have had false notions of the retinal image and of Hume's 'impression,' my *ad hominem* argument with Berkeley would not apply, but I should be left with my conclusion quite as intact as before, since there would be no basis for that school at all.

As to Hume's 'impression' and 'sense experience,' I can discuss them when we are clearly told what they are. I have never yet seen any more definite or clear idea of these than I have found in the usual hotch-potch of philosophic abracadabra. I would like to know what they are. I merely observe that all recent philosophy talks about 'experience' in a way that sometimes implies its inclusion of everything, and sometimes its Lockeian limitations, which are generally negatively defined. The former conception makes the term useless in philosophy and the latter leaves us where Locke was. I do not pretend to discuss the epistemological problem in any *ad rem* fashion from either point of view. Hence I try neither to transcend 'experience' nor to remain within it, until I know what it is. My discussion in the paper reviewed by Professor Pierce had no reference to the nature of 'impressions,' but to certain conceptions of them, and these not my own. I can touch upon the question whether perception makes additions to sense experience—actual conscious sense experience—only when I have found out what this is. I have never yet seen any intelligible statement of what it is. All the transcendency that I have in mind is that which has to be admitted when we talk about cortical existence and processes, and was designed to justify any talk about them at all.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

NEW YORK CITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Studies in Logical Theory. JOHN DEWEY. The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago. 2d Series, Vol. XI. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. 1903. Pp. xiii + 388.

This book is first of all an account of the nature of knowledge, but it soon becomes a theory of experience and even of reality. Taken as a whole its thesis is, in the words of Professor Dewey (preface, x), that "knowledge . . . must be . . . reconstructive or transformatory (of experience); since Reality must be defined in terms of experience, judgment appears . . . as the medium through which the consciously effected evolution of Reality goes on." The first ten chapters are devoted mainly to the theory of knowledge and experience, and the last chapter mainly to the philosophic aspects of the theory. As the book has attracted much attention in America its contents will be summarized very briefly here, that I may pass at once to a criticism of its fundamental positions.

In the first four chapters Professor Dewey outlines the logical system. In Chapter V. Dr. Helen B. Thompson criticises Bosanquet's theory of judgment upon this basis; in Chapter VI. Dr. S. F. McLennan describes three stages of judgment; in Chapter VII. Dr. M. L. Ashley shows that the predicate of judgment is an hypothesis. Chapter VIII., by Dr. W. C. Gore, treats of 'Image and Idea in Logic.' Chapter IX., by Dr. W. A. Heidel, on the 'Logic of the Pre-Socratic Philosophy,' has a mainly historical interest. Chapter X., by Dr. H. W. Stuart, on 'Valuation as a Logical Process,' shows that there can be no objects that have not ethical or economic value; and Dr. A. W. Moore in Chapter XI., under the title 'Some Logical Aspects of Purpose,' presents, in criticism of Professor Royce's absolutism, the philosophic thesis that reality is essentially dynamic, not static.

The general position may be briefly outlined as follows: Judgment (which is the essence of knowledge) can be understood only if we know the conditions of its origin. Now we think and judge only when our habitual reflexes do not meet our needs. We have to seek some new course of action; the proposing of this to ourselves is entertaining an idea or plan of action, an hypothesis, which is crystallized in the judgment 'reality is such as to permit this action.' If the plan turns out to be useful for our need, it is correct—the judgment is true; if not, the judgment is erroneous. The real-ideal distinction is that between stimulus of environment and plan of action or tentative response. Both real and ideal are equally experiences of the individual man. Knowledge is only the means of gaining control over our environment or bettering our condition, is wholly teleological. Any dualistic theory of reality and idea is unable to find a criterion of truth and error; the present monistic view avoids this difficulty. In discussing this position I shall call it by the widely accepted term 'pragmatism.'

First of all one must beware of interpreting this view too narrowly. When we are told that reality changes always, we should not jump to the conclusion that no sort of permanence is allowed to anything in our experience. The pragmatical argument is after all not very far from Kant's. There must be knowledge, said Kant, so there must be certain forms of it, and a permanent self to remember; and a pragmatist might say: I need knowledge, therefore I find it most useful to erect certain standards or pigeon-holes for convenient reference, to classify my materials; and these I had best keep practically constant. Perhaps there are no pure pragmatists; perhaps they simply mean to insist on one important aspect of experience among other and equally important aspects.

But the question I wish to raise is, have we here a *philosophic* account of experience, that is, one which applies universally to all the facts? Have these writers not selected a certain aspect of experience and erected that into a metaphysical principle, neglecting other aspects quite as clearly present, and thus hypostasizing what is only an abstraction? (And note that the pragmatist, in Hegelian fashion, regards abstraction as falsification.) In short, have they been truly empirical, as they profess to be

when they take 'evolution' (save the mark!) as a war-cry? I think they have not, that they have been false to their own initial method, and have neglected some very commonplace facts.

We are told by Professor Dewey that the only way to understand the nature of any process is to see how it arose, what called it forth. This rule is, I believe, often found useful in biology, and perhaps in psychology; but have we any right to generalize from these? Other sciences use a different method. I see a colorless liquid in a glass before me that looks like water. To test this I take it to a laboratory, pass an electric current through it, and get two gases with volumes two and one, which by recognized tests I prove to be hydrogen and oxygen. The method here is analysis, bringing the thing into relation with other things, to see what effects arise. We do not care to know how it is made, but rather what it becomes. Indeed, in most cases we judge the nature of a thing by its effects rather than by the way it originated. Why not generalize that method as well as the other? The fact is, pragmatism borrows this genetic method from just one of the sciences (perhaps because it forms the most useful basis for pragmatism) and straightway declares it the only genuine philosophic method. But, you say, in the other sciences we are dealing with inanimate, unconscious things, which are only abstractions anyway. I answer that you take your method from a science (biology) which deals with what you must condemn as abstractions, namely, individual organisms, which are to any one of us only parts of the total presented world. But, you say, the 'functional' method has always been found useful in dealing with vital and conscious phenomena, and therefore must be presupposed here. Now, in the first place, this is not quite true, for it has not explained the origin of variations, but only their perpetuation. And second, even if it were strictly true, it gives no ground for asserting dogmatically, when we come into what *looks* like a quite different region, that of logic, that the *only possible* method is the functional. This is only a new kind of apriorism, with purpose as its chief category. There may be cases of judgment which the 'functional' view throws no light upon. Of course this view fits the judgments which we make for practical purposes. If, to use Dr. Stuart's illustration, I am chased by a wild beast and see a small tree near me, I need to know whether it will bear my weight before attempting to climb it rather than seek some other escape—and the judgment here is my tentative response to the stimulus of the beast. But do we never judge except to get out of some scrape? Or to put it more fairly, perhaps, do we never judge except to better ourselves? Our writers are careful to choose their illustrations from practical needs. But is all life made up of practical needs? Their own studies in evolution should have taught them that, although the theoretical interest may be far too much neglected to-day, it was not always so. Science and philosophy arose only when the practical needs of men were so well adjusted that a leisure-class could grow up, with time for theoretical interests. The early thinkers did not think because their environment compelled them to think or

die. They thought because they wanted to understand the world. This theoretical interest is lightly dismissed by our school with the words 'but this too is a need.' In the first place this is trivial; it means that we don't try for anything that does not thereby become to us an end. But, second, what is this theoretical need? It is one which is satisfied only by a belief in an external reality which does not alter with the thought of the observer, but which those thoughts represent. If this is a need, it is a need of abolishing pragmatism.

Even in judgments of practical need the theoretical attitude is present. When chased by the wild beast, I am compelled to judge, to make an hypothesis about the strength of the tree. This framing of the hypothesis is a definite state of mind, a single experience. If I test it by climbing the tree, this is also a single experience, distinct from the other. The judgment is thus distinct from the experience to which it refers. The man judging knows that he is referring to a future possibility and has present to his mind the content of his judgment and its reference to something (the future experience) not given, yet something not affected by his judgment about it; rather his judgment is affected (as to error or truth) by the nature of that future experience. That is of course the theoretical attitude, and it is the attitude a man naturally takes; for it is the most useful one. In order to fulfil the practical need one must act for the time as if he were not a pragmatist. Now I shall not dwell on the logical objection that it is just as hard to see how a judgment can refer to a future (or past) experience as to see how it can refer to a reality outside experience. But it certainly looks as if we could not be pragmatists when we are in the thick of the practical struggle. We must be good old-fashioned realists then. Indeed, Professor Dewey admits that we often find it useful to hypostasize some parts or aspects of experience into objective realities. For that matter, the extreme elasticity of 'useful' and 'need' suggests that some logicians may find it more useful to their intellectual needs to reject pragmatism.

The pragmatist can not help talking as if there were a reality whose character does not in the least depend on our judgments. For *either* he must grant that the real is anything that comes along and satisfies my present whim (which of course he would not do), *or* he must appeal to something—the empirical character of human nature, eternal principles, or what not—as containing a standard whereby to judge what whims we should or should not entertain, and can or can not be satisfied. His appeal to the nature of experience, or what not, however, is the theoretic attitude over again—observer and facts observed. He means his words to correspond to facts of experience, and he does not when he is writing out his system of pragmatism mean to have his words remould or alter in anyway those facts. The 'reconstructive' theory will not serve as a refuge here, because it has to meet the following difficulty: If reality is reconstructed by us (we might as well say, in part created, for we mean at least creation of its form) then the part created is dependent on our momentary whim or else on a stable permanent basis in our intellectual nature. The first alternative will of course be

denied: so taking the second, this remoulding must at least not alter those categories which constituted that permanent basis—otherwise the second alternative, which we agreed to take, would be destroyed. In the description of those categories, however much this may remould them, something must remain unaltered, however we describe, define, conceptualize, etc. Now this unaltered part, I take it, we can not very well call unreal—but if so, we have a reality which is not in the least altered by our description and definition of it. And if this must be the case with categories, why may it not hold, too, of the objects given in sense-experience?

Another basis for the system in its idealistic aspect is found in their criticism of the dualistic presuppositions in Lotze's, Bosanquet's, and Bradley's theories of judgment. Now one may perhaps admit that these theories do not offer a quite satisfactory account of the method by which our judgments get a direct hold upon reality itself. It has already been suggested that there is a corresponding dualism in the pragmatic theory of judgment, because actually a judgment refers to some aspect or part of experience not at the moment present to us. I now wish to point out another difficulty, which resides in their description of an idea as a plan of action and of fact as the successful, though perhaps never quite complete, fulfilment of such plan. If an idea is a plan of action, the success of that plan is determined, at least in part, by the nature of the environment. Call the latter one experience if you will—we at least have two distinct regions of experience, the physical and the tentative, hypothetical, the plan of action. The truth of the latter is supposed to mean that they can be carried out, are not inhibited in the process. But the carrying out, or inhibition, is regarded as dependent upon the nature of the environment. The strength of the tree holds me up, or my weight, pressing down upon a branch, breaks it. We simply can not avoid speaking in causal terms here; and that not because we have observed uniform sequences, but because the fulfillment of a plan is regarded as *due to* something other than the plan itself. If there is no necessary connection between them, then the success of the plan might go along with any kind of an environment, and could not be regarded as an unambiguous index of the nature of that environment—in short, it would not be a true description thereof. To say an idea, or rather the judgment containing that idea, is true, means that the environment conditions its fulfillment. If it did not mean this, truth has no necessary reference to fulfillment—but the pragmatist claims that it has. His category of purpose then includes that of cause. Nor can he take refuge in the commonplace evasion that this is only a subjective synthesis—for purpose is meant to have factual validity. I say only that if it does, causation must be treated just as respectfully. Now it happens that Professor Dewey himself treats this category with lofty scorn. (In his paper, 'The Superstition of Necessity,' *Monist,* III., 362). This, however, may be merely accidental. At any rate, the pragmatist has this problem of causation on his hands, and, to judge from the history of philosophy since Hume, it seems to be a more

difficult problem than the one which pragmatism pronounces insoluble (that of the knowledge of external reality)—for the attempts at solution of the former have been less frequent than of the latter.

The spirit of this criticism has been that the empirical method with which pragmatism sets out is indeed the only correct one, but that it has abandoned this method. In actual experience, even when engaged in the 'struggle for existence' we regard and seek other things than our own advantage. We do discover truth by analysis of the present as well as by the study of origins in the past. We find that we are compelled to use certain standard categories—*e. g.*, permanent reality, causation—and even the pragmatist has his *a priori* category of purpose. Pragmatism in neglecting the analytic study of these categories is narrow and unphilosophical. On the other hand, one must admit that it is a very essential guide of method. In seeking to know the real world, we best advance by noticing the most fruitful hypotheses, those which embrace the most facts. But this is only a matter of subjective method, for the wider collection of facts is no more real than the narrower.

W. H. SHELDON.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

The Standpoint of Experience. J. E. CREIGHTON. *Philosophical Review,* November, 1903, pp. 593–610.

While we all claim to be empiricists as basing our philosophies upon 'experience,' this term, 'far from being a clear and transparent medium that presents to us facts in unambiguous and unmistakable form, is rather so many-sided and complex, in some relations so shifting and unstable, as to be capable of yielding various and even contradictory readings.' Different points of view result in different selections of facts and thus give an *a priori* bias to every philosophy. I. 'Definition and determination of the true standpoint of experience is, in a certain sense, the essential . . . problem of philosophy.' The test of the adequacy of any experience must be intelligibility, *i. e.*, 'completeness and consistency both of facts and relations.' This implies apprehension of experience through intelligence; precludes the possibility of a 'pure' or presuppositionless experience—an experience *ab extra;* and requires that in every stage experience contain 'the moving principle of thought as its dynamic and integrating factor.' What, then, is the standpoint of experience for the philosophy of our time? Obviously, not that of the plain man, but that reached through the development of philosophical thought. Hence, the important question is: 'What may fairly be said to have been established through the reflection of the past and the discussions of our own day?' II. In answer, the author gives three propositions: (1) 'Experience is not a stream of subjective processes, existing as mental modifications in a thing called mind.' Experience shows no such disjunction of subject and object, body and mind, as this would imply; it is 'not the resultant of a mechanical interplay of two independent things, but the concrete expression of rational life, having subject and object as organic, though distinguishable members of its essen-