

consistent work which no chance group of individuals would have produced, which demanded a unified program and the enthusiasm of the leading thinkers of the world. But we hope that still more important than the set addresses will be the living influence of this gathering, in which the four or five hundred invited official speakers and chairmen, together with the thousand who may make shorter communications, will form merely the nucleus of the international meeting. That such a unique fusion of scholarship will be productive in itself no one can doubt; but that these scholars are brought together and are doing their work under the control of the demand for unity in knowledge, for interrelation and synthesis:—this thought will be the living force, the most powerful factor of the Congress, and a tremendous influence in overcoming the pedantic and unphilosophic narrowness of specialists in every corner of the realm of science.

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#### THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS AS ONTOLOGICAL.<sup>1</sup>

THE study of religion as a historical development has for its principal problem to trace the rise and evolution of the conception of Divine Being, and of the relations which this Being sustains to nature and to the human race. The lowest stage of religious belief seems to be a kind of naïve, vague and unreflective spiritism. This belief attaches itself to a motley group of invisible spiritual powers, some of which are ill-disposed, and some more kindly, toward man; but all of which are mysterious in nature and more or less capricious in conduct. But under the influence of political and social changes, and by means of the reflective thinking and insight of a few, a more definitely anthropomorphic conception of the gods, and of their relations to man, is formed; and yet later, but chiefly in dependence upon the teaching of religious thinkers, reformers or 'founders' of religion—'men of revelation'—monotheism appears. In its purest form, this highest development of the religious consciousness first took place, upon a basis common to the Semitic religions, among the Jews; but it is Christianity which preeminently stands for the conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit, as well as the 'Ground' of the world and of human life. Considered from the empirical point of view, this process may be described as man's making of the Divine Being after the pattern of the constantly improving image of man.

The study of the same phenomena from the psychological point of view shows us how the impulsive and emotional nature of man

<sup>1</sup> Brief abstract of a chapter in a treatise on the philosophy of religion.

has cooperated with his intellectual curiosity to arouse and guide imagination and intellect in their efforts to construct a worthy conception of God. In a word, the psychology of religions shows us what stimuli have excited, and what activities have been employed in, the task of forming the idea of the Object of religious belief and worship. This psychological study of religion, too, has for its problem the construction, by the human mind, of a conception of the Divine Being in a form to satisfy man's eudæmonistic, intellectual, esthetical and moral needs. It shows us why, and how, man makes God in his own (man's) image.

But now, the notable thing about this mental activity, and its resulting product, is its ontological character. For religion is, as a matter of historical and psychological fact, always metaphysical. It is always a naïve or a reasoned theory of reality. It is an attempt to explain human experience by relating it to invisible existences that belong, nevertheless, to the real world. Indeed, monotheism finds in its One and Alone God the Ultimate Reality, the Being from whom all finite beings proceed, on whom they all depend, and to whom they all owe the devotion of their lives in a faithful allegiance. This, however, is ontological doctrine—somehow postulated rationally, or reasoned out, or superstitiously and vainly imagined.

The customary agnostic or sceptical attitude toward the validity of the religious consciousness as ontological is based upon two grounds. Of these the first emphasizes the large part which feeling and imagination play in the construction of the Object of religious belief; and the second points to the dependent and evolutionary character of the conception thus constructed. The conclusion is, that an idea which is so largely the result of unscientific and only half-rational impulses and *motifs*, and which is so plainly a dependent outgrowth of man's historical development, can not have ontological validity.

It is not our present purpose to establish the objective validity, by philosophical discussion, of the conception of the Divine Being, or the Object of religious belief and worship, in any one of its several forms. It is only our purpose to note some of the characteristics of this ontological aspect of the religious consciousness in general, when regarded chiefly from the psychological point of view.

And, first, the facts plainly show that there is something universal and permanent in the constitution of man which furnishes the stimuli and supplies the principles of control in this form of his creative energy. These very reactions upon his physical and social environment themselves need explanation; and the reasonable presupposition is that their complete explanation involves both man's nature and the real nature of his environment as well. This

needed explanation religion attempts to furnish by the doctrine that God, the Ground of both nature and man's life in history, is progressively making men more in His own (the divine) image.

Now we can no more reasonably, and in the name of science and philosophy, quarrel with the evolutionary method in religion than in any other of the several most important forms of the complex progress of the human race. If the religious beliefs, sentiments and cult of humanity were not subjects of development, then religion could never exist in helpful reciprocal relations with man's other developments. But the data of history confirm what a study of human nature suggests as undoubtedly true—namely, that all the various forms of race-culture are most intimately and necessarily related to the activities and products of the so-called religious culture. Industry, politics, science and philosophy, art and morals, all advance or retrograde in dependence upon one another and upon the religious progress or degradation of mankind.

The reciprocal dependence of all these reactions upon the spiritual unity of the race, and upon the particular stages of race-culture, is a general truth established by a study of man's religious history. But all this history shows that the development of religion always carries along with its changing beliefs a certain confidence in its own right to a metaphysics, or a theory of reality, which shall explain those peculiar experiences in which its essential nature, as religion, consists.

This general truth as to the procedure of the religious consciousness may, as has already been indicated, be considered to involve two equally important classes of factors. The first of these is involved in all the exercises of man's cognitive faculty, and in all the growth of knowledge. The psychological principle which is applicable in religion is therefore applicable also in science and philosophy, and in all the practical life of man. The human mind inevitably regards the constructs of its own imagination and intellect as significant and trustworthy representations of the real beings and actual events of the world, whenever such constructs seem necessary for a satisfactory explanation of experience. Religion must explain itself to itself; and its explanations, like all other explanations, must take hold on reality. Physical science does the same thing; and the social sciences are no exception to the same rule. The combined work of imagination and intellect has produced many mythical entities for the explanation of man's experience with concrete things; nor can any one be sure that modern physics and chemistry will not soon find their postulated entities ill-suited to perform the office of explaining the world of widening experience in a wholly satisfying way. But, on the other hand, the vain and ineffectual contortions

of the current phenomenalism in science show plainly how insistent man is upon finding a ground for *his* conceptions and perceptions of things in a world of reality that is *not* dependent upon these conceptions and perceptions. The One Being of the World must, indeed, be more and more looked to, as it were, for the explanation, in reality, of the constructs of both the scientific and the religious imagination. What is sought by both is the completion and harmonizing of the different factors and aspects of man's total experience with himself and with his environment. This ontological belief, or postulate, or reasoned conviction—whichever it may be, or by whatever other name one may elect to call it—is as necessary to the particular sciences or to philosophy, as it is to religion. It is as war-rantable in religion as it is in science or philosophy.

The other important fact as to the mode of the procedure of the religious consciousness in its endeavor to teach truth of Reality is its 'anthropomorphizing' character. It is, indeed, customary in discussing the classification of religions and the principles of religious development, to speak of one class as peculiarly 'anthropomorphic.' 'Anthropomorphism' is not infrequently considered to be a somewhat definite stage in the evolution of the religious consciousness. In the more comprehensive, but quite defensible and proper use of all these terms, however, they are applied to every kind and stage of the religious idea. 'Spiritism' constructs its divine beings after the analogy of man's existing knowledge of his own spirit, and projects these constructions into the totem, the fetish, the phenomenon of nature, or physical thing, or into the deceased ancestor. In the shamanism of the Mongolian-Tartar tribes, the nature worship of ancient Egypt, the fetishism of Africa and the South Sea Islanders, the totemism of the Red Skins, and even in the survivals of these lower conceptions and practices found to-day among civilized and Christian, as well as Mohammedan, Brahmanical or Buddhist communities, the process is the same. Polytheism is, of course, distinctly anthropomorphic in its conceptions of the gods. But so is Pantheism. The Atman of Brahmanism can be conceived of and worshiped as a World-Soul only as the result of the personifying process. Of course, the 'personal' God of Theism is anthropomorphically conceived of; He is the construct of imagination and intellect, in a sort of combined effort to satisfy man's esthetical, ethical and more distinctly religious needs.

What, however, is quite too often forgotten is that the positive sciences are all, of necessity, equally anthropomorphic. Science knows the world, and explains the world as a system of interacting and self-like existences. As I have shown<sup>2</sup> by a searching analysis

<sup>2</sup> In my work called 'A Theory of Reality.'

of all the so-called 'categories,' of which the particular sciences find themselves obliged to make use, every conception of these sciences is derived from an experience with self-like activities, and every relation is stated in terms, as though it were between self-like beings. Natural science is through and through anthropomorphic. Indeed, from the psychological point of view, knowing is anthropomorphizing. On this point the Kantian critical philosophy is unanswerable.

But if the metaphysics of physics, and the metaphysics of religion, have their roots in the same psychological process, and stand or fall together when judged by the merits of their psychological genesis and growth, the same thing is not equally true from the ethical and practical points of view. Positivism, or phenomenalism, or agnosticism, in any one of their various forms, does not shock the sentiments and determine practice, to the same extent in science and in religion. A man may, with a certain claim to rationality and a certain satisfaction of his scientific aims, continue in the service of science, undisturbed by either a naïve or a systematic, but agnostic, theory of Reality. If, however, one is convinced that one's conception of the Divine Being is *only* the shadow of one's own fear, or desire, thrown against the background of a wholly unknown and unknowable Reality, then one must either adore one's self, which can cast so substantial a shadow, or one must cease to adore at all. The Object of a truly religious belief and worship must find a place somewhere in the believer's and worshipper's theory of Reality.

Now all this matter, as thus far discussed, concerns only the interest of a psychological investigation into the phenomena of the religious consciousness as ontological. The conclusion is that this form of man's conscious life and conscious, creative activity, is ontological; and that the important features of its ontological aspect are such as characterize the use of imagination and intellect in science and in philosophy, as well as in the so-called 'common-sense' operations of daily life. How far this ontological anthropomorphizing, or constructing of a world of reality as a kind of super-human and yet self-like Being, is rational and critically defensible, psychology can not pronounce. That is a question for philosophy, in its branch of so-called 'Epistemology,' or critical theory of knowledge, to undertake.

One point more, however, deserves more than a passing notice. Both scientific religion—if such a thing there be—and devout science prefer to use somewhat different terms to describe the total attitude of the rational Self toward the religious Object and toward the fundamental entities and laws of the particular sciences. The contrast is more frequently expressed by such terms as 'faith' and 'knowledge.' It might even be said that the goal which intelligence seeks

is a rational faith toward God; but toward the entities and laws of the particular sciences it is certified knowledge at which one should aim. It would be found, on further examination from the psychological point of view, that such a distinction is by no means absolute, even if we confine our attention to the customary opinions and expressions of those who advocate the distinction most strenuously. Such an inquiry, however, involves another set of considerations from that before us at the present time.

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## DISCUSSION.

### SOME POINTS IN MINOR LOGIC.

A RECENT writer in *Science* slips into a curious error in phraseology. He allows himself to speak of a 'superabundance of physicians going hand in hand with a shortage of patients' as being attributed to, etc. But the superabundance of physicians is the same thing as the shortage of patients (looked at from a different point of view), and a thing can not go hand in hand with itself. This is a sort of lapse which is not infrequent—to make the mistake of supposing that 'There are too many physicians for the patients' and 'There are too few patients for the physicians' are two different statements, instead of being two different forms of one and the same statement. The standardization in logic of the phrases 'same or different statement,' 'same or different form of statement,' would conduce very much to clearness in the treatment of equivalent propositions, where it is in general, of course, a question of a change in the figured copula (see 'Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,' article 'Proposition'), instead of, as above, a change of aspect. For instance:

$$(1) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{All } a \text{ is } b, \\ \text{None but } a \text{ is } b, \\ \text{No } a \text{ is } b, \\ \text{All but } a \text{ is } b, \end{array} \right.$$

are all different statements, while

$$(2) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{None but the brave deserve the fair,} \\ \text{All who are not brave do not deserve the fair,} \\ \text{None deserve the fair who are not brave,} \\ \text{All but the brave are undeserving of the fair,} \end{array} \right.$$

are all different forms of one and the same statement. The term