

ever arise that certain representations are *per se* exempt from displacement by simpler and more comprehensive ones, that they are *true*? Or is it perhaps the best conception of the future to imagine something of which one has absolutely no conception?"<sup>13</sup> In the same note Professor Ward concludes his criticism of Principal Rücker as follows: "After all, then, he is only defending a working hypothesis, and one, moreover, that has lost greatly in prestige in the last half century. But if the atomic and other theories of the constitution of matter are but working hypotheses, and hypotheses strictly confined to physical phenomena, there is no justification for a theory which maintains that mechanism is fundamental everywhere and reduces the facts of life and mind to epiphenomena."<sup>14</sup> That the provisional character of its results should be urged against any division of knowledge is to me intelligible only in the case of a too persistent attempt to discredit it. I fail to see how even the Spiritual Monism of Professor Ward's choice can be excepted from the general rule that all knowledge is subject to correction, and that to be convinced of truth is to be open to conviction. I can only believe that his use of such considerations in his argument is the sequel to his misconception of the critical function of philosophy.

After a reperusal of the two editions, guided by the suggestions of Professor Creighton and Professor Ward himself, I see no reason to alter my opinion that 'Naturalism and Agnosticism,' interesting and profitable though it may be, is vitiated by its general attitude to science. I cheerfully testify to the pleasure and instruction the book has afforded me, but, am, nevertheless, prompted to urge that no philosophy of science is sound which does not primarily seek by an analysis of its concepts to understand science on its own grounds. Philosophy may understand science better than science understands itself, but only by holding fast to the conviction of its truth, and including it within a critical system of truth.

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## REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*The Neighbor, the Natural History of Human Contacts.* N. S. SHALER.  
Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1904. Pp. x + 342.

A book by Professor Shaler always promises pleasure as well as profit and this volume is no exception. Indeed, an unusual charm pervades this book. The methods of scientific inquiry are linked with high ethical motives and we can not but realize that it is the fruit of ripe experience,

<sup>13</sup> 'Naturalism and Agnosticism,' second edition, I, p. 307.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 314-315.

the result of a lifetime of noble intercourse with man that is offered us. In these interpretations of human contact, to quote the author, 'the novelty is to be found in the careful study of the effect of tribal institutions and states of mind on the development of the modern commonwealth and the effects of a first contact of individuals on their subsequent relations.' We are given an interesting summary of the author's investigation of the natural history of human contacts and in the end we are assured that we need a complete revision of our social impulses and of our methods of contact with the fellow man. The book is in effect a plea for a deliberate self education in the matter of meeting one's neighbor.

The introductory chapters treat of the nature and extent of man's influence as an individual, as a source of influence on other lives, of the persistence of instinctive motives, to which in the evolution of man have been added the rational group of motives, giving us a mingling of the ancient, primal forms with the higher intellectual motives combining in action. "It is the first object of education and the noblest result of civilizing culture to bring these two groups of mental parts into a fit cooperation, so that they together make the enlarged humanized man." We are next confronted with the phenomenon of a most potent force, animating primitive man, second only to hunger in its intensity, that of anger and hatred. Without the corrective of sympathy, man would have remained a brute, keener witted than his ancestors, but a brute still. The origin and growth of sympathy is traced, beginning with the instinct of parental devotion to the child, through sympathy with the fellow kinsman which was later extended to all members of the common tribe. The nature of the tribal spirit is examined, personal experience being cited as an illustration of how the tribal impulse acts in us and how it can be checked and transformed. The benefits of the tribal motive, its power in binding man to man and preparing the way for the modern commonwealth, are discussed. The problem of uniting diverse races in one state, of reconciling ethnic differences, leads to a consideration of Roman and British methods of government. Here one might be inclined to differ from the author, asking whether British rule, successful as indeed it may seem in regard to the semblance of prosperity and contentment in its dependencies, has been equally satisfactory in respecting the inherent national temper of its subject peoples—whether, to use Mr. Shaler's own phrase, the British, 'who have little sympathy with alien races,' can be successful in fostering and caring for the indigenous motive of a people, subjugated, but still entitled to and desirous of living out their national life in their own way. We come next to the practical problems which our author considers at length—the Hebrew Problem and African Question. "The greatest obstacle to the advance of all races is the inevitable limitation of the sympathy which the ethnic pale imposes." This then is the danger of the tribal spirit. The 'categoric' motive, the desire to label men without treating them as individuals, this is the great evil and therefore such problems have arisen and remain, to make miserable the lives of thousands and paralyze and shrivel our human sympathies. The methods of contact with the neighbor are examined in

detail. Mr. Shaler maintains that this subject has not received the attention it deserves. In spite of psychological study and investigation, we hardly recognize how much the inheritance of our brute methods of intercourse still entails upon us in the way of suspicion and hatred. He points out why we have not been able to throw off these fetters. The struggle to get rid of prejudice is not new. "It is interesting to observe how early the moralists seized upon the evils of tribal hatred as the first of the evils to be cleared away in order to make possible the higher life." The one great teacher who saw most clearly that the ills that beset mankind lie in lack of friendliness to the neighbor of every estate, was Christ. But the religion of Christ has not accomplished its task. Indeed the religious motive has proved ineffective because in its own way it reinforces the tribal spirit. What then in the author's opinion is to take the place of religion to enable man to overcome the ancient impulses? Science married to sympathy, is his answer. A union of modern knowledge with the Christian motive. Unfortunately one finds it difficult to believe such a motive will appeal to any but those who are already humane and enlightened. Religion having in his opinion failed, Mr. Shaler would rely on scientific curiosity reinforced by sympathy as a motive for overcoming racial antipathies. The repulsive traits in our fellow men, from which in consonance with the heredity of tribal instincts we shrink, are sure to become interesting and even fascinating, he thinks, as soon as we learn to look upon them as objects of scientific study. This interest is likely in his opinion to be followed by sympathy. Thus we shall be able to transcend the barriers of prejudice and find to our delight the finer qualities that are hidden behind the unpromising exterior. Thus too a feeling of brotherhood will arise, urging us toward those whom at first we were inclined to spurn.

We can not but ask, however, does not our author exaggerate the possibilities of the scientific interest? Is it likely to influence the generality of men to such an extent? Is not the impartial attitude of scientific inquiry largely the result of temperament and of long training and can it be reproduced in the average man? Will not the same objection hold good here that we must urge against the efficacy of the religious motive and must it not be cited with even greater force against the scientific motive—namely that it appeals only to the few and but slightly affects the many? The average man, we are inclined to think, will not care to hear more about the 'Jew and the nigger,' what he sees on the surface being such as to deter him from desiring to continue his acquaintance any further.

On the other hand, there seems to be no reason why the two motives should be presented as mutually exclusive alternatives. Religion must still continue her divine task of teaching the law of brotherhood, and the new scientific interest may add its influence among those whom it can hope to affect. In either case, it is only the few whom we can expect to reach, but from them as a nucleus, the beneficent contagion can spread outwards, and the teaching of brotherhood to take the place of prejudice can continue to grow, in the course of time may we not trust? to grad-

ually transform man's hatred and persecutions into a new law of sympathy and kindliness. Toward directing men into this new upward tendency the book of Mr. Shaler will be found a most valuable contribution. The exquisite humanity that is reflected from beginning to end from its pages, constitutes an indispensable component of the message which we trust it is destined to bring to a large number of readers.

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*Die Welt als Wille zum Selbst.* Eine philosophische Studie von MAX DRESSLER. Heidelberg, 1904. Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung.

The doctrines advanced in this book may accord with some of the general conclusions of idealistic philosophy, but the author gives no adequate reason for the acceptance of these conclusions. Only those readers will agree with him who have already reached the same position by other means. The presentation is more in the form of a poetical rhapsody than of a philosophical investigation, and emphasizes anew the need of a convincing statement of the grounds for belief in idealism, a statement based on the consideration of the process by which the conclusions are reached.

The author considers successively the abstract object in itself, the abstract subject in itself, art, mysticism and the self. Immediate reality is neither knowledge nor truth, it is only the immediate certainty of being. Truth is the mediated idea of that which appears immediately as thing. The naïve man believes in the certainty of the immediate realities which surround him and does not seek for a truth which transcends these. Scientific reflection finds truth in the material which is behind the phenomena, but its truth is still a thing. Even in the higher form of platonic idealism the thing remains a thing.

Truth, though, is not thing, but self. This truth is the key to mysticism, art and the true philosophy. A false mysticism abstracts from all material reality and considers the self-feeling of the natural subject as its immediate truth. It identifies the individual subject immediately with the whole truth, with the self. True mysticism and art reconcile the immediateness of the thing and of feeling; the truth of the one is to be found only in the other, but this reconciliation itself remains immediate and is based on feeling. Only in philosophy is feeling developed to knowledge, the thing to self, and only in this mediate knowledge is truth. The highest form of this mediate truth is individuation, the principle of which is the means of the will to know. Not being, but knowledge, is the truth of the individual subject.

The world has its whole reality in the relation of this self-realizing knowledge of the whole. The truth of the whole is eternally self-completing knowledge of self. The individuals are the agents in completing this self knowledge, which knows the world as its appearance and self-presentation, and is thus true developed philosophy.

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