

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, by **Robert Merrihew Adams**. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. xi and 433. \$55.00 (Cloth)

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In the Introduction to Robert Adams' *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* the reader is told that the work "is not an introduction to Leibniz's philosophy, nor even a fully comprehensive account of his metaphysics. It is a piece of research into three areas related to the three attributes mentioned in the title" (p.4). But it doesn't take the reader long to realize that this book represents one of those few occasions where what is delivered is far more than what is advertised. Divided into three sections and composed of thirteen total chapters, the book covers the topics mentioned in its title, but in doing so takes the reader deep into the labyrinths of nearly every aspect of Leibnizian metaphysics currently of interest to Leibniz scholars. The book represents more than twenty years of work on Leibniz by Adams. But there is far more here than mere reprints of previously published material. Fewer than half of the chapters spring from previously published material, and most of those that do so have been significantly reworked.

What is most impressive about this work, beyond its wide scope, is the comprehensive treatment of the topics discussed. While working through each topic Adams brings to bear not only the published Leibnizian texts but a generous supply of still unpublished material as well (as a quick glance at the references to the Bodemann volumes<sup>1</sup> and Vorausedition<sup>2</sup> makes evident). In addition, the reader is made aware of the competing current positions taken on controversial topics, and is supplied with careful and balanced arguments for the positions Adams defends. All of this is presented in a form that demonstrates a historical sensitivity that makes the most of opportunities to inform the reader of related currents of thought in the seventeenth century, both by way of "traditional" early Modern figures and early modern scholastics. Leibniz scholars will be especially grateful for two features of the book: a comprehensive index of Leibniz texts cited and an extensive topical index. There are the occasional mistakes or oversights. For example, Adams sometimes will give a reference to the unpublished Vorausedition version of a text without referring the reader to a published version of the same text (the page 11 reference to VE 302, which is the same piece as found in Grua pp.268ff.<sup>3</sup>), or give an errant reference to

a medieval source (page 96n should refer to St. Thomas' *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book III, c.70 instead of c.71). But in a book with this much scholarly apparatus, such problems are no doubt impossible to purge completely. As noted, Adams provides the reader with an incredibly rich store of information in each section. Such comprehensive treatments of these topics is surely a storehouse for those interested in Leibniz's views on these topics. But the comprehensiveness, combined with Adams' willingness to take stands for often controversial positions, makes it just as sure to stir up a great deal of discussion among Leibniz scholars. The temptation in reviewing this book is to try to say something about all of the areas where one might disagree with Adams. But the fact is that, because of the richness of his treatment, useful critical discussion of any of the topics he discusses requires nearly as much space as Adams devotes to it in the text. As a result, I will provide a brief overview of the main themes covered in the text and finish with a few critical remarks on some of the material in chapter 1.

In section I, Adams discusses Leibniz's views on the problems of contingency and freedom. Several features of Leibniz's philosophical system put necessitarian pressures on Leibniz, a position that he was unwilling to accept (or so he says); Leibniz expended significant energy resisting these pressures. The result was a series of theories of contingency that Leibniz endorses at one time or another throughout his life. Just what these views are and when he holds them are issues of current dispute. In chapter 1, a reworked version of Adams' landmark paper, "Leibniz's Theories of Contingency,"<sup>4</sup> Adams offers one interpretation of what the various theories are, and the order in which Leibniz held them. I will comment on this in more detail below. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the relationship between the theories of contingency and Leibniz's logic and metaphysics of modality. In these chapters (reworkings of his "Predication, Truth, and Trans-World Identity in Leibniz"<sup>5</sup>), Adams offers an account of how we might begin to square Leibniz's theories of contingency with his concept containment theory of truth and the view that each substance contains a "complete concept." The latter issue is closely tied to another receiving significant attention in the third chapter, namely, Leibniz's views on miracles. The issue is what miracles might amount to on Leibniz's view, since he seems to say that all states of a substance are contained in its complete concept and that each state of a substance follows causally from its prior state. It is difficult to see how Leibniz might then be able to distinguish miraculous states of a substance from naturally occurring states. Two main interpretations of Leibniz's views on miracles are now current. According to this first, miraculous states of a substance are not causally determined by prior states of the substance, and it is this that makes them miraculous. According to the second view, largely championed by Adams and defended again in the book, miraculous states are causally determined by prior states, and what makes them miraculous is the fact that these states cannot be predicted by created minds.

Section II of the book, encompassing chapters 4 through 8, treats certain issues in Leibniz's philosophical theology and certain arguments for

theism. Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of the nature of divine perfections and the relation between divine perfections and properties and powers of created substances. Included here is a lengthy discussion of Leibniz's supposed adoption of something very much like a Spinozistic conception of God around 1676, a conclusion Adams resists. The remaining four chapters in the section are built around Leibniz's development of the Ontological argument. Chapter 5 examines Leibniz's rejection of earlier versions of the argument due to their failure to prove the possibility of divine existence, and his own versions of the proof that aim to remedy this deficiency. But Leibniz's own proofs rely on a number of supporting premises. Chapter 6 takes up Leibniz's views on the relationship between essence and existence. If one thinks that God's existence is demonstrable from considerations of the divine essence, one must be able to provide some general account of the nature of essences, existence, and the relation between the two. Here Adams discusses Leibniz's attempt to provide such an account. The final two chapters of the section discuss Leibniz's specific argument that the divine essence is in fact possible. Chapter 7 addresses Leibniz's argument for the compossibility of all perfections and thus of the divine nature. Adams argues that this proof ultimately fails. The discussion of chapter 8 then goes on to make the case that Leibniz thought that we are permitted to make a presumption in favor of the possibility of God's existence, even if the possibility cannot be demonstrated by the sorts of arguments raised in chapter 7. This discussion takes the reader through Leibniz's discussions of what can be reasonably "presumed" in matters of jurisprudence and theology and how Leibniz uses these claims in arguing that we should accept the premise that God's existence is possible.

Section III, encompassing chapters nine through thirteen, is by far the longest, making up half of the book's length. Here there is a long discussion of Leibniz's views on the nature of substances, bodies, and our perceptions of both. It is well known that Leibniz (at least the mature Leibniz) thinks that bodies are in some sense phenomenal entities. One of the many difficulties with this position is what Leibniz takes to be the relation between real substances (monads in the later years) on the one hand, and the bodies that we perceive on the other hand. Many have held that there are two contradictory accounts in Leibniz, one holding that bodies are mere phenomena that are *grounded in* (in some sense) the reality of monadic substances, a second holding that bodies *are* aggregates of monads. Chapter 9 is a detailed discussion of these two views, the claim of many interpreters that these are inconsistent, and Adams' argument that the two are compatible and represent, as he puts it, "one analysis in two or three layers" (p.261).

The next three chapters (9 through 12) of the book discuss various aspects of Leibniz's adoption, from 1679 onward, of the Aristotelian terminology of form and matter as a way of explicating his doctrine of substance. Chapter 10 is a discussion of what we are to make of Leibniz's claim that there are "corporeal substances." Specifically, Adams takes up the following questions: What does someone who believes that bodies are (mere) phenomena understand by the term "corporeal sub-

stance"? And, what is it that makes something a true corporeal substance as opposed to an aggregate on this account? Chapter 11, an English version of an article recently published by Adams in German<sup>6</sup>, discusses the development of the form/matter conception of substance in Leibniz's middle years (1686-1704). This chapter and the next are in large measure a reaction to the view most powerfully defended by Daniel Garber, that these middle years were dominated by a theory of substance far less phenomenalistic than the one of the later years. Adams argues that the transition from the middle "Aristotelian" years to the late "monadological" years does not reflect a major transition in Leibniz's thought, but that the same basic principles are in force in both periods. Chapter 12 takes up Leibniz's use of the concept of "primary matter." Three important items are discussed in some detail in this chapter: the compatibility of Leibniz's metaphysics with various theories concerning the Eucharist, the necessity of a "passive element" in all created substances, and Leibniz's arguments against the possibility of "thinking matter." As chapters 9 and 10 discuss the relationship between substances and bodies, chapter 13 discusses the relationship between intramonadic forces and the forces studied in physics. Just as Leibniz was convinced that the (phenomenal) properties of (phenomenal) bodies are "well-founded" in the (real) properties of (real) monads, so he was convinced that the (phenomenal) forces of the (phenomenal) physical world are "well-founded" in the (real) intramonadic forces. Thus it is not without reason that Leibniz calls the monadic forces "primitive" and the physical forces "derivative."

While Adams makes strong cases for the various interpretive positions he defends, nevertheless, many questions still remain. To provide a sample of the sort of difficulties I have in mind, I will take a brief look at some of the issues raised in chapter 1. Adams' position is that Leibniz's views on contingency can be broken down into two main accounts (as indicated by the division of the chapter into the parts "Leibniz's First Main Solution" and "Leibniz's Second Main Solution") although we are never told in short form exactly what these two theories *are*. The first part of the chapter takes up, we are told, Leibniz's first main solution. Here we find a discussion of the following items: the so-called "possible-in-its own-nature" and "hypothetical necessity" accounts of contingency, the nature of choice, and Leibniz's use of the phrase "moral necessity." In the second part of the chapter we are supposed to get the second main solution. In this section we find a discussion of the following items: contingency of the "bestness" of the best possible world, the infinite analysis account of contingency, Leibniz's use of the phrase "inclination without necessitation" in the context of free choice, the nature of the contingency of God's choice of the best, and Leibniz's distinction between "essential" and "existential" propositions. The problem here is that many of the items discussed under the heading "solution one" and many of the items discussed under the heading "solution two" seem for all the world like good candidates for a "solution" to the contingency problem on their own. What is it that is supposed to tie together these various elements into unified "solutions" to

the contingency problem? We are not told. As a result, one is left to wonder where the boundaries of a "solution" are to be drawn here. However, one might surmise, as many do, that we should take one main theory to revolve around the fact that for Leibniz, each possible world is self-consistent (possible-in-its-own-nature) even if (maybe) inconsistent with the existence of God, combined with the fact that which contingent propositions are true is dependent upon the hypothesis of the divine free choice to create one world over the others. And we should take the second theory to revolve around Leibniz's later view that the contingency of propositions depends on the mode of containment of the predicate in the subject. Those predicates that can be demonstrated from the subject via an analysis of a finite number of steps are necessary propositions, those that can only be demonstrated via an infinite number of steps are contingent.

Beyond this bit of unclarity, there are more serious issues raised in the detailed discussion of each "solution." One of Leibniz's worries throughout his career is that certain doctrines he endorsed might appear to entail that this world is necessary. Specifically, he thought one might argue that since God chooses to actualize the best world, and this world is the best, it seems that this world must necessarily be chosen by God. Since, however, Leibniz thought that this world's existence is in fact contingent, he argued that it must either be the case that: i) it is contingent that God creates the best, or ii) it is contingent that this world is the best. Call the "contingency-of-creating-the-best" option the *Contingency of Creating* option, or CC; and call the "contingency-of-the-best" option the *Contingency of Bestness* option, or CB. Some (myself included) think that the early Leibniz inclines toward accepting CB and rejecting CC but later reverses course, either adopting CC and rejecting CB, or rejecting both. And it is worth noting that there are serious difficulties for Leibniz in accepting either CC or CB. It is hard to see what sense can be made out of CB', and it is hard to see how someone who takes Leibniz's strong line on the applicability of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to choice can hold CC. Still Adams defends the claim that Leibniz' strategy throughout his career is more often than not to affirm CB and deny CC.

What evidence is there that Leibniz still endorses CB after the early years? Adams cites three texts to make his case here. The first two date no later than the early 1690's (the latest passage might be no later than 1691), a fact unlikely to trouble those who take endorsement of CB to be early.<sup>8</sup> The third, however, comes from some notes that were written in preparation for writing the *Theodicy*, which were composed no earlier than 1706, a late date indeed. Adams quotes this texts as follows:

It is the same argument: God wills necessarily the work that is most worthy of his wisdom, I say that he wills it, but not necessarily, because although this work is most worthy, that is not a necessary truth. It is true that this proposition: God wills the work most worthy of him, is necessary. But it is not true that he wills it necessarily. For this proposition: This work is the most worthy, is not a necessary truth; it is indemonstrable, contingent, a truth of fact.

It seems that this represents a clear endorsement of CB. But when one continues to read beyond the portion quoted by Adams, things become much less clear:

I believe that one can say generally that this proposition is necessary: His will will follow the greatest inclination. In the same way, it is necessary that future contingents would be determined, but it is not true that they would be determined necessarily, which is to say that they are only contingent. [Interestingly, the text changes from French to Latin here] "A is B" is a necessary proposition. But it is not therefore true that "A is necessarily B." It is a necessary proposition that "God wills the better." But does it follow that "God necessarily wills what is better"? I reply that it can be applied necessarily to the copula, but not to the contents in the copula. God is necessarily he who wills the best. But he is not the one who necessarily wills the best. For he wills freely. In this same manner one can say: "A man wills to walk." This proposition is necessarily contingent but the contingent does not on this account become necessary.

It is not clear what one is to make of the part quoted by Adams when one considers the remainder. But it appears that whatever confidence Leibniz has in the French portion of the passage that "God wills the best" is necessary, it is fading when, I surmise, he later sits down and finishes the notes in Latin. Further, as Adams notes, when Leibniz finalizes his thoughts on this passage in the *Theodicy* (§237) he explicitly denies the necessity of the proposition "God wills of necessity the work most worthy of his wisdom." At best, it seems that Leibniz toyed with the thought of endorsing CB at this point, but there is no clear evidence he endorsed it.

Adams also provides evidence that Leibniz on occasion rejects CC, though he admits that the evidence here is mixed. Still, even if Leibniz wants to accept CC, Adams claims that certain features of his philosophy commit him to rejecting it. I will look at each of these claims in turn. Adams begins by citing the evidence which indicates Leibniz's view on CC. It is interesting that one of the passages he cites of Leibniz favoring CC doesn't clearly make the point that he claims it makes. Adams says that in Grua 301 Leibniz, "denies flatly that the proposition 'God chooses the best,' or 'God wills the best,' can be demonstrated" (p.37). One might take this to indicate the contingency of these propositions. But this text, by most interpreter's lights, is written before the period when Leibniz casts contingency in terms of infinite analysis, as Adams himself agrees a few pages later (p.41)!<sup>9</sup> As a result, it is not clear that indemonstrability is supposed to amount to contingency for Leibniz at this date.

The best evidence for the rejection of CC comes, he says, in the same texts that endorse CB. But we have seen that only the (two) texts that were written before the early 1690's give a good indication that Leibniz considered endorsing CB. Furthermore, it is worth noting that only the

earlier of these two texts<sup>10</sup> contains a clear rejection of CC.

Adams cites two additional pieces of textual evidence in favor of the rejection of CC here, but both seem to me to fail to make his case. The first (a text from the early-1680's) comes from Grua 297 where Adams (p.38), quotes Leibniz as saying, "From God's essence or supreme perfection it follows, certainly and, so to speak, by a necessary implication, that God chooses the best." But when taken in context the passage seems to say just the opposite of what Adams claims, holding explicitly that whatever sort of necessity we attach to God's choosing the best it is *not* "absolute" necessity. Here is the line in context:

There is a necessity of the consequence (*necessitas consequentiae*) when something follows from another by a necessary implication (*necessaria consequentia*). There is an absolute necessity when the contrary of something implies a contradiction. From God's essence or supreme perfection it follows, certainly and, so to speak, by a necessary implication (*necessaria consequentia*), that God chooses the best. Still, God chooses the best freely because in the best there is nothing absolutely necessary, otherwise its contrary would imply a contradiction, and only the best would be possible, all others then being impossible, contrary to the hypothesis.

Once again, this is a difficult passage. There are two sorts of necessity here, "absolute necessity," corresponding to the definition Leibniz always gives for metaphysical necessity (that the denial entails a contradiction), and necessity of the consequence. It seems clear that whatever "necessity of the consequence" means here, Leibniz does not, in this passage, argue that it is metaphysically necessary that God will the best.

The final bit of evidence that Adams adduces to make a case that Leibniz rejects CC comes from those texts in which Leibniz affirms the impossibility of God's willing evil. Adams argues that if it is impossible for God to do evil and doing a lesser good is evil, then it is necessary that God choose the best. Despite Adams' efforts to show that Leibniz's principles should lead him from the impossibility of doing evil to the necessity of God's doing the best, he gives no evidence that Leibniz ever saw or endorsed such a connection. But isn't Leibniz committed to such a necessitarian conclusion, even if he failed to realize it? I am inclined to think not, for reasons I will mention below.

Adams says that Leibniz appears to try to dampen the necessitarian implications for God's choice by appealing to something called "moral necessity." He thinks this appeal only serves to bolster his (Adams') case in the end. Moral necessity, he argues earlier in the book, is a deontic term for Leibniz, meaning: what one must do in order to be counted good (p.22). The only relevance moral necessity can have in discussions of necessitarianism, says Adams, is this: God's acts are morally necessary because they are found in the complete concept of a perfectly good being, but the indemonstrability of the claim that a perfectly good agent would choose this world is grounded in the fact that it is indemonstrable that this world is best; just the view Adams ascribes to Leibniz. The

result is that moral necessity is just not relevant to the difficulty here. But if this is right, why does Leibniz so often raise moral necessity as a way out of these necessitarian pressures in later texts? No doubt, Leibniz does use the phrase "moral necessity" in a deontic way in texts on ethics and jurisprudence, as Adams notes (pp.21-2), but I have argued that he uses it as a distinctly modal term in his later writings. Such a modal usage was by no means novel in the seventeenth century. I (elsewhere) and others have shown that the application of the modal conception of moral necessity to free choice was a commonplace amongst many Jesuits (especially those in or from Spain) in the mid- and late seventeenth century. Now this does not prove Leibniz used the term as they did, but there is some very good evidence that he did.

The concept of moral necessity in seventeenth century scholasticism springs from, among other things, disputes about the relationship between the intellect and will. It is a commonplace of Thomistic metaphysics at the time to say that both intellect and will are involved in choice and that each has certain essential tendencies or inclinations. The intellect is inclined towards truth (most strongly in the case of first principles, where the intellect necessarily assents) while the will is (merely) inclined towards created or "participated" goods, but necessitated in the presence of the highest good: God seen in his essence. The questions for these Jesuits were: a) when God chooses amongst worlds, is he necessitated to choose the best (if there is one)? and, b) when creatures choose amongst various perceived goods, are they necessitated to choose the perceived best? One school of thought held that choice is necessitated in both cases, but only in certain (weak) sense. The will can only be metaphysically necessitated to love the highest good, but nonetheless, given its natural inclination toward the (perceived) good, it might still infallibly choose that which is perceived best, even if that choice would not be *metaphysically* necessary (given the nature of the will and the finitely good object of choice) for it to so choose. They called this infallibility a "moral necessity," and Leibniz surely uses the term in just this way at least after 1700.<sup>11</sup>

The following text from the *Theodicy* makes it clear that Leibniz cannot always be using the phrase "moral necessity" to express the deontic meaning Adams insists it expresses:

It is therefore only necessary to understand fully some distinctions, such as that I have frequently urged between the necessary and the certain, and between metaphysical necessity and moral necessity. It is the same with possibility and impossibility, since the event whose opposite is contingent, even as that whose opposite is impossible, is necessary. . . . It may be said in a certain sense that it is necessary that the blessed should not sin; that the devils and the damned should sin; that God himself should choose the best; that man should follow the course which all things considered attracts him most. But this necessity is not opposed to contingency; it is not of the kind called logical, geometrical or metaphysical, whose opposite implies a contradiction.(emphasis mine)<sup>12</sup>



Surely "moral necessity" in this context cannot have the deontic meaning since here the sinning of the devils is morally necessary!<sup>13</sup> The sort of necessity referred to in this text is that which requires the will to choose in accordance with the perceived best. That is, the term is being used in quite the same way that it was being used by certain Jesuits in this period.

It is clear then why, later in his life, after adopting this way of using moral necessity, one would expect to find Leibniz affirming CC. God, like us, is only morally necessitated to choose the perceived best, except in those cases where the perceived best is the highest good, God seen in his essence. That is why, over and over (as Adams notes), one finds Leibniz saying that God's willing to love *himself* is necessary, but that his choice of any world is *not* necessary (or at least is "only" morally necessary). Once he saw a way of maintaining that God could do the act to which he was most inclined without fail, without being metaphysically necessitated to do so, he could deny that it was metaphysically necessary that God choose the best, while nevertheless affirming divine freedom. Once we adopt this framework, the possible-in-its-own-nature account of free choice begins to make a bit more sense. Why? Because if the will is never metaphysically necessitated to choose finite goods, one only needs a plurality of (possible) options for choice to be free. Thus, there is no surprise that we see the possible-in-its-own-nature account appearing throughout Leibniz's career. But note, it is an account of the contingency of *choice* that is at issue in these texts.

When we come to infinite analysis, another view Leibniz seems to endorse from his middle years through the end of his career, something different is going on. Here the issue is not the contingency of choice, but the contingency of propositions in light of the concept containment theory of truth. And this is why considerations of infinite analysis are rarely (if ever) brought into play when Leibniz discusses why choice is free. Adams cites what seems to be counter-examples to this claim in Grua 480 and 343.<sup>14</sup> But in neither of these passages does Leibniz make an explicit connection between free choice and infinite analysis. In Grua 480 Leibniz does say that an infinite number of motives come to play in every free choice, but he does not say that it is in virtue of this that the free choice cannot be demonstrated and is thus contingent. He merely claims a) that an infinite number of motives enter into choice and b) that we are free because our doing otherwise does not entail a contradiction. No clear connection between the two is made in the text between these two claims. In Grua 343, Leibniz again says that God requires an infinite number of reasons to judge this universe best, and that this explains why we can never "understand" or "comprehend" that this world is best. But there is simply no connection made to the necessity of this world or God's choice of this world in the passage.

Thus, it appears that a number of the apparent difficulties for Leibniz's theories of contingency can be resolved if we see him as endorsing the modal conception of moral necessity found in seventeenth century Jesuit scholasticism. Viewed in this way, a number of Leibnizian problems concerning the necessity of this world or the necessity of God's choice of this world seem less vexing than they would be

on other readings such as the one suggested by Adams here.

Hopefully this brief discussion of what amounts to a mere nine pages of Adams texts provides the reader a sense for the complexity of the issues discussed and the depth of the treatment that Adams gives them. No doubt this book will be a required reference point for any discussion of the issues it treats for a long time to come. And this will make the book a requisite fixture on the shelves of all of those who are interested in Leibniz's work or these important seventeenth century topics.<sup>15</sup>

## NOTES

1. The two volumes, *Die Leibniz Handschriften* and *Der Briefwechsel der Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz* are catalogues of the Leibniz manuscripts.
2. The Vorausedition texts are pre-publication editions of forthcoming volumes of the Academy edition of Leibniz's works. They contain numerous texts previously unpublished.
3. All references to "Grua" refer to the two volume work, *Textes Inédits*, Gaston Grua (ed.), New York: Garland, 1985.
4. In *Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, Michael Hooker (ed.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982.
5. In *How Things Are*, James Bogen and James F. McGuire (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985.
6. "Form und Materie bei Leibniz: die mittleren Jahre," *Studia Leibnitiana*, Volume 25, 1993.
7. At least if one is inclined to think about such matters in terms of an S5 modal system. Although, it is interesting to note that Adams argues that Leibniz's modal semantics seems incompatible with S5 (on pages 46-50).
8. Though some, like Rescher, have proposed an earlier date (1686) for the change (see, *Philosophy of Leibniz*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp.69ff.)
9. The editors of the Vorausedition date the piece 1680-4 while most think that the infinite analysis view of contingency is not in place until after 1686. For a recent example of someone who dates Leibniz's coming to the infinite analysis account in 1686 see Robert Sleigh's *Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their Correspondence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, p.88.
10. Grua 305f, from the period 1689-90.
11. There are a number of these moral necessitarians in the seventeenth century. For more detail on them and their views see Sven Knebel's "Necessitas Moralis ad Optimum: Zum historischen Hintergrund der Wahl der besten aller möglichen Welten", *Studia Leibnitiana*, Volume 23, number 1, 1991 and "Necessitas moralis ad optimum. Die Früheste scholastische Absage an den Optimismus," *Theologie und Philosophie*, Heft 4, 1992, pp.514-535.
12. *Theodicy* §282.
13. It is clear from other texts as well that it is this modal sense of moral necessity Leibniz that has in mind. For more on this see my "Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Volume LV, number 1, March 1995, pp.75-108.
14. Adams p.35.
15. Special thanks are due to Jan Cover and Eric Watkins for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review.