# JULES LEQUYER AND THE OPENNESS OF GOD

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Until recently the most prominent defender of the openness of God was Charles Hartshorne. Evangelical thinkers are now defending similar ideas while being careful to distance themselves from the less orthodox dimensions of process theology. An overlooked figure in the debate is Jules Lequyer. Although process thinkers have praised Lequyer as anticipating their views, he may be closer in spirit to the evangelicals because of the foundational nature of his Catholicism. Lequyer's passionate defense of freedom conceived as a creative act as well as the theological implications he drew from this are examined for their relevance to the present discussion of the openness of God.

Jules Lequyer (1814-1862) is a philosopher whose name is little known outside his native Brittany.<sup>1</sup> Reasons for his obscurity are not difficult to find. He published nothing during his lifetime; his writings are mostly incomplete or fragmentary; his work was not widely available until 1924, and his *Œuvres* did not appear until 1952; translations of his writings have either been in the form of excerpts or printed in little known publications.<sup>2</sup> The neglect of Lequyer's work is unfortunate, for he was a gifted writer and an ingenious and resourceful thinker. Charles Renouvier, his close friend, referred to Lequyer as his "master in philosophy" and William James called Lequyer "a French philosopher of genius."<sup>3</sup> The most well-known contemporary philosopher who routinely recognizes Lequyer's contributions is Charles Hartshorne.

Lequyer's primary contributions to philosophy are his reflections on the meaning and ramifications of human freedom. One finds evidence of Lequyer's influence on James. In France, the first to take notice of Lequyer, after Renouvier, were the Existentialists. Jean Wahl and others noted parallels between the philosophies of Lequyer and Kierkegaard. Finally, process philosophers, who can be credited with transmitting Lequyer to an English speaking audience, have remarked on the elements of process philosophy in Lequyer's thinking.<sup>4</sup>

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Lequyer's philosophy can be tapped for its relevance to what Richard Rice and Clark Pinnock call the openness of God. According to this idea, God is qualified by temporal processes, even to the extent of facing a future whose details are not settled in advance. In the words of William Hasker, "God

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is a risk-taker."<sup>5</sup> Lequyer was a devout Catholic, even a mystic, who was aware of the implications of his philosophy of freedom for theology. An enduring aspect of Lequyer's genius is to have written literary masterpieces in which the idea of the openness of God is developed in detail.

## The Openness of God

Before turning to Lequyer's philosophy it will be useful to have a more definite idea of what the phrase "openness of God" means. The openness of God is defined in contrast to those aspects of the classical concept of God that deny God's relativity to temporal processes. According to classical theism, God is wholly simple (without parts), wholly eternal (no temporal aspects), wholly immutable (without change), and wholly impassible (devoid of emotion or passion). Of course, classical theism held other doctrines about God, but this cluster of concepts is that against which the openness of God is contrasted. Here is Rice's summary of the concept of the openness of God:

The central claim of this alternate view is that God's experience of the world is open rather than closed. God's experience does not consist of one timeless intuition. He does not have one eternal perception of all reality, past and future. Instead, He responds to developments and changes in the world as they occur. Accordingly, God is open to new experiences and receives new stimuli. He continuously assimilates new data. God does not have once and for all the entire value of the creaturely world. He acquires the value of creaturely events as they happen, as they come into existence.<sup>6</sup>

In contrast to classical theism, the open view of God claims that God is, in certain respects, not simple, not eternal, not immutable, and not impassible.

Pivotal to the doctrine of the openness of God, if not to its intelligibility, is that the classical ideas about God are not completely mistaken. There are respects in which God is simple, eternal, immutable, and impassible. For example, Rice maintains that the existence and character of God should be considered beyond time and change. To remain true to the Biblical witness, not only must one conceive of God's existence as unchanging, but the divine faithfulness, righteousness, justice, and mercy must also be understood as unchanging. More recently, Hasker makes the same point, albeit in the context of "perfect being theology." According to Hasker,

God changes—not indeed in his essential nature, his love and wisdom and power and faithfulness, but in his thoughts and deeds toward us and the rest of his creation, matching his thought toward the creature with the creature's actual state at the time God thinks of it.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the idea of the openness of God is not that God is not simple, eternal, immutable, and impassible; it is that God is not *wholly* simple, eternal, immutable, and impassible.

A principal reason for believing in the openness of God derives from the belief in human freedom. According to Pinnock, Rice, John Sanders, Hasker, and David Basinger,

God, in grace, grants humans significant freedom to cooperate with or work against God's will for their lives, and he enters into dynamic, give-and-take relationships with us.<sup>8</sup>

When these authors refer to "significant freedom" they mean more than acting voluntarily. They mean freedom as conceived by incompatibilists. In Hasker's words,

an agent is free with respect to a given action at a given time if at that time it is within the agent's power to perform the action and also in the agent's power to refrain from the action.<sup>9</sup>

This sort of freedom involves genuine contingency, and according to the doctrine of the openness of God, human decisions may not turn out as God wants—hence the idea of God as a risk-taker. It is this sort of freedom that God's grace grants to the creatures, at least to the human ones.<sup>10</sup>

A momentous consequence of the idea of the openness of God, drawn by the evangelicals we have mentioned, is that God knows the future as relatively indeterminate so far as human free decisions are concerned. If a person, in making a free decision, faces an open future, a being with perfect knowledge would know this. Classical theists conceived God's knowledge (whether as eternal or as perfect foreknowledge) as a detailed map of all that occurs, past, present, and future. For the classical theist, the appearance of a relatively indeterminate future is merely a function of a limited point of view. From a divine standpoint, there is no uncertainty; God's knowledge is a crystal ball revealing all that will be.

#### Lequyer on Freedom and its Theological Implications

Lequyer adhered to the idea of the openness of God and, like the contemporary exponents of this idea, he emphasized human freedom. His concept of freedom is multifaceted and includes a profound sensitivity to the many dimensions of our lives in which we are not free. Furthermore, his ruminations on how freedom is known are insightful and novel.<sup>11</sup> However, for our purposes it is enough to make two points. First, Lequyer affirmed an incompatibilist idea of freedom. "If it is a question of a free action," he says, "we know that it is really possible not to do it." Second, he identified this sort of freedom with creativity. In deciding among alternatives, in a genuinely free decision, we are the originators of new "modes of being." "To act," says Lequyer, "is to begin," that is to say, to initiate a "train of events." For good reason Jean Grenier said that Lequyer's philosophy "is nothing but a serious meditation on the word *create*."<sup>12</sup>

Lequyer did not hesitate to draw out what he believed to be the theological implications of the concept of freedom as creativity. He did not seriously question the truth of his faith. He believed that the existence of God could not be demonstrated and he questioned the value of theistic proofs as confirmations of faith. Nevertheless, Lequyer's *interpretation* of the doctrines of his faith, drawn from his concept of freedom, place him in direct and conscious defiance of the regnant Catholic tradition.

*The self-creative creature*. If God is the creator, and if freedom is creativity, then God creates beings capable of creating. It is as much a statement of the logic of his position as a declaration of his faith that Lequyer speaks of "God who created me creator of myself."<sup>13</sup> The alternative view, which dominated Catholicism in particular and Christianity generally, is neatly stated by Thomas Aquinas.

[To] create can be the proper action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the more universal is being itself; and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, God.

For Aquinas, any being that God creates participates in the nature of being. Thus, its activity always presupposes being. At most "it causes *being* in some particular subject."<sup>14</sup> For example, Aquinas says that man is the cause, through procreation, of human nature in the child. Updating Aquinas' biology one would say that the parents are the cause of human nature in the child. The parents are not, however, the cause of human nature itself.

Lequyer would not disagree with the specific example Aquinas uses. However, he denies that a creature can only cause *being* in some particular subject. Freedom involves an "absolute initiative" that brings something into being that, prior to the decision, was a mere potentiality. The free act is itself drawn from nonbeing and adds, by its activity, a new determination to being.<sup>15</sup> Aquinas presupposes the very thing that Lequyer rejects, namely, that effects can be reduced to their causes.

Lequyer argues that one does not find within God the reason or the cause for the creature's free activity. The decisions of the creatures bring something into existence—if only the decisions themselves—for which God is not responsible. Lequyer asks, "if God creates us at each instant such as we are, how are our actions really free and indeterminate?"<sup>16</sup> Only a compatibilist concept of freedom, which Aquinas accepts but which Lequyer rejects as inadequate, would save the creature's freedom.

The difference between Lequyer and Aquinas is profound for it involves not only the concept of freedom, but also the concept of omnipotence. Lequyer marvels at the power to create a being capable of acts of creation.

Without a doubt, nothing was difficult for God: God is power itself. But to create a being who was independent of himself, in

the rigorous sense of the term, a really free being, a person, what an undertaking! All his art is brought to bear on the task, and one does not know what feat of strength it takes to achieve the masterpiece.

By creating a self-creative creature God opens the prospects both for greater goods and greater evils, for the creatures may choose evil over good or a lesser good over a greater good. God has created a being "who can will what God does not want, and not will what God wants, that is to say, a new God who can offend the other."<sup>17</sup> Lequyer conceives God to have a power that Aquinas denies of God, that is to say, the power to create beings independent of the divine being.

*Potentiality in God.* Perhaps Lequyer's most radical departure from traditional theology is his claim that creaturely decisions have an effect upon God. If Lequyer is correct then, contrary to classical theism, God is not wholly simple, eternal, immutable, and impassible. Here Lequyer is in agreement with the doctrine of the openness of God.

Aquinas provides the *locus classicus* of traditional theism. He argued that God is *pure act*, with no admixture of potency. It follows that there can be no change in God since potency is the principle whereby things change. If there can be no change in God then God cannot be qualified by time—God is not only immutable but eternal. Furthermore, God's eternity is not a question of everlasting existence but of genuine time-lessness. Another consequence is that God, as the fullness of being itself, is in no way affected by creaturely decisions. Aquinas says that "the creatures are really related to God," because God is their creator, however, "in God there is no real relation to the creatures . . ." since the creatures can have no power over God.<sup>18</sup>

Lequyer's insistence on freedom as creativity will allow him to accept very little of this traditional idea of God. If the creature is itself creative, another god beside God, then its decisions must have an effect on God. Targeting the doctrine of Aquinas, Lequyer says, "The relation of God to the creature is as real as the relation of the creature to God."<sup>19</sup>

By conceiving God as creating creatures who are themselves capable of creating, Lequyer introduces a principle of potency into the divine being. He argues,

The sovereign intelligence would not confuse [the world] with nothingness and, small as it is, it suffices to deprive God of the integrity of all encompassing being. It makes a spot in the absolute that destroys the absolute. This universe compared to immensity is, I concede, but a grain of sand; but this grain of sand has its proper being, and the changes that are brought in it, not having less reality than the things that change, God who sees these things change changes also in regarding them, or he does not perceive them change.

Lequyer's argument for divine potentiality is simple, but it turns on the premise that God creates other creators. A creator brings something new

into existence. God, being perfectly aware of what exists, must be aware of these new realities being brought into existence by the lesser creators. What is brought into existence is brought into existence in time; hence, God is qualified by temporal processes. This is what Lequyer means when he says that there is a "spot on the absolute that destroys the absolute." The absolute that is destroyed is the wholly immutable God of classical theism. Cognizant of the profound departure from traditional thought Lequyer writes, "Terrible prodigy: man deliberates and God waits."<sup>20</sup>

*God's Knowledge.* Lequyer draws a further theological consequence from his philosophy of creative freedom that meets with even greater resistance from traditional theology than the claim that there is a principle of potency in God. According to Lequyer, God cannot know eternally or beforehand what a free creature will do; God has "conjectural" knowledge of future free decisions.

It is instructive to note that the denial of eternal foreknowledge in God does not follow directly from the affirmation that there is a principle of potency in God. If God were nontemporal but internally related to the world, then God's knowledge of the world could be fully actualized but it would still make sense to say that God's knowledge could have been otherwise. This view requires something like Boethius' view that temporal events can be present to God "simultaneously" without coming to exist *for God* successively. Boethius argued that, in a strict sense, an eternal God does not have *fore*knowledge; that is to say, God's cognitive act of knowing does not precede the event it knows.

Lequyer denies the Boethian doctrine. He says with irony, "to be wholly present eternally, in spite of its very fugitive existence is the proper character of a finite being."<sup>21</sup> Lequyer notes that this view of eternal knowledge implies that God knows things as they are present to the divine mind (in eternity), not as they are in themselves (in time). In simplest terms, a wholly eternal God would know that things occur in time but would never know what time it is. The feeling of time's movement must be, from a Boethian perspective, illusory.

Lequyer is also clear that his own view does not entail that God is not omniscient. Aquinas argued convincingly that the inability of God to accomplish the logically impossible is no limit on God's power; it is only a limit on what it makes sense to say God can do. For instance, God cannot make a rectilinear figure that, in the same respect, is both a circle and a square, for a square-circle is not a possible object. Lequyer proposes an analogous argument for omniscience. If a future event exists *as* an unrealized possibility and not as an actuality, then it is no limit on God's knowledge not to know the event as actual.<sup>22</sup>

Clearly, Lequyer does not believe he is committed to the claim that God is ignorant of something. Hartshorne puts the case succinctly:

The point is not that God is first ignorant and then knowing, but rather that first there is no definite fact of the kind to know and then there is the fact . . . "knowing all truth" is entirely compatible with "acquiring new truths" as new realities come into being.<sup>23</sup>

The issue, then, is not whether God is omniscient, but what sort of things exist for God to know. If the future is relatively indeterminate where free acts are concerned, then a *perfect* knower would know it as such. Lequyer says that God knows the past *as* past, the present *as* present, and the future *as* future. The difference between divine and nondivine awareness of real possibilities is that the latter is "limited, obscure and full of errors, whereas God knows them perfectly."<sup>24</sup>

Lequyer takes the argument a step further by saying that his view of omniscience recognizes a knowledge in God that the classical view does not, to wit, a knowledge of unsettled possibilities. He says to the classical theologian:

I do not deny in the least the knowledge of God, which is manifestly infinite. But if you will allow me to say it, it is you, master, who does not take into consideration a reality that I affirm, namely that God knows that some man is at present undecided between two choices, and that neither the one nor the other is absolutely future, but that each of the two is conditionally, imperfectly future.<sup>25</sup>

The master—the classical theologian—could respond that, on his view, God is aware that some man is undecided between two choices. However, what the master cannot concede is that, from God's point of view—which is the true point of view—the man's future is indeterminate. Thus, according to classical theology, the man's future is as fully determinate as his past, although the man, in making his decision, cannot act as though it is fully determinate.

Lequyer's reflections bring us face to face with the question of the nature of time. Many classical theologians, following Boethius, said that God's relation to the temporal world is analogous to the relation of a circle to its center. Just as all of the points on the circumference are equidistant from the center, so each moment of time is present to God.<sup>26</sup> Duns Scotus rejected this analogy on the grounds that "time is not a standing circumference but a flowing one."<sup>27</sup> Lequyer too rejects the circle analogy. He insists that a careful analysis of the movement from potentiality to actuality—from the *may be* to the *is*—shows it to be *essentially* temporal.

The existence of a thing at an instant and at the same time the possibility, not anterior, but *concomitant*, that this thing not exist at the same instant that it exists and is not able not to exist insofar as it exists—this escapes me altogether.<sup>28</sup>

Lequyer uses an analogy. The shadow of the bird perched on a limb does not remain after the bird flies away. Similarly, act and potency, with respect to a single event, do not coexist.

The theological implications that Lequyer draws from his philosophy of freedom aptly demonstrate what he says of himself, to wit, that the "reasoning of the doctors have never had any power over me"<sup>29</sup> Lequyer's most extended treatment of the teachings of the "doctors" is "The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate." The dialogue takes one into the heart of Lequyer's reflections on the relations between divine power, divine knowledge, and human freedom. Renouvier called the dialogue "a dramatic metaphysical masterpiece, probably without equal in any literature." Hartshorne and Reese echo this judgment.<sup>30</sup> This high praise is founded on the imaginativeness, passion, humor, and tight argument with which Lequyer approaches the problems, as well as the ingenuity of Lequyer's own solutions. Although the dialogue remains unfinished it provides a well-rounded view of Lequyer's ideas on the subject of human freedom and divine foreknowledge.

The dialogue is divided into three parts. In the first part, two clerics are made privy, by means of a screen, to God's knowledge of their futures. One of the monks, who is simple and pious, has lived his life in devotion to God. He sees in the vision that he shall succumb to a fault, backslide, and be damned to hell. He is called "The Reprobate." The other monk, whose piety is questionable, sees in the vision that he shall one day repent of his sins and become a resident of heaven. He is called "The Predestinate." The Predestinate takes it upon himself to give hope to his friend by trying to convince him that his friend's damnation, "though certain, will perhaps not happen."<sup>31</sup> The consolation comes in the form of various distinctions, culled from medieval and renaissance philosophers, that attempt to reconcile human freedom and Providence. The Reprobate remains unconvinced, and unconsoled, as the first part of the dialogue ends.

A further ironic twist occurs as the second part of the dialogue begins. In essence, the second part is a dialogue within a dialogue. The Predestinate points to an episode twenty years in the future that is revealed on the screen of God's knowledge. The screen shows that the Reprobate will become someone called "the master" who defends the very ideas that he has just rejected from the mouth of the Predestinate. The master monitors a Socratic exchange between a young divine named Probus and a youth, Caliste, who aspires to be one of the master's pupils. Probus now serves as Lequyer's mouthpiece. He convinces Caliste that truths about future contingents must be expressed in the language of probabilities. Moreover, probabilities are to be understood not merely as a function of our ignorance of the outcomes of events, but may sometimes express a real indeterminacy in the events themselves, as in the case of free acts. It is Probus who argues that truths about future contingents are not settled in advance and hence, that God could no more know the future as though it had already taken place than God could give all of the properties of a circle to a square.

The closing segments of the second part of the dialogue are given over to a discussion between Probus and the master. The master claims that Probus' views are merely a repetition of Aristotle's ideas about future contingents (which, interestingly, the master finds acceptable). However, the master doubts that Probus' views can meet the test of orthodoxy, for it would seem that God would be unable to issue absolute prophecies about the future. Probus defends his views against this objection but the master is given the final word. The master appeals to the mystery of God and accuses Probus of relying too heavily on the imagination in his claims about what God can and cannot do. According to the master, God is aware—without contradiction—of future free acts as indeterminate in relation to us and as determinate in relation to himself.

The third part of the dialogue, which is the briefest, gives voice to the Reprobate's anguish and his inability to accept the classical idea of divine foreknowledge. Lequyer employs ironic similes to ridicule the idea of God that the Predestinate has been defending. The dialogue ends with the two clerics returning to "the dream of human life."<sup>32</sup> Neither has a specific memory of the mutual vision they have had. This memory loss is essential to the coherence of the dialogue, otherwise, the Reprobate could use his knowledge of the future to avoid the damnation which is certain to be his. Satan, who was not privy to the vision, is given the final ironic word. "Let us work," he says, "and perhaps one or the other will reimburse me for my trouble."<sup>33</sup> Of course, this is precise-ly what has been revealed in the vision.

#### The Mechanics of Omniscience

Lequyer's main concern in the dialogue is with what I and others call the *mechanics of omniscience*.<sup>34</sup> That is to say, how is it that God comes to have knowledge, what is the source of divine knowing? Let us call this the *source question*.<sup>35</sup> The source question should be kept distinct from two other questions about God's knowledge. First, can God's knowledge of one's future free acts be reconciled with the claim that those acts are genuinely free? Let us call this the *reconciliation question*. Second, assuming that God has knowledge of truths about what occurs in time, how are those truths—especially ones concerning future contingents to be understood? Let us call this the *semantic question*. Although Lequyer's discussion touches on all of these questions, it is clear that he views the source question as the most fundamental.

*The reconciliation question.* Consider first the reconcilation question. Let *A* be a person's decision which has yet to occur, that is to say, which is in the future. The question of reconciliation is whether the following sentence, labeled R, is true or false:

R. If God knows *A* then *A* is not free.

The Predestinate gives a standard response to this question by distinguishing the *necessity of consequence* and *necessity properly so-called*. The necessity of consequence is necessity as it applies to a sentence; necessity properly so-called is necessity as it applies to *A*, the event itself. The two senses of necessity can be written as follows—using NC and NP as the names of sentences expressing necessity of consequence and necessity properly so-called respectively: NC. Necessarily, "If God knows *A* then *A* will occur." NP. If God knows *A* then *A*'s occurring is necessary.

The necessity expressed in NC applies to the quoted sentence. It is arguable that NC makes explicit what it means to know something. In that case, NC is a special case of the more general truth: Necessarily, "if K knows *A* then *A* will occur," where K is *any* knower. However, NC neither states nor entails that God's knowledge of *A* is necessary or that *A* itself is necessary; the necessity qualifies the conditional as a whole. Thus, it is impossible, using only NC, in conjunction with the statement that God knows *A*, to deduce that *A* is not free. In other words, the following argument is invalid:

Necessarily, "If God knows *A* then *A* will occur." God knows *A*.

Therefore, *A*'s occurring is necessary.

The only conclusion that one may derive from these premises is that *A* will occur, not that *A*'s occurring is necessary.

In order to correctly infer that *A* is not free one requires the much stronger statement of NP, in which the necessity of *A* itself is a consequence of God's knowing it. However, NP *appears* to be false. In other words, the following argument, though it is valid, appears to be unsound:

If God knows *A* then *A*'s occurring is necessary. God knows *A*. Therefore, *A*'s occurring is necessary.

Why should something be necessary merely because God knows it? Put another way, why can't God have knowledge of contingencies, including future ones?

The source question. Can God have knowledge of future contingencies? The argument thus far does not decide the issue. Nothing we have said warrants a definite answer to whether R—"If God knows A then A is not free"—is true or false. However, R might be true if the source of God's knowledge is incompatible with A being free. For this reason the Reprobate is dissatisfied with the Predestinate's appeal to the two sorts of necessity. He suspects that there is an "antecedent necessity" upon which God's knowledge is based which deprives him of his freedom.<sup>36</sup> In short, the Reprobate is asking the source question.

The source question may be asked by adding a qualification to R, call it *X*, which will stand for any explanation for how God comes to have knowledge of *A*. Let us call the new sentence S:

S. If God knows *A* because of *X* then *A* is not free.

Since *X* is a variable ranging over various explanations of God's cognitive state of knowing *A*, *S* will be true or false depending on whether *X* 

is compatible or incompatible with *A*'s being free. It is important to note that *X* must be an explanation for God's *cognitive state of knowing A*. In other words, it is not enough to say that God knows *A* because God is omniscient. The "because" in S is not the "because" of definition but the "because" of explanation.

Alfred Freddoso argues that the commitment of traditional Christian thinkers to the doctrine of God's providential control of the world prevented them from conceiving the reconciliation question simply as a matter of showing human freedom and mere precognition to be compatible.<sup>37</sup> Christians not only believe that God has perfect knowledge of the world, they also believe that God arranges the world perfectly in accordance with the divine plan. Moreover, if God is to have control of the world, then God's knowledge of the world cannot occur, as it were, by accident. Ordinarily it is taken as an article of faith by Christians that God is *infallibly omniscient*; that is to say, God believes all and only true propositions in any world in which God exists. However, being infallibly omniscient may be a necessary condition of being God, but it is not sufficient. An infallibly omniscient being who had no other divine property would hardly qualify as God. Lequyer agrees with these points, and he too is concerned to provide a robust doctrine of divine providence.

The problem for the Christian thinker, of course, is to save God's providential control of the world without denying human freedom, which, as Lequyer argues, is the basis of morality and human dignity. Alternately, the Christian must save human freedom without denying God's providence. In Lequyer's attempt to address this problem, three interrelated questions appear and reappear in the dialogue.

(1) Who or what brings it about that a particular free decision is made?

(2) Is a choice between two or more alternatives such that, given the identical antecedent conditions for the choice, the choice that was made is not the only choice that could have been made?(3) Does God know something because it happens or does it

happen because God knows it?

The answer to the first question, as far as Lequyer is concerned, is that it is the agent himself or herself who is responsible for the free decision. In the opening stages of the dialogue, the Predestinate correctly identifies the source of the Reprobate's despair. He despairs because he believes that his salvation no longer depends on himself.<sup>38</sup> Lequyer is also clear about the answer to the second question—freedom requires an open future.

Lequyer is no less clear about the answer to the third question. Indeed, he is disarmingly straightforward. Lequyer maintains that God knows what happens because it happens, it does not happen because God knows it. Here at last is Lequyer's answer to the source question. His account, based on an analogy with human perception, would seem to be the simplest account of the mechanics of omniscience. The knowledge relation in God is in principle no different than it is for the creatures. Moreover, Lequyer's account clearly preserves the freedom of the creatures. Indeed, this is Lequyer's reason for adopting it.

Unfortunately, there are at least three problems with the simple explanation of God's knowledge, as far as traditional theism is concerned. First, it requires that the divine life is qualified by temporal processes. A related concern was that God, to be God, must be in all respects immutable, that is to say, unchangeable. But if the occurrences in the world bring about a change in God's cognitive states, in God's knowledge, then God cannot be immutable in all respects. Finally, the claim that God knows things because they happen poses a problem for divine providence. How can a God who must, so to speak, wait on the world's events to occur before knowing them be in control of those events?

In order to vouchsafe the perfection of God, most traditional theologians argued that God is eternal and completely immutable. These ideas, coupled with the idea that God's will is efficacious in creation, provided a strong basis for divine providence. However, the thrust of Lequyer's argument is that the only accounts of the mechanics of omniscience—of answers to the source question—that are consistent with this concept of God also jeopardize the freedom of the creatures. Consider Aquinas. In keeping with his denial that there is any real relation in God to the creatures, he maintained that things occur because God knows them. It is true that Aquinas often used perceptual metaphors for God's knowledge suggesting that God knows things occur because they occur. However, he explicity says, "the knowledge of God is the cause of all things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to the things made by his art."<sup>39</sup>

In the dialogue, Lequyer explores Aquinas' theory as it occurs in the writings of the Thomistic scholar Jacques Bossuet. The Reprobate concedes that Aquinas' views give prescience "a solid basis." On the other hand, Aquinas' view violates Lequyer's requirement that a free action is an action brought about by the one whose decision it is. Late in the first part of the dialogue the Reprobate says to the Predestinate:

You have to understand that passing from the vulgar notion of God Almighty to the scientific notion of God All-Doing is hard work for me. I was so accustomed to thinking that God does not do everything since man does something!<sup>40</sup>

The irony in the Reprobate's statement is vintage Lequyer. Aquinas' "scientific" notion of "God All-Doing" destroys human freedom.

An account of the mechanics of omniscience that Lequyer does not discuss directly, either in the dialogue or elsewhere in his writing, but which has received a great deal of attention in recent years is Luis de Molina's theory of middle knowledge. Molina attributed three sorts of knowledge to God: (I) *natural knowledge*: knowledge of all possible objects—along with their necessary relations—to which divine power extends; (II) *free knowledge*: knowledge of the objects that have been actualized by the divine will; and (III) *middle knowledge*: knowledge of what

any free creature would do under any set of circumstances.<sup>41</sup> The sort of freedom that Molina attributes to the creatures is the libertarian freedom accepted by Lequyer. Moreover, a middle knowledge proposition is not a statement about what a free creature *is likely to do* in a given situation, but simply a statement of what the free creature *would in fact do*. If God has middle knowledge of what a possible free creature would do under any set of circumstances and also places the creature in those circumstances, God knows infallibly what the creature will freely do. Molina's theory is designed with the traditional restrictions in mind. That is to say, Molina's God is eternal and wholly immutable. Furthermore, God's providential control of the world is not in doubt.

The closest that Lequyer comes in the dialogue to discussing middle knowledge is in the Predestinate's use of Bossuet's arguments. The Predestinate quotes Bossuet directly: "God makes us such as we would be ourselves if we were able to be of ourselves . . ."<sup>42</sup> Bossuet's view is that God creates us in such a way that we make the decisions we *would make* if we had libertarian freedom. This presupposes that God has middle knowledge, knowledge of what any free creature would do. The difference between Bossuet and Molina is that in Bossuet's theory God uses middle knowledge to know what decisions to bring about in the creatures, whereas in Molina's system God uses middle knowledge to know what decisions the creatures will bring about by themselves. Bossuet's theory denies Lequyer's first requirement whereas Molina's view apparently preserves it.

Lequyer rejects Bossuet's idea as incoherent. He has the Reprobate ask rhetorically, "Does God bring it about that we do precisely what we would do if we did inconceivable things that we would do if the absurd were realized?"<sup>43</sup> The required condition of existing apart from God is an impossibility. Thus, it would be impossible for God to create us such as we would be if we could exist apart from God. The impossibility would also infect God's knowledge. God could not have knowledge of an impossibility.

It is difficult to imagine that Lequyer would be any less dissatisfied with Molina's solution than he was with Bossuet's. It is true that Molina, like Lequyer, denies that God brings about the creature's decisions. However, unlike Lequyer, Molina does not believe that the truths of propositions about what a free creature would do are brought about by the creature. God is said to have middle knowledge prior to the creature's existence. Indeed, for Molina, God has middle knowledge of a myriad of possible creatures who are never born. Nor are these truths brought about by God; Molina says that "middle knowledge is indeed in God before any free act of His will . . . "<sup>44</sup> Clearly, the truth about what the free creature would do is determined by neither God nor the creature.

If Molina concedes that the truth of a proposition about what a free creature *would do* is not determined by the creature, he may insist nevertheless that the truth of a proposition about what a creature *will do* is determined by the creature. In this way Molina could meet Lequyer's requirement that the agent him or herself is responsible for the decision in question. Can Molina also meet Lequyer's requirement for a free decision that the agent could have chosen otherwise? Molina believed so, but it is difficult to see how.

To say that a free decision could have been otherwise is plausibly construed as the idea that there are antithetical but equally possible worlds in which an agent makes contrary decisions in the self-same circumstances. The possibility in question must be more than mere logical consistency, for it must be possible for the agent, by his or her decision, to bring either possible world into being, to make it actual. Suppose an agent (*S*) in a given circumstance (*C*) makes a decision (*A*). Let us call this possible world number 1, symbolized PW<sub>1</sub>.

 $PW_1$ : *S* is in *C* and chooses *A*.

By hypothesis, PW<sub>1</sub> is the actual world. Now consider a second possible world, PW<sub>2</sub>, which is such that, up to and including S's being in C, PW<sub>2</sub> is identical to PW<sub>1</sub>. What distinguishes PW<sub>2</sub> and PW<sub>1</sub> is that S chooses *not*-A in PW<sub>2</sub>. Hence, PW<sub>2</sub> is defined as follows:

PW<sub>2</sub>: *S* is in *C* and chooses *not*-*A*.

If S's decision for or against A is to be free in the sense accepted by both Lequyer and Molina, then both PW<sub>1</sub> and PW<sub>2</sub> must be possible. That is to say, while PW<sub>1</sub> is the actual world, PW<sub>2</sub> could have been the actual world.

It is a fair question whether Molina's principles permit these conditions. Molina's God knows that  $PW_1$  is the actual world because God created *S* in *C* and because God has middle knowledge—God knows that if *S* were in *C*, *S* would choose *A*. This same middle knowledge, however, prevents God from creating (and hence, knowing *as actual*)  $PW_2$ . God's knowledge of  $PW_2$  is restricted to God's natural knowledge. That is to say, God knows that there is *no logical impossibility* involved in asserting that *S* is in *C* and that *S* chooses *not*-*A*. Thus,  $PW_2$  is indeed a possible world but not in any sense that would preserve *S*'s freedom. Given God's middle knowledge and his decision to place *S* in *C*,  $PW_1$  is the only world that is really possible.

*Prophecy and Providence.* For all of the difficulties that Thomistic and Molinistic accounts of the mechanics of omniscience pose for human freedom, they have the advantage of providing a basis for absolute prophecy and for a robust doctrine of divine providence. Aquinas' God has providential control of the world because he is the primary cause of all that happens. Molina's God can control which world becomes actual by consulting his middle knowledge. A serious problem with Lequyer's God, so far as the classical theologians are concerned, is that he may be surprised or even thwarted in his plans by the caprice of human freedom. How can a God who must wait upon human decisions to know what they are going to be issue absolute prophecies or guide history in a providential way?

Lequyer takes these questions quite seriously if only because he had no desire to contradict his church's doctrines. This alone is enough to show that Lequyer has as much or more in common with the evangelical defenders of the openness of God than with Hartshorne's process theology. Unlike the evangelical philosophers, Hartshorne is not interested in defending the idea of Biblical prophecy. In the dialogue, the master challenges Probus to explain how his view of God can avoid these problems. "Let us see," he says, "if with all your evasions you will evade God." The master specifically mentions Jesus' forecast that Peter would deny him and his prediction that Judas would betray him.<sup>45</sup> If Lequyer is correct in denying that God knows free decisions in advance then how would such absolute prophecies be possible?

The outline of Lequyer's response to these criticisms is evident from the discussion of the dialogue. Unfortunately there is a major lacuna in the text so that we do not have Lequyer's fully developed answer to the criticisms. Nevertheless, Lequyer left clues, in the form of notes and citations scribbled in the margins, as to the direction his thought was taking.<sup>46</sup> Combining these notes with the arguments that are developed in the dialogue one can piece together Lequyer's ideas about prophecy and providence.

Three strands of thought are woven together in Lequyer's theory. First, if one takes prophecy seriously, one must account for both absolute prophecies and conditional prophecies. A conditional prophecy is a prediction of what will (or will not) occur depending on how humans respond to God's commands. Lequyer—through Probus—mentions the example of God sparing the Ninevites after they heeded Jonah's warnings. The citations found in Lequyer's marginal notes indicate that he had carefully examined the Bible and found other examples of conditional prophecies. The importance of conditional prophecies is that they presuppose human freedom. God punishes or rewards depending upon how the individuals to whom the prophecy is addressed freely respond to the warning. Lequyer seems to be positioning himself to argue that classical accounts of the mechanics of omniscience, because they compromise human freedom, undermine conditional prophecies.

Promising though this line of reasoning is, it remains undeveloped in the dialogue. Instead, Lequyer focuses upon the idea that God knows in unerring detail the necessary consequences of decisions that, in their origins, are contingent. These consequences, Lequyer argues, are the objects of absolute prophecies. For example, he says that Judas' betrayal was already consummated in his heart when Jesus said "One of you will betray me."<sup>47</sup>

Lequyer insists that we are prone to considering human decisions in isolation from the context in which they are made. We fail to appreciate, in Lequyer's metaphor, the shadow that the present casts upon the future.<sup>48</sup> However, every decision has its effects and we are often not aware of what these effects will be, for the smallest of decisions can have the greatest effects.

What do we know of that which is open or of that which is closed for us in the future for each of our acts, and I speak even of the least of them? No more than I know if this movement of my hand transmits a movement, and what movement, to the extremities of Asia. How our own being escapes us, especially as it expands more and more!<sup>49</sup>

However, God has perfect knowledge of the consequences of human decisions and can therefore issue prophecies that, from a human perspective, predict the future in surprising detail.

Lequyer presses the argument further by observing that God must know the extent to which we have shaped our own characters by the decisions we have made. Lequyer says that we should admire the man who, because he has developed a good character, is above temptation more than we admire the man who must exert a mighty effort to overcome the effects of his own poorly developed character.<sup>50</sup> In any particular case, God knows what is and what is not within one's power to do. A lifetime of bad habits, for example, can make further unwise decisions inevitable.

The final strand of Lequyer's reasoning is to remind us that God, as well as humans, has a hand in the fulfillment of prophecies. By acting, or refusing to act in certain ways, God may guarantee the fulfillment of an absolute prophecy. This is how Lequyer interprets the prophecy of Peter's denial. Peter proclaims that he would not desert Jesus in his hour of need. But Jesus saw into Peter's heart and realized that there was more pride than faith in his declaration of loyalty. On this basis, Jesus predicted that Peter would deny him. Lequyer asks, "so that Peter infallibly fall into this predicted fault, [did it not suffice] that at the moment of peril God refused to rescue him?"<sup>51</sup> In Lequyer's view, Peter's denials were the inevitable result of Peter's character and God's withholding of divine aid at the critical moment.

Lequyer's emphasis on the extent of God's foreknowledge of the consequences of free decisions, coupled with his reminder of God's active role in fulfilling absolute prophecies, are the primary elements whereby he attempted to retain an orthodox doctrine of providence. Lequyer's intentions were clear. According to Grenier, Lequyer was "greatly scandalized" by an argument for the incompatibility of providence and free will that he read in Bergier's *Dictionnaire de Théologie.*<sup>52</sup> Lequyer quoted Bergier as maintaining that, if humans have free will,

God would continually be obliged to change his decrees and form completely contrary ones, because he would encounter obstacles that he would not have foreseen.

Lequyer scornfully refers to this argument as "the foolish words of Bergier."<sup>53</sup> Apparently he meant more than that it is foolish to conceive of an overextended deity; Lequyer believed it is foolish to suppose that human freedom *entails* that God would continually have to revise his plans in light of unforeseen contingencies.

Lequyer does not develop his theory of providence any further in the dialogue. However, he gives the question of providence an imaginative

twist in *Abel and Abel*, a work he called a "biblical narrative." Abel and Abel are identical twins who are tested as to their responses to God arbitrarily favoring one over the other. Lequyer imagines three possible outcomes to the test. In the first, the chosen Abel is puffed up with pride while his brother is jealous and angry. In the second, the chosen Abel refuses his election out of concern for his brother. In the third, the Abel who was not chosen rejoices in his brother's good fortune. Whatever the outcome, the brothers discover that God's favor is based upon their responses to the test. Lequyer says that the "Book of God" is a stone engraved thus: "Your name is: What you were in the test."<sup>54</sup> Only in the last two scenarios are the Abels triumphant and their destinies secured. Xavier Tilliette summarizes the parable this way: "One is not born predestined, or damned, one becomes it."<sup>55</sup>

According to one of Lequyer's close friends, Abel and Abel was his "most beloved work."<sup>56</sup> Thus one is tempted to interpret the dialogue in light of the parable. While the Predestinate and the Reprobate are not identical twins, their responses to the tableau of God's foreknowledge is closest to the responses of the Abels in the first scenario. The Predestinate can barely conceal his delight at his turn of fortune and the Reprobate is full of bitterness and jealousy. Be this as it may, the arguments of the dialogue are not superseded in the parable.<sup>57</sup> Something like the hypothesis of Probus must be true if the story of the Abels is to make sense. In other words, the future must be open, even for God, if the Abels are to have any hand in their own destinies. The only doctrine of providence compatible with this condition is one in which it is God's plan that the Abels decide their own fates. Thus, Abel and Abel does not shed additional light on how Lequyer proposed to keep the future open enough to accommodate free will but closed enough to insure divine providence.

The semantic question. Lequyer's effort to develop an alternative to the classical concept of God's omniscience would be incomplete if he did not address the question of the truth value of statements pertaining to future contingents. We have already noted Lequyer's answer to the objection that his God is ignorant of the future. According to Lequyer, future contingents are not possible objects of divine cognition, and thus, it is no limit on God not to know them. God is perfectly aware, perfectly omniscient, of the extent to which the future is open.

Lequyer's argument is clever but it does not prove that his God is not ignorant. Here is a simple counter-argument: An omniscient being is a being who knows the truth value of every statement. That is to say, for *any* statement, an omniscient being would know whether it is true or false. Consider the following two statements about a given future contingent, *A*:

A will occur. A will not occur.

If these statements are contradictory, then one must be true and the other must be false. However, Lequyer's God does not know which of these statements is true. Therefore, Lequyer's God cannot be omniscient.

Lequyer's answer to this argument follows Aristotle's reasoning. He abandons the principle of excluded middle where future contingents are concerned. Bivalent logic recognizes only two truth values, true and false. In standard bivalent logic, the principle of excluded middle states that, for any proposition p, the schema "p or *not*-p" is true.<sup>58</sup> Lequyer argues that, where contingencies are concerned, excluded middle is true or false depending on the tense of p.

Between contingent past things and contingent things to come there is this difference: Of two contradictory affirmations concerning contingent past things, one is true, the other false; but of two contradictory affirmations concerning contingent things to come, neither the one nor the other is true, both are false.<sup>59</sup>

Suppose that *A* is a contingent event. Then, on Lequyer's view, the statement,

A occurred or A did not occur.

is true since "*A* occurred" and "*A* did not occur" have opposite truth values—one is true and one is false. However, the statement,

A will occur or A will not occur.

is false since "*A* will occur" and "*A* will not occur" are both false. Since it is no problem to suppose that God would know these things, there would be no meaningful sense in which God is ignorant.


Lequyer's semantics for future tense propositions represents a departure from traditional logic, although it should not, for this reason alone, be discounted. Lequyer is not the first or the last to suggest qualifications on the principle of excluded middle. Lequyer took the idea from Aristotle. In our day, excluded middle has been questioned on a number of independent fronts, from quantum mechanics to fuzzy logic.<sup>60</sup> Nevertheless, denying the principle of excluded middle considerably complicates logical formalisms and has, in addition, certain counterintuitive consequences. For example, if "A occurred" is true, when uttered after the occurrence of A, then shouldn't "A will occur" be true when uttered before the occurrence of A? Thus, W. V. O. Quine advocates that "predictions are true or false when uttered, no matter how illfounded and capricious."<sup>61</sup>

Lequyer acknowledges the counter-intuitive consequences of his view and suggests a number of ways to interpret ordinary language so as to avoid them.<sup>62</sup> In any event, it is certain that Lequyer's view is not alone in being counter-intuitive. According to the traditional view, the following statements can both be true (when uttered before the occurrence of *A*).

A will occur. A may not occur. Lequyer would say that if the first statement is true the second must be false. Lequyer is in good company. Aristotle would agree. So would Charles Dickens who has Scrooge ask the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come, "Are these the shadows of the things that Will be, or are they shadows of the things that May be, only?"<sup>63</sup> These examples demonstrate that there is no consensus on how statements about future contingents are to be interpreted. As Hartshorne says, "People commonly hesitate, in this and many other matters, between two or more meanings ....."<sup>64</sup>

We will not here attempt to further adjudicate the debate between Lequyer and classical thinkers. However, it is worth noting that Hartshorne developed a semantics for future contingent statements that meets the spirit of Lequyer's theology without abandoning the principle of excluded middle. Hartshorne suggests that we conceive definiteness and indefiniteness as predicates for future moments of process. A future moment is definite or indefinite depending on whether causal conditions necessitate, exclude, or permit the moment in question. This allows one to put statements about the future into three categories, corresponding to the formally exhaustive triad, all/none/some. Either (a) all causal possibilities include *A* (definitely *A*), (b) no causal possibilities include *A* (definitely not *A*), or (c) *A* is included in some but not all causal possibilities (indefinite with respect to *A*). As Hartshorne notes, this view does not require the sacrifice of the principle of excluded middle. "The truth of one of the three (a, b, or c) is the falsity of the other two."<sup>65</sup>

George Shields has shown how Hartshorne's semantics can be represented using a logical square of opposition similar to Aristotle's traditional square.<sup>66</sup>



Square of Opposition for Future Tense Propositions (following Hartshorne's semantics)

Lequyer calls "*A* will occur" and "*A* will not occur" contradictories and claims that, where *A* is a future contingent, both are false. Hartshorne's alternative is to identify the two propositions as contraries. By definition, contraries are such that both may be false. Hence, Hartshorne's semantics allows one to say, with Lequyer, that "*A* will occur" and "*A* will not occur" may both be false without thereby denying the principle of excluded middle.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, Hartshorne's semantics agrees with Lequyer's view (and, interestingly, with Aquinas) that "To know things before they happen is to know them in their causes."<sup>68</sup>

## Lequyer's Legacy

Lequyer summarizes the case for his view of God eloquently, through the character of Probus:

The All-Powerful, the divine poet, in no way brings about the appearance on the world scene of characters who come to fill a roll decided for them in advance—these imitations of life are the games of human genius. Who could make of the work of God so frivolous and so base an idea! God made man free and capable himself of resisting even him. When he acts on us, he has said, it is with a great respect.<sup>69</sup>

The classical theologians, intent on insuring God's knowledge of the future, unwittingly destroyed the basis upon which a person's decisions can be called his or her own. Moreover, as Lequyer suggests at the close of the first part of the dialogue, the puppet master view of God also seems to make God responsible for the evil that occurs in the world. In fairness, one must say that the classical theologians believed that they could dodge this unwelcome consequence. Lequyer's theology, on the other hand, obviates the need for auxiliary explanations concerning the goodness of God. The problems of theodicy are bad enough without compounding them by making God the sole decision maker.

Lequyer did not live long enough to complete his work. His life came to a tragic end when he drowned off the coast of Brittany. His was a spirit troubled by lost love confused with dreams of glory. Nevertheless, his writing provides glimpses of a resourceful and active mind. Moreover, he developed his ideas with great literary power and imaginativeness. As Wahl said, Lequyer failed to achieve a fully developed system, but "not without leaving in the philosophical sky some brief vivid traces."<sup>70</sup>

The "traces" examined in this paper demonstrate that he anticipated and expanded upon the idea of the openness of God. He forcefully articulated objections to the classical concept of God. Moreover, he clearly saw the problems that the open view of God must address to be a tenable option for Christian belief and he struggled to show how to meet the objections to it. With Lequyer's solution to the ancient problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom is born not only a critique of traditional arguments but new ways of conceiving the divine life and its relation to the flux of time.

Unfortunately, very few contemporary discussions of philosophical theology examine Lequyer's writings, much less mention his name. Thus, more than a hundred years after his death, his legacy has yet to be determined. Somehow it is fitting, in light of his philosophy, that the future should be open even in this respect.

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#### NOTES

1. In Quintin, the place of his birth, a street and a psychiatric facility are name for him. In Plérin, where he lived much of his life, an attractive tombstone marks his grave (erected by his friends, Renouvier and Madam Lando), and a school, Collège Jules Lequier, is named for him. Lequyer's name is often spelled "Lequier," although "Lequyer" is the official orthography and is found on both the plaque marking his birthplace and his tombstone.

2. In 1865 Renouvier published, at his own expense, 120 copies of a selection of Lequyer's writings and distributed them to his and Lequyer's friends. Louis Dugas reissued this edition with a biographical notice in 1924. The book was published again twenty-eight years later as part of Jean Grenier's edition of Lequyer's *Ceuvres complètes* (Neuchatel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1952), and again in 1993 with a new introduction by André Clair. All quotations in this paper are from Grenier's edition (hereafter OC). For translations of Lequyer's writings see the following: C. Hartshorne and W. L. Reese, *Philosophers Speak of God* (University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 227-230; H. H. Brimmer, "Jules Lequier's 'The Hornbeam Leaf'," *Philosophy in Context*, 3 (1974), pp. 94-100; H. H. Brimmer, *Jules Lequier and Process Philosophy* (Doctoral Dissertation, Emory University, 1975), pp. 293-459. My translation of *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate* is presently being considered for publication.

3. C. Renouvier, *Traité de psychologie rationnelle* (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1912), p. 371; C. Renouvier, *Derniers Entretiens* (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1930), p. 64; R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, volume II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1936), p. 663; W. James, *The Principles of Psychology*, volume II, edited by F. Burkhardt, and F. Bowers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 1176.

4. For Lequyer's influence on James see D. W. Viney, "William James on Free Will: The French Connection," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 14,1 (October 1997): 29-52; for the comparison of Kierkegaard and Lequyer there are three sources: OC, ix-xi, J. Wahl, *Études Kierkegaardiennes*, 3e édition, (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1967), pp. 430-432, and D. W. Viney, "Faith as a Creative Act," *Faith & Creativity: Essays in Honor of Eugene H. Peters*, edited by G. Nordgulen and G. Shields, (St. Louis, Missouri: CBP Press, 1987), pp. 165-179; for Lequyer and process thought see H. H. Brimmer, op. cit. (1975).

5. C. Pinnock, R. Rice, J. Sanders, W. Hasker, and D. Basinger, *The Openness of God* (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1994), p. 151.

6. R. Rice, *God's Foreknowledge and Man's Free Will* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Bethany House, 1985), p. 25-26. Originally published in 1980 as *The Openness of God.* 

7. Pinnock et al., p. 133. Those familiar with Hartshorne's philosophy will recognize one of the central pillars of his neoclassical theism, the difference between existence and actuality. See Hartshorne's *The Divine Relativity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 87.

8. Pinnock et al., p. 7

9. Ibid., pp. 136-137.

10. One of the watersheds between process theology and the evangelical defenders of the openness of God is that process thinkers believe that every genuine individual, not alone human ones, possesses some degree, however, slight, of creativity. Lequyer sides with the evangelicals when he says, "The contingent does not exist in nature except in the sphere of action of human power" (OC, 475).

11. For Lequyer's views on freedom see D. W. Viney, "William James on Free Will: The French Connection" op. cit..

12. OC, pp. 192, 14, 43, and 15; J. Grenier, *La Philosophie de Jules Lequier*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1936), p. 210.

13. OC, p. 70.

14. T. Aquinas, Introduction to Thomas Aquinas, edited by A. C. Pegis, (New York: Modern Library, 1945), pp. 243-244.

15. OC, p. 429.

16. Ibid., p. 334.

17. Ibid., pp. 70 and 71.

18. T. Aquinas, *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, Book One: God*, translated by A. C. Pegis, (Garden City, New York: Image, 1955), pp. 101, 136; Aquinas (1945) ibid., p. 113.

19. OC, p. 73.

20. Ibid., pp. 74 and 71.

21. Ibid., p. 125

22. Ibid., pp. 171, 405.

23. C. Hartshorne, *Creativity in American Philosophy*, (Albany: State University of New York, 1984), p. 60.

24. OČ, pp. 123 and 205.

25. Ibid., p. 205.

26. Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, translation by R. Green, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), p. 115; Aquinas (1955), ibid., p. 219.

27. Delmas Lewis, "Eternity, Time and Tenselessness," Faith and Philosophy 5/1 (January 1988), p. 88.

28. OC, p. 111.

29. Ibid., p. 13.

30. C. Renouvier, *Philosophie Analytique de L'Historie*, v. 4 (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1897), p. 428; Hartshorne and Reese (1953), op. cit., p. 228.

31. OC, p. 96.

32. Ibid., p. 224.

33. Ibid., p. 226.

34. D. W. Viney, "God Only Knows? Hartshorne and the Mechanics of Omniscience," *Hartshorne, Process Philosophy and Theology*, edited by R. Kane and S. Phillips, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); G. Shields, "Some Recent Philosophers and the Problem of Future Contingents," *The Midwest Quarterly*, 34/ 3 (Spring 1993), p. 298.

35. The source question as I have characterized it should be distinguished from the source question as characterized by Alfred Freddoso. Freddoso expresses the question this way: "How is it that God knows future contingents with certainty, that is, what is the source of and explanation for the fact that God knows future contingents with certainty?" (*Luis de Molina*  *On Divine Foreknowledge*, Part IV of the *Concordia*, translated and with an Introduction and Notes by A. J. Freddoso, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 1). Lequyer would reject Freddoso's way of putting the question, for it presupposes that God knows future contingents with certainty. Lequyer, faithful though he was to Catholicism, did not make that assumption.

36. OC, p. 95. Lequyer does not consider whether the fixity of the past might provide a reason to believe that R is true. Briefly, the argument is that God's foreknowing of *A* is in *A*'s past and, as such, is necessary in the way past events are necessary; but if God's knowledge of *A* is necessary, then *A* must itself be necessary. This argument, with different variations, is what John Martin Fischer calls "the basic argument" and it has been the focus of a great deal of discussion since Nelson Pike gave it more rigorous expression in 1965. Fischer's anthology, *God*, *Foreknowledge and Freedom* (Stanford University Press, 1989), includes Pike's original article and numerous responses to it. For Pike's retrospective on the debate see his "A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge Problem," *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*, 33, 3 (1993), pp. 129-164.

37. Molina, op. cit., p. 2.

38. OC, p. 85.

39. Aquinas (1955) op. cit., p. 222; Aquinas (1945) op. cit., p. 142; compare Freddoso's remarks in *Molina*, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

40. OC, p. 152.

41. Molina, op. cit.; Anthony Kenny, *The God of the Philosophers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 62f. Current debates about Molinism turn on such questions as whether counter-factuals of freedom exist (see W. Hasker, *God, Time, and Knowledge*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) or whether, if they exist, there are enough to vouchsafe infallible foreknowledge (see L. Zagzebski, *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 141-152). For a recent discussion and bibliography see W. Hasker, "Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited," *Faith and Philosophy*, 12/2 (April 1995), pp. 223-236.

42. OC, p. 152.

- 43. Ibid., p. 164.
- 44. Molina, op. cit., p. 248.
- 45. OC, p. 206.
- 46. Ibid., pp. 212-213.
- 47. Ibid., p. 207.
- 48. Ibid., p. 210.
- 49. Ibid.
- 50. Ibid., p. 211.
- 51. Ibid., p. 206.
- 52. Grenier, op. cit., p. 178.
- 53. OC, p. 212.

54. Ibid., p. 276. *Abel and Abel* was published once again in 1991 alongside the most extensive biography of Lequyer. See *Abel et Abel*, suivi d'une "Notice Biographique de Jules Lequyer" par Prosper Hémon, édition de G. Pyguillem, (Combas: Edition de l'Ecat, 1991).

55. Xavier Tilliette, Jules Lequier ou le Tourment de la Liberté (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), p. 66.

56. Grenier, op. cit., p. 272. This testimony comes from a poem by Agathe Lando published after Lequyer's death. The poem caused a month long controversy in the local press. It was published anonymously, as though it came from Lequyer's own pen, and it left the impression that Lequyer had committed suicide.

57. Tilliette believes that the dialogue only presents Lequyer's logical or rational point of view, whereas *Abel and Abel* reveals "a religious Lequier" whose ideas render the hypotheses of Probus superflous (see Tilliette, op. cit., p. 66). I do not find any evidence that Lequyer abandoned or relaxed his religious point of view in arguing his ideas rationally.

58. The assumption of bivalence should be distinguished from the principle of excluded middle. In standard bivalent logic, "p or *not-p*" is a tautology. However, if we assume three or more truth values, then "p or *not-p*" need not always be true. Lequyer's view is unusual in that he accepts bivalence but denies that excluded middle is a tautology.

59. OC, p. 194.

60. W. V. O. Quine, *Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 55-57.

61. Quine, op. cit., p. 74.

62. OC, pp. 196-199.

63. Charles Dickens, *A Christmas Carol* (New York: James H. Heineman, 1967), p. 128.

64. C. Hartshorne, "The Meaning of 'Is Going to Be'," *Mind* 74/293 (January 1965), p. 128.

65. C. Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method* (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1970), p. 135.

66. G. W. Shields, "Fate and Logic: Cahn on Hartshorne Revisited," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 26/3 (1988) and Shields (1993), op. cit.

67. It is of some historical interest that Hartshorne originally adopted a position not unlike Lequyer's, giving up the principle of excluded middle for future contingent propositions (see Viney 1989). However, by 1941 he had adopted the position explained here. For a critical discussion of Hartshorne's views see W. L. Craig, "Process Theology's Denial of Divine Foreknowledge," *Process Studies*, 16/3 (Fall 1987), pp. 198-202 and D. W. Viney, "Does Omniscience Imply Foreknowledge? Craig on Hartshorne," *Process Studies*, 18/1 (Spring 1989), pp. 30-37.

68. OC, p. 207.

69. OC, p. 212.

70. J. Wahl (ed.), Jules Lequier (Paris: Editions des Trois Collines, 1948), p. 12.