instrumental to the end of realizing hitherto unique situations. Now that ideas have this

¹⁵ On the relation of the general to the particular, see the remarks of H. Poincaré, 'La Valeur de la Science,' p. 142.

function, the whole body of our knowledge, both theoretical and practical, certifies. No less in science, properly so-called, than in ethics, esthetics and religion, is illustration of this fact to be found. Let the idea of measurement, for example, take possession of the human mind as a criterion of that knowledge which it is allowable to call scientific, and then we consider everything as potentially measurable, and without further ado deny the term knowledge (*scientia*) to whatever either does not or can not submit to methods of quantitative determination. What has been quantified is knowledge; everything that falls outside is, at best, subject to further investigation, and if, in the end, anything remains there is no name for it but illusion. We are not concerned with the adequacy of this position; it is mentioned merely for the purpose of illustration. The idea of measurement, as it figures in modern science, is an ideal not merely because it is an idea, but because it is an idea that has become functional in the organization of those groups of experience in which the particular sciences are more directly interested. It is not otherwise with the anthropological sciences. When, for example, we are required to conform our behavior to the acknowledged standard of our class we do so, not because we must, but because there is, at the time, no other ideal which is operating in the interest of variation. We obey, that is to say, because the law in the case supplies us with an ideal through which it is possible to harmonize experience. But what need of further illustration? The truth is that knowledge, whatever the several forms it may take, is made possible by the ideals which are developed on the basis of experience, and which, through the widening and deepening of the experience they make available, are themselves brought to complete development in the theoretical and practical progress of the race.

The more important points of the discussion may be briefly summarized:

1. The conditions under which the human infant normally exists are sufficient to determine his growth in mental faculty so that from being imitative and non-moral, he becomes a rational and moral member of society.
2. The principle of becoming in this process of socialization is the ideal.
3. The ideal, we have said, is at once the product of experience and the organizing center of all knowledge and conduct.
4. The ideal because it is an idea is a transcendental element of experience which, as we believe, is not without a transcendent character.

5. The essential quality of ideals is found in this functional relation to the individuality of experience. By means of the ideal, experience is transmuted into knowledge.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Myths of Plato. J. A. STEWART. London: The Macmillan Co. 1905. Pp. vi + 532.

Professor J. A. Stewart has made a useful book by collecting, translating, and illustrating with copious extracts from the literature of mysticism and folk-lore the 'myths of Plato.' His somewhat desultory and rhapsodical Introduction may be read with interest by everybody, and with sympathy by those who experience the special quality of 'transcendental feeling' which Plato's poetry and eloquence awaken in a scholarly and cultured but not wholly critical mind. More austere and hard-headed (or hearted) censors will have their reserves. We may cheerfully concede that Plato's myths are 'poetry' without feeling that our sense of their beauty is quickened by Professor Stewart's random quotation of poems whose only associating link is the quoter's enthusiasm. The 'Tale of Er' thrills Mr. Stewart, and so, he tells us, does the twenty-fifth sonnet of the 'Vita Nuova,' or Wordsworth's 'Duddon,' or Tennyson's 'Row us out from Desenzano,' or Shelley's 'Adonais,' or Whitman's 'When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom'd.' I share all these thrills save the last, but except as thrills they do not resemble one another or my feeling for Plato's myths.

If we abandon ourselves to feeling, all feelings are in a sense the same. But such emotional expansion is not necessarily 'transcendental' in any but a Pickwickian or ecstatic sense, nor is it genetically or actually always a persistence of the 'dream consciousness.' Still less can these vague terms be applied to such conscious and clearly defined workmanship as the Platonic myths.

Plato stirs emotion, but he never abandons himself to it or wishes us to do so; and nothing can be less Platonic than the proclamation of the hegemony of sentiment and intuition over clear-eyed reason. It may be 'good that man should thus be made to feel in his heart how small a part of him his head is,' but this was not Plato's purpose. The Tennysonian heart that stands up in wrath and answers 'I have felt' would be bidden by Plato to know its place midway between the head and the liver. It is the second, not the first. Plato uses the rhetoric of mysticism and Orphism to commend convictions which he cherishes or believes salutary for mankind. But the pretensions of the individual mystic he always treats with irony and contempt. The inspiration of the poet or the seer, even when conceded for the argument's sake, is always subject