

fessor James has neglected just that kind which Mr. Bradley emphasizes. It is not difficult to understand how we are coerced by past habits of thought ingrained in our nature. But except as we can discover the source of determination in the present or past structure of experience, what real meaning is there to the claim that experience guides itself? In sense perception, in particular, the difficulty will continue to be raised, just because there is in experience, unless taken in some esoteric sense, nothing to explain the insistence of this, and its independence of our will. Experience may determine the form in which I am to see a lion in the path, but what in experience brings the lion there? Neither does the conception of *implicit* truth seem in such a case to have any application.

In another point Professor James seems to me to overlook the force of Mr. Bradley's contention. And the reason is that he leans too heavily upon the new logic of science. But does science, with its utilitarian end, really exhaust the whole value of the knowing experience? Is not the 'love of truth' in the old-fashioned sense too vital a thing to be dismissed summarily? At any rate, when the reality in question is of a *personal* sort—and in connection with the religious experience this might conceivably become of central importance for our view of reality—is not the idea of personal *communion* essential in knowledge? And does not this involve the actual mirroring of the nature of the real being we know, as something quite over and above the mere problem of getting a result for ourselves?

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The Heart of Mr. Spencer's Ethics. FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS. *The International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1904. Pp. 496-499.

The formulation of a system of scientific ethics was the crowning achievement of Mr. Spencer's intellectual career and the heart of that system was its ideal of social and industrial peace. In a conversation with the writer of this article, Mr. Spencer, in 1896, stated that it was one of the greatest disappointments of his life that the world had reverted to the militarism which it ought to have outgrown. Nevertheless, according to his own principles, such a relapse must necessarily occur whenever a stronger race comes into contact with a weaker, the warfare continuing until stable equilibrium is again reached by the conquest or transformation of the latter. Mr. Spencer's inability to reconcile himself to this necessary process is evidence 'of the intensity of his abhorrence of all aggression.' Yet this equilibration will not inevitably take the form of an extermination of the weak but more and more the energies of the strong will transform the weak in humane ways, above all by economic stimulation and educational uplifting.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOCIOLOGIE. September, 1904, Band XXVII., Heft III. *Der Einfluss der Dunkelheit auf das Seelenleben des Menschen*