

difficult problem than the one which pragmatism pronounces insoluble (that of the knowledge of external reality)—for the attempts at solution of the former have been less frequent than of the latter.

The spirit of this criticism has been that the empirical method with which pragmatism sets out is indeed the only correct one, but that it has abandoned this method. In actual experience, even when engaged in the 'struggle for existence' we regard and seek other things than our own advantage. We do discover truth by analysis of the present as well as by the study of origins in the past. We find that we are compelled to use certain standard categories—*e. g.*, permanent reality, causation—and even the pragmatist has his *a priori* category of purpose. Pragmatism in neglecting the analytic study of these categories is narrow and unphilosophical. On the other hand, one must admit that it is a very essential guide of method. In seeking to know the real world, we best advance by noticing the most fruitful hypotheses, those which embrace the most facts. But this is only a matter of subjective method, for the wider collection of facts is no more real than the narrower.

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The Standpoint of Experience. J. E. CREIGHTON. *Philosophical Review*, November, 1903, pp. 593-610.

While we all claim to be empiricists as basing our philosophies upon 'experience,' this term, 'far from being a clear and transparent medium that presents to us facts in unambiguous and unmistakable form, is rather so many-sided and complex, in some relations so shifting and unstable, as to be capable of yielding various and even contradictory readings.' Different points of view result in different selections of facts and thus give an *a priori* bias to every philosophy. I. 'Definition and determination of the true standpoint of experience is, in a certain sense, the essential . . . problem of philosophy.' The test of the adequacy of any experience must be intelligibility, *i. e.*, 'completeness and consistency both of facts and relations.' This implies apprehension of experience through intelligence; precludes the possibility of a 'pure' or presuppositionless experience—an experience *ab extra*; and requires that in every stage experience contain 'the moving principle of thought as its dynamic and integrating factor.' What, then, is the standpoint of experience for the philosophy of our time? Obviously, not that of the plain man, but that reached through the development of philosophical thought. Hence, the important question is: 'What may fairly be said to have been established through the reflection of the past and the discussions of our own day?' II. In answer, the author gives three propositions: (1) 'Experience is not a stream of subjective processes, existing as mental modifications in a thing called mind.' Experience shows no such disjunction of subject and object, body and mind, as this would imply; it is 'not the resultant of a mechanical interplay of two independent things, but the concrete expression of rational life, having subject and object as organic, though distinguishable members of its essen-

tial unity.' (2) 'The relation of subject and object in experience can not be adequately expressed in terms of cause and effect.' Parallelism, *e. g.*, shows that 'the relation of body and mind is no external and occasional relation of two separate entities, but is so close and intimate . . . that it can not be adequately described by the mechanical notion of action and interaction.' (3) 'The mind is not one particular thing separated from other things, but as a true individual it contains within itself the principle of universality.' This is 'shown by the fact that it is able in one indivisible act [reason] to differentiate itself from things and to relate them to the unity of its own life.' III. The standpoint of special sciences views experience as a collection of things to be observed and operated upon externally. Philosophy deals with experience from an internal point of view, as we actually live it; and this, indeed, is what makes philosophy preeminently the science of experience. IV. The philosopher's business is, on this view, to interpret experience, give appraisements of our various ideals—rational, ethical, esthetic—and discover the categories that will preserve truth and harmonize the ideals. Necessarily the process is teleological, with the world regarded as an instrument for the realization of ends. This is not subjectivism—the 'hard discipline of the real world' prevents that—but at the same time it subordinates the real to the ideal, the whole significance of facts in experience being due to conscious selection of them. The necessity for the subordination of the real to the ideal springs from the fact that subject and object as functions are not coordinate. Functions 'imply a central unity which is something more than the mere togetherness of parts. . . . The fact of functional relationship implies the existence of an inner pervading identity running through the parts. In experience this principle of identity comes to consciousness of itself by distinguishing itself from the objects in which its nature is expressed and embodied. And in this act of discrimination and recognition there is to be found the central principle in the light of which the whole process of experience gains significance and the possibility of interpretation.' Hence, 'to give a philosophical interpretation of experience is to show its relation to the ideals and purposes of a rational self-consciousness.'

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Les éléments et l'évolution de la moralité. M. MAUXION. *Revue Philosophique*, July and August, 1903, pp. 1-29 and 150-180.

Professor Mauxion finds the present time peculiarly without a well-based morality. Approving the reduction of morality to a factual basis, he sees danger in identifying morality with sociality and in finding the basis of individual morality in social morality. It is a gratuitous hypothesis, he says, to regard society as an actual organism, because individuals are not fixed like cells and, moreover, have an independent value. The social organism theory would necessitate the recognition of groups or castes as in India and also does violence to the classification of sciences, reducing sociology to biology. Social and moral progress differ as much as scientific and esthetic.