

rational function consists, as we then perceive, in expressing a natural situation and *improving* that situation by expressing it. . . . Expression makes thought a *power in the very world* from which thought drew its being, and *renders it in some measure self-sustaining and self-assured.*"<sup>1</sup> Here surely no vestige remains of the Aristotelian distinction between efficient and final causes elsewhere so devotedly expounded and defended.

Of the chapters not already mentioned the reviewer finds the one on 'History' and the three on 'Prerational, Rational and Post-rational Morality,' especially stimulating. In the chapters on 'The Nature of Intent' and 'Dialectic,' which deal with logical questions, notwithstanding repeated affirmations of the natural origin of reflection, the account of its operations seems to cut it loose too much from its base. Deduction is given more independence of induction and of hypothesis (p. 97) than many will wish to allow.

But a logic-chopping type of criticism can not do Professor Santayana's work justice. For, despite the discordant note of finalism, it still remains that nowhere has the essentially *vital* character of reason been more clearly, forcefully and gracefully stated than in these volumes. Moreover, the distinctive thing in Professor Santayana's important contribution is that this character of reason has been exhibited, not in a formal and dialectic fashion, but by a scholarly appeal to the various contentual 'fields' of experience.

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*A New Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology and Educational Theory through the Philosophy of Leibniz.* JOHN DAVIDSON. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood & Sons. 1906. Pp. 191.

An excellent work, growing out of discussions concerning the relation of Herbart's philosophy to his educational theory. It is not an exposition of Herbart, but an *interpretation*, as its title states. The author's style is clear and easy, but he assumes that the reader is already familiar with the subject and the work is not suited to the student who is just beginning in the field of philosophy or education.

Some writers admit the practical value of Herbart's educational theory, but deny the validity of his philosophical principles. Dr. Davidson does not believe in this separation, and he comes forward with a defense of Herbart's philosophy. His purpose may be best stated in his own words:

"That the central positions of the Herbartian pedagogy are based on Herbart's psychology and ethics, and that the latter are in turn of such a character as to meet the demands of a science and art of education, it will be our task to attempt to prove as we proceed. We entertain the hope of being able to show that the conception of 'mechanism,' applied with such condemnatory signification against the Herbartian psychology, must give place to such conceptions as 'organism' and 'function,' as

<sup>1</sup> P. 180. Italics mine.

being the real categories implied in the theory; that these categories point far more definitely than the category of 'self-activity' to that law of mental activity according to which the most highly efficient minds in any department of life work; and finally, that, instead of being at variance with or contradictory of the category of self-activity, they indicate the only way in which the self can find its highest and best realization."

The author believes that Herbart will find a better interpretation through Leibniz than through Kant, and he sets forth the philosophical principles of Leibniz as the proper point of departure for an understanding of Herbart. He holds that Herbart's theory of education is implicit in Leibniz, and he identifies the 'soul' of the former with the 'monad' of the latter. It is a mistake to think that from the Herbartian point of view education is a growth wholly *ab extra*. The 'apperceiving soul' through its 'presentative activity' constitutes a 'living reality and not a lifeless presentation mechanism' and the 'presentation' does not deny or preclude force and effort. A great deal of misunderstanding has grown out of attempts to make a distinction between presentative activity and presented content. There can be no activity without content, and soul-life consists of activity; therefore, the soul-life and the content are one. Only through abstraction can a distinction be made. This point of view makes life an organic activity and brings harmony into our conceptions of individuality and character as the outcome of 'many-sided interest.'

Dr. Davidson has given us a valuable contribution to philosophy and education, and his book deserves to be widely read. In a short chapter on 'The Fallacy of Formal Education' he attempts to make a practical application of his theories. This chapter is interesting and suggestive, though I do not see that all of his applications necessarily follow from the theory presented in the rest of the book.

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VIRGINIA STATE NORMAL SCHOOL.

*Psychologie de l'enfant et Pédagogie expérimentale.* ED. CLAPARÈDE.  
Genève: H. Kündig. 1905. Pp. 76.

In an excellently written brochure M. Claparède summarizes the standpoint and methods of the more recent pedagogical tendencies taken on the individual side. That he has had nothing to say concerning the reconstruction of educational aims and processes as primarily a social need is to be regretted. The omission, consequently, leaves the impression that education is merely a process for developing and perfecting individual powers. Hence the formal and disciplinary play a larger part in M. Claparède's conception of education than is now thought to be permissible by our best instructors. These would develop the pupil's powers through their concrete use in a social medium and without immediate reference to the development of any power of itself. M. Claparède, on the contrary, runs the risk of playing into the hands of those whom he desires most to oppose by considering the individual simply as individual. Sociology should have made it clear to him that no power can be developed as merely individual.